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Dollar Ratios

My friend’s dad joked that kids are the most destructive force in the universe.

For stocks, the most powerful (and sometimes destructive) force is the movement of the dollar. The Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan both meet today so it could soar or swoon. Since the buck holds sway, we should all of us in the capital markets from investors to issuers understand how and why.

Stocks react to the dollar because they’re opposite sides of the ledger. Debits and credits.  If money buys less, a debit, then what preserves value (stocks) increases in price, a credit.  So a “strong dollar” means more value resides in the currency and less in stocks.  A weak dollar is the opposite, and value transfers at higher risk into stocks to offset diminishing purchasing power – the quantity of things money buys.

It’s about ratios.  In the past, countries would scrounge around for a gob of gold. Then they could issue paper currency at a ratio. Played poker?  Chips are an asset-backed currency. Pay money, get chips.  Want more chips? Pay more money. The ratio is always the same so chips have fixed value and supply varies with the number of players.

Not so with money.  If Europe has spent more than it makes, its debts depressing the economy (like credit card debt constrains discretionary income), the European Central Bank can manufacture more money – bump up the chip stack without paying.  Remember our ratios?  Increase the supply of euros and prices of risk assets that preserve value, like stocks and bonds, rise to compensate.

Follow that reasoning. When money declines in value, stuff costs more. When stuff costs more, the revenues of the businesses supplying the stuff increase.  And since consumption – buying stuff – is the core way we count “economic growth” today, economies grow when prices rise.

Get it?  Yeah, it’s balderdash that selling the same unit at a higher price is growth. But that’s how governments now measure it. All central banks including the Federal Reserve thus have inflation targets. They are trying to create growth, without which most governments go broke.

Think I’m making this up?  Follow the math. You can’t print a batch of Benjamins. That’s counterfeiting. So how do central banks create money?  They issue money against the most widely available commodity in the world today:  Debt.

When you buy dinner on a credit card, the bank doesn’t reach into somebody’s savings account to pay the restaurant. It creates money. Pay the balance and that money vanishes.

Remember the ratios? Burn money and there are fewer dollars, which means the dollar rises in value, and prices fall, and economies contract (not really but that’s how we count now), and stocks swoon. Create money and the opposite occurs – everything rises.

Investor-relations people, you know the term “multiple-expansion?” It describes stocks that cost more without any change to underlying fundamentals.  This is a product of money-creation. In effect, central banks are trying to induce us all to pay more for things than they’re worth.  Value investment is the opposite: buying at a discount.

For perspective, JP Morgan is leveraged about 8 to 1.  Citigroup, about 7 to 1.  The Fed? With capital of $40 billion and liabilities of $4.54 trillion, its leverage ratio is 113 to 1.  Where money before depended on assets, like gold, now it’s backed by liabilities – debt.

The European Central Bank is buying eighty billion euros of debt a month to create money. What happens to debt? Its value skyrockets and interest rates plunge. It’s the opposite in the real world. You’re in hock, you pay the vig.  Bigger debts, more cost.

Japan is way beyond that, financing the government by directly trading yen for government debt, and now it’s buying exchange-traded funds, shifