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Dollar Ratios

My friend’s dad joked that kids are the most destructive force in the universe.

For stocks, the most powerful (and sometimes destructive) force is the movement of the dollar. The Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan both meet today so it could soar or swoon. Since the buck holds sway, we should all of us in the capital markets from investors to issuers understand how and why.

Stocks react to the dollar because they’re opposite sides of the ledger. Debits and credits.  If money buys less, a debit, then what preserves value (stocks) increases in price, a credit.  So a “strong dollar” means more value resides in the currency and less in stocks.  A weak dollar is the opposite, and value transfers at higher risk into stocks to offset diminishing purchasing power – the quantity of things money buys.

It’s about ratios.  In the past, countries would scrounge around for a gob of gold. Then they could issue paper currency at a ratio. Played poker?  Chips are an asset-backed currency. Pay money, get chips.  Want more chips? Pay more money. The ratio is always the same so chips have fixed value and supply varies with the number of players.

Not so with money.  If Europe has spent more than it makes, its debts depressing the economy (like credit card debt constrains discretionary income), the European Central Bank can manufacture more money – bump up the chip stack without paying.  Remember our ratios?  Increase the supply of euros and prices of risk assets that preserve value, like stocks and bonds, rise to compensate.

Follow that reasoning. When money declines in value, stuff costs more. When stuff costs more, the revenues of the businesses supplying the stuff increase.  And since consumption – buying stuff – is the core way we count “economic growth” today, economies grow when prices rise.

Get it?  Yeah, it’s balderdash that selling the same unit at a higher price is growth. But that’s how governments now measure it. All central banks including the Federal Reserve thus have inflation targets. They are trying to create growth, without which most governments go broke.

Think I’m making this up?  Follow the math. You can’t print a batch of Benjamins. That’s counterfeiting. So how do central banks create money?  They issue money against the most widely available commodity in the world today:  Debt.

When you buy dinner on a credit card, the bank doesn’t reach into somebody’s savings account to pay the restaurant. It creates money. Pay the balance and that money vanishes.

Remember the ratios? Burn money and there are fewer dollars, which means the dollar rises in value, and prices fall, and economies contract (not really but that’s how we count now), and stocks swoon. Create money and the opposite occurs – everything rises.

Investor-relations people, you know the term “multiple-expansion?” It describes stocks that cost more without any change to underlying fundamentals.  This is a product of money-creation. In effect, central banks are trying to induce us all to pay more for things than they’re worth.  Value investment is the opposite: buying at a discount.

For perspective, JP Morgan is leveraged about 8 to 1.  Citigroup, about 7 to 1.  The Fed? With capital of $40 billion and liabilities of $4.54 trillion, its leverage ratio is 113 to 1.  Where money before depended on assets, like gold, now it’s backed by liabilities – debt.

The European Central Bank is buying eighty billion euros of debt a month to create money. What happens to debt? Its value skyrockets and interest rates plunge. It’s the opposite in the real world. You’re in hock, you pay the vig.  Bigger debts, more cost.

Japan is way beyond that, financing the government by directly trading yen for government debt, and now it’s buying exchange-traded funds, shifting to equities with infinite supply (ETFs can theoretically create as many shares as demand requires – but inevitably leverage increases). Japan is even contemplating paying banks and businesses to borrow. Why? Because debt creates money and more money keeps prices from falling.

The effort fails because consumers buy more when prices fall and less when they rise. So the very attempt to drive economic growth is in fact undermining it. Plus, the soundness of our currencies today depends on the capacity of governments to pay on their debts.

Summarizing, the world is indebted so it needs money. Central banks supply money by exchanging it for debt.  Creating money paradoxically reduces the capacity of consumers to buy things because prices rise. So they have to go into debt.  The cycle repeats like two parties munching opposite ends of a strand of spaghetti.

Back to stocks. When they vary inversely with the dollar it’s contraction or expansion of multiples, not real growth.  And that means consumers are losing purchasing power.  Since consumption drives economies now, it inevitably leads to slower growth.

And that’s what the planet’s got. Circular reasoning obfuscates facts.  The solution is a stable currency so all of us can understand fair value for stocks and everything else. But we’ll start with identifying the destructive force – and it’s not the kids.

Dollars and Sense

I looked back at what we wrote Dec 2, 2008. It was two weeks before Madoff (pronounced “made off” we’d observed bemusedly) became synonymous with fraud. Markets were approaching ramming speed into the Mar 2009 financial-crisis nadir.

In that environment on this date then, we introduced you to Ronin Capital, a Chicago proprietary trader. It had exploded through the equity data we were tracking. Today it’s a top-twenty proprietary trader in equities but not the runway model.

Yet it’s thriving. It has 350 employees. Its regulatory filings show $9.5 billion of assets including financial instruments valued at $6.4 billion, with government securities comprising $4.5 billion, derivatives about $1.1 billion, and equities about $700 million.

As the Federal Reserve contemplates a rate-increase in two weeks, Ronin Capital is a microcosm for the whole market. Its asset-mix describes what we see behaviorally in your trading, clients: Leveraged assets, dollars shifting from equity trading to derivatives, producing declining volumes and paradoxically rising prices. In a word, arbitrage.

The Fed Funds rate is the daily cost at which banks with reserves at the Fed loan them to each other.  The Fed last raised it June 29, 2006 to 5.25%, marking a pre-crisis zenith. As the housing market trembled, the Fed backpedaled to 4.25% by December 2007. On Dec 16, 2008 the Fed cut to 0.00%-0.25%, where it remains.

Since the Fed began tracking these rates following departure from the gold standard in 1971, the previous low was 1% in June 2003 as the economy was trudging up from the 9/11 swale. The high was 20% (overnight!) in May 1981.  It’s averaged about 5%.

Now for almost ten years – the life of the benchmark US Treasury – there has been no rate-increase. Since 2008, it’s been close to free for big banks to loan each other money. Backing up to Nov 30, 2006, the Fed’s balance sheet showed bank reserves at $8.9 billion, lower than (but statistically similar to) $11.2 billion at Nov 29, 1996. But at Nov 27, 2015, the Fed held $2.6 trillion of bank reserves, an increase of 29,000%.

Lest you seethe, this money was manufactured by the Fed and paid to banks that bought government debt and our mortgages.  It didn’t exist outside the Fed.

The construction of the financial instruments held by Ronin Capital describes how these polices have affected market activity.  First, the pillar of the asset base is government debt, the most abundant security in the world (a commodity – something available everywhere – cannot be the safest asset, by the way).  Governments need buyers for debt so rules manufacture a market. All the big banks hold gobs of government debt.

Second, Ronin holds equity swaps, equity options, options on futures, and currency forward contracts which collectively are 34% greater than underlying equity assets. We infer that Ronin makes money by leveraging into short-term directional trades in options and currencies. It’s worked well. It did in real estate too ten years ago, until mortgage-backed derivatives devalued as appreciation in the underlying asset, houses, stalled.

Ronin Capital, big banks, derivatives, currencies, equities and interest rates are interlaced. When money lacks inherent worth, speculation increases. Government debt is today’s real estate market underpinning massive leverage in today’s mortgage-backed securities, the sea of derivatives delivering short-term arbitrage profits.

To see the potential Fed rate increase Dec 16 as but a step toward normalization is to misunderstand the foundation of capital today. Raising rates to 0.25%-0.50% is good. But it’s at least 29,005% different from raising rates to 5.25% in 2006.

You don’t have to grasp all the mechanics, IR professionals. You do have to understand that if fundamentals have been marginalized by arbitrage the past seven years, wait till the calculus in arbitrage changes.  It’s happening already. We saw a steep drop in shorting the past two weeks. Sounds good, right? But it means borrowing is tightening.

Don’t blame Ronin Capital for adapting.  In fact, forget blame, though it’s apparent where it lies. Let’s instead think about the implication for our task in the equity market. It’s about to get a lot more interesting, and not because of fundamentals.

The good news is that it’s never been more vital to measure your market structure and report facts to management. This is when IR careers are made.

Relativity and Dollars

How do you prove relativity?

When Einstein proffered the preposterous suggestion that all motion is relative including time, people clearly had not yet seen Usain Bolt. Or what happens to stocks after options-expirations when the spread between the dollar and equity indexes is at a relative post-crisis zenith.

Let me rephrase that.

As you know if you get analytics from us, we warned more than a week ago that a reset loomed in equities. Forget the pillars on which we lean – Behavior and Sentiment. Yes, Sentiment was vastly neutral. Behavior showed weak investment and declining speculation –signs of dying demand – all the way back in mid-August.

Let’s talk about the dollar – as I’m wont to do.

There is a prevailing sense in markets that stocks are down because earnings are bad. No doubt that contributes. But it’s like saying your car stopped moving because the engine died, when a glance earlier at the fuel gauge on empty would have offered a transcendent and predictive indicator.

Stocks are down because money long ago looked a data abounding around us. From Europe clinging together through printed Euros, to steadily falling GDP indicators in the US and China, to the workforce-participation line in US employment data nose-down like it is when economies are contracting not recovering, there were signs, much the way a piercing shriek follows when you accidentally press the panic button on your car’s key fob, that stuff didn’t look great.

We know institutional money didn’t wake up yesterday, rub its eyes, and go, “Shazzam! Earnings are going to be bad!” (more…)

Stocks, dollars and Newtonian physics

Isaac Newton posited 334 years ago in his third law of motion that mutual forces of action and reaction between two bodies are equal.

I wonder what he’d think of the relationship between the US dollar and equities, where this small action produces that decidedly unequal reaction.

After the Federal Reserve acted to shore up bank balance sheets by buying long bonds and mortgage-backed securities last week, the dollar trampolined and markets dropped like Newton’s apple.

Pundits blamed dismal economic data. Yet we saw money market-wide shifting from equities September 16 with quad-witching. Before the Fed offered a dim economic portrait. If money was reacting, it sure had a funny, proactive, organized way of showing it.

Today and Monday, the dollar weakened and stocks zoomed skyward in a Newton-flummoxing frenzy to reclaim paradise lost. How many believe this is rational investment behavior? If you do, there’s a solar-panel plant in California that might interest you. (more…)

Soft Dollars and Investor Relations

A note on trading today: The dollar dropped out of the gate this morning, buoying stocks. Talk about soft dollars. The price of shares is a construct of the Fed at present.

Anyway, after sharing the Hyatt in downtown Seattle with the Kansas City Chiefs (convincing victors Sunday), we returned to Denver Monday, body-scanned once but otherwise briskly processed through airport security. So we’re a day late with The Map.

Speaking of body scans, the SEC’s current insider-trading probe is poking at the squishy Wall Street practice of rebating trading costs with “soft dollars.” We should know about soft dollars in the IR profession. Chances are, the last sizeable institutional position taken in your stock involved them. (more…)

The derivative we need is a weather swap. The Winter Olympics would pay a premium for that spare snow lying around unused on the east coast.

Speaking of derivatives, the dollar retreated today, and US equities rebounded. We all want it to be about investing. Commentary everywhere today polished bullishness to an economic sheen. But that won’t make it reflect reality. Money keeps buying short-term love because the direction of the dollar is like a blacksmith’s bellows on equities. (more…)

Why Traders Trade

Albert Einstein reputedly quipped that compounding was the 8th wonder of the world. What would he think of negative interest rates?

The 10-year German government bond yield is -0.61%. The Rule of 72, which nobody mentions now, says dividing 72 by the expected rate of investment return tells you when it’ll double. At 6%, that’s 12 years. At 2%, 36 years. Try compounding negative rates.

Believe it or not, the stock market is weirder still.

Volatility in US stocks averaged 3.4% daily the past week, 55% higher than the risk-free return of 2.2% for 30-year US Treasurys.

Plug those figures into an equity cost of capital calculation where the expected return is 8%.  You with me?  It’s 22%!  So, the interest you earn on cash has vanished while the cost of raising it in public markets has exploded.

You may say, investor-relations professionals, there’s no way my equity costs 22%.  The truth is, volatility introduces value-uncertainty, which both increases what you pay for money, and on the other side, decreases returns on it.

University of Chicago professors Eugene Fama, who won a Nobel Prize in 2013, and Kenneth French, who also serves as head of investment policy for quant investor Dimensional Fund Advisors, co-authored a paper describing how equity-market volatility diminishes the apparent superiority of equities over bonds.

To wit, three-month Treasury Bills are returning 2% annualized. The S&P 500 since Sep 20, 2018 is down 0.4% even after yesterday’s gains. What if you’d sold Monday when the Dow Industrials dropped 391 points and bought yesterday when they rose 372? One day can make or break returns for investors.

Same for public companies. Say you issued stock in Dec 2018 and implemented an aggressive buyback in Jan 2019.  On the wrong side of the market, cost of capital skyrockets.

Rather than rationalizing market behavior, we should be asking why it’s become so volatile. And yes, it’s vastly more so now than during earlier epochs.

The answers? Rules. Stocks must trade between the best bid to buy and offer to sell, which cannot be the same. Thus, machines change prices. They’re 45% of volume.

On top of that, stock exchanges give firms economic incentives to trade stocks and derivatives simultaneously, accelerating the rate of change for prices.

For instance, the Nasdaq pays traders with more than 0.6% of sell volume (they call it adding liquidity but it’s paying traders to set the offer, the highest price for a stock) $0.29 per hundred shares.

Sell 1.75% of Nasdaq volume, with 0.6% in derivatives like options and futures, and if that amount is 0.1% of total Nasdaq derivatives volume, the exchanges pays $0.32 per hundred shares. That’s a 10% kicker for more prices.

Now add Exchange Traded Funds, which have no intrinsic value and depend for prices on the stocks that collateralize them. The two – stocks, and ETFs – are always a bit out of step.

Take Energy stocks last week.  XLE, a big Energy ETF, was down 2.2%. But composite Energy stocks were down 5.5% – a spread of 150%!

Capture half that by buying the ETF and selling the stocks, and it’s a 75% return.  No wonder traders trade.

ETFs drive what we estimate is 60% of total market volume now. ETFs exist via a regulatory exemption from the Investment Company Act of 1940 permitting them to trade as stock substitutes around an “arbitrage mechanism.”

That is, they depend on changing prices. There are thousands of ETFs, worth trillions of dollars. It’s a mania.

I’ll summarize: Market rules and investment behavior built on continually changing prices have transformed the market from a place where long-range horizons are the objective, to one where continuously changing prices are the objective.

Changing prices is the definition of volatility. Traders trade to profit on it. They rule.

What we expect from the stock market should derive from these facts. Public companies and investors alike should adapt. How? Understand the ebbs and flows and surf them like waves (we have that data). Modulate your buybacks, your stock issuances, your tactical investor-outreach, your investment decisions, to reflect behavioral facts.

Investors and public companies could also band together to petition the SEC to stop giving arbitrage a leg up.  The first step toward that goal is understanding how and why the market’s focus is now today’s spread, not tomorrow’s capital appreciation. I’ve explained it.

Mark Twain would say: Is the market run by smart people who are putting us on or imbeciles who really mean it?

Yet Arrived

Bula!

That’s Fijian for “greetings!” You say it “boo-lah.” Fiji is among the friendliest places on the planet. Karen and I are just back from the South Pacific, as this compilation illustrates.  Do you know it’s traditional in Fiji to invite anyone passing by to breakfast?

Maybe that’s the answer to the world’s woes.

And maybe we should have stayed out to sea!  Our first day back the market tumbled.

We left you July 18 with our concern that the market had become a runaway train. In a private client note Jul 19 as options expired we said, “Right now, the data say the market will next tick up. If it’s a weak top – check page 3 of your Market Structure Reports – we could have trouble. At this moment, I don’t think that’s set to occur. Yet.

Well, “yet” arrived.

Is it possible to know when yet is coming?

Yes. At least the way one knows a storm front is forming. It’s not mystical knowledge. It’s math. Weather forecasters track patterns because, as it turns out, weather is mathematical.  It follows rules that can be modeled.

We put a man on the moon 50 years ago because escaping gravity and traveling four days at predictable velocity will get you there. It’s math – which smart people computed on devices less powerful than your smart phone.

Even human behavior, which isn’t mathematical, can often be predicted (somebody needs to develop a model for mass-shooting nutcases). For instance, in the stock market rational people predictably buy weakness and sell strength.

What kind of money sells weakness and buys strength? We’ll come to that.

Conventional wisdom says stocks imploded because a) people wanted the Federal Reserve to cut rates Jul 31 more than it did, b) President Trump tweeted about Chinese tariffs, c) and the Chinese retaliated by letting the yuan slide.

Relative currency values matter. We’ve written often about it. The pandemonium routing equities Aug 24, 2015 followed a yuan devaluation too. Stocks inversely correlate with the dollar because currencies have no inherent value today.

So if the supply of dollars rises, the value of the dollar falls, and the prices of assets denominated in dollars that serve as stores of value, such as stocks, rise. Value investor Ron Baron said he puts depreciating assets, dollars, into appreciating assets, stocks.

With dollars increasing, the relative value of other currencies like the euro and the yen rises, so prices of goods denominated in them fall – which governments and central banks interpret as “a recession,” leading to interest-rate cuts, negative bond yields, banks buying stuff to create money, and other weirdness.

Makes you wonder if these central planners actually understand economics.

I digress. That’s not the root reason why stocks rolled over. Headlines, Fed actions and currencies don’t buy or sell stocks. People and machines do.

The majority of the money in the market pegs a benchmark now – machine-like behavior. Market Structure Sentiment, our index for short-term market-direction, has been above 5.0 for an extended period without mean-reversion.

That matters because money tracking a measure must rebalance – mean-revert. If it goes an unusual stretch without doing so, risk of a sudden mean-reversion rises.

We saw the same condition before stock-corrections in Jan 2016, June 2016 around Brexit, ahead of the US election in late Oct 2016, in Jan 2018, and in Sep 2018. Each featured an extended positive Sentiment run with a weak top, as now.

The week ended Aug 2 also had another mathematical doozy: Exchange Traded Fund flows as measured not by purchases or sales of ETFs but market-making by brokers plunged 20%.  In some mega capitalization stocks it was the largest decline in ETF flows since early Dec 2018.

Passive money buys strength, until it stops. When it stops, weakness often follows. And if it has not rebalanced, it sells weakness because weakness means deteriorating returns.

The last day of trading every month is the most important one for money tracking benchmarks. That was July 31. Stocks deteriorated in the afternoon. Pundits blamed Jay Powell’s comments. What if it was long overdue rebalancing on the last trading day?

That selling coupled with a big overall decline in ETF flows converged with a currency depreciation Monday, and whoosh! What yet we feared arrived.

And yet. It’s not fundamental. Why does that matter? Monetary policy, portfolio positioning, and economic predictions may be predicated on a false premise that rational people had unmet expectations.

I think that’s a big deal.

So. Since yet has arrived, is yet over?  Data say no. It’s a model with predictiveness that may be a step ahead or behind. But a swoon like this should produce a mean-reversion. That’s not – yet – happened.

With that, I say Bula! And if you’re in the neighborhood, drop by for breakfast on us.

In Control

This is what Steamboat Springs looked like June 21, the first day of summer (yes, that’s a snow plow).

Before winter returned, we were hiking Emerald Mountain there and were glad the big fella who left these tracks had headed the other way (yes, those are Karen’s shoes on the upper edge, for a size comparison).

A setup for talking about a bear market?  No.  But there are structural facts you need to know.  Such as why are investor-relations goals for changes to the shareholder base hard to achieve?

We were in Chicago seeing customers and one said, “Some holders complain we’re underperforming our peers because we don’t have the right shareholder mix. We develop a plan to change it.  We execute our outreach. When we compare outcomes to goals after the fact, we’ve not achieved them.”

Why?

The cause isn’t a failure of communication. It’s market structure.  First, many Active funds have had net outflows over the last decade as money shifted from expensive active management to inexpensive passive management.

It’s trillions of dollars.  And it means stock-pickers are often sellers, not buyers.

As the head of equities for a major fund complex told me, “Management teams come to see my analysts and tell the story, but we’ve got redemptions.  We’re not buying stocks. We’re selling them. And getting into ETFs.”

Second, conventional funds are by rule fully invested.  To buy something they must sell something else.  It’s hard business now.  While the average trade size rose the past two weeks from about 155 shares to 174 shares, it’s skewed by mega caps.  MRK is right at the average.  But FDX’s average trade size is 89 shares.  I saw a company yesterday averaging 45 shares per trade.

Moving 250,000 shares 45 at a time is wildly inefficient. It also means investors are continually contending with incorrect prices. Stocks quote in 100-share increments. If they trade in smaller fractions, there’s a good chance it’s not at the best displayed price.

That’s a structural problem that stacks the deck against active stock pickers, who are better off using Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) that have limitless supply elasticity (ETFs don’t compete in the market for stocks. All stock-movement related to creating and redeeming ETF shares occurs off-market in giant blocks).

Speaking of market-structure (thank you, Joe Saluzzi), the Securities Traders Association had this advice for issuers:  Educate yourself on the market and develop a voice.

Bottom line, IR people, you need to understand how your stock trades and what its characteristics are, so you and your executive team and the board remain grounded in the reality of what’s achievable in a market dominated by ETFs.

Which brings us to current market structure.  Yesterday was “Counterparty Tuesday” when banks true up books related to options expiring last week and new ones that traded Monday.  The market was down because demand for stocks and derivatives from ETFs was off a combined 19% the past week versus 20-day averages.

It should be up, not down.

Last week was quad-witching when stock and index options and futures lapsed. S&P indexes rebalanced for the quarter. There was Phase III of the annual Russell reconstitution, which concludes Friday. Quarterly window-dressing should be happening now, as money tracking any benchmark needs to true up errors by June 28.

Where’d the money go?

If Passive money declines, the market could tip over. We’re not saying it’s bound to happen.  More important than the composition of an index is the amount of money pegged to it – trillions with the Russells (95% of it the Russell 1000), even more for S&P indices.

In that vein, last week leading into quad witching the lead behavior in every sector was Fast Trading.  Machines, not investors, drove the S&P 500 up 2.2%, likely counting on Passive money manifesting (as we did).

If it doesn’t, Fast Traders will vanish.

Summing up, we need to know what’s within our control.  Targeting investors without knowing market structure is like a farmer cutting hay without checking the weather report.  You can’t control the weather. You control when you cut hay – to avoid failure.

The same applies to IR (and investing, for that matter) in modern markets.

Jekyll and Hyde

Your stock may collateralize long and short Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs) simultaneously.

Isn’t that cognitive dissonance – holding opposing views? Jekyll and Hyde? It’s akin to supposing that here in Denver you can drive I-25 north toward Fort Collins and arrive south in Castle Rock. Try as long as you like and it’ll never work.

I found an instance of this condition by accident. OXY, an energy company, is just through a contested battle with CVX to buy APC, a firm with big energy operations in the Permian Basin of TX (where the odor of oil and gas is the smell of money).

OXY is in 219 ETFs, a big number.  AAPL is in 271 but it’s got 20 times the market-capitalization.  OXY and its short volume have moved inversely – price down, shorting up. The patterns say ETFs are behind it.

So I checked.

Lo and behold, OXY is in a swath of funds like GUSH and DRIP that try to be two or three times better or worse than an index. These are leveraged funds.

How can a fund that wants to return, say, three times more than an S&P energy index use the same stock as one wanting to be three times worse than the index?

“Tim, maybe one fund sees OXY as a bullish stock, the other as bearish.”

Except these funds are passive vehicles, which means they don’t pick stocks. They track a model, and in this case, the same model.  If the stock doesn’t behave like the ETF, why does the fund hold it?

I should note before answering that GUSH and DRIP and similar ETFs are one-day investments. They’re in a way designed to promote ownership of volatility. They want you to buy and sell both every day.

You can see why. This image above shows OXY the last three months with GUSH and DRIP.

Consider what that means for you investor-relations professionals counting on shares to serve as a rational barometer, or you long investors doing your homework to find undervalued stocks.

Speaking of understanding, I’ll interject that if you’re not yet registered for the NIRI Annual Conference, do it now!  It’s a big show and a good one, and we’ve got awesome market structure discussions for you.

Back to the story, these leveraged instruments are no sideshow. In a market with 3,500 public companies and close to 9,000 securities, tallying all stock classes, closed-end funds and ETFs, some routinely are among the top 50 most actively traded.  SQQQ and TVIX, leveraged instruments, were in the top dozen at the Nasdaq yesterday.

For those juiced energy funds, OXY is just collateral. That is, it’s liquid ($600 million of stock trading daily) and currently 50% less volatile than the broad market. A volatility fund wants the opposite of what it’s selling (volatility) because it’s not investing in OXY. It’s leveraging OXY to buy or sell or short other things that feed volatility.

And it can short OXY as a hedge to boot.

All ETFs are derivatives, not just ones using derivatives to achieve their objectives. They are all predicated on an underlying asset yet aren’t the underlying asset.

It’s vital to understand what the money is doing because otherwise conclusions might be falsely premised. Maybe the Board at OXY concludes management is doing a poor job creating shareholder value when in reality it’s being merchandised by volatility traders.

Speaking of volatility, Market Structure Sentiment is about bottomed at the lowest level of 2019. It’s predictive so that still means stocks could swoon, but it also says risk will soon wane (briefly anyway). First though, volatility bets like the VIX and hundreds of billions of dollars of others expire today. Thursday will be reality for the first time since the 15th, before May expirations began.

Even with Sentiment bottoming, we keep the market at arm’s length because of its vast dependence on a delicate arbitrage balance. A Jekyll-Hyde line it rides.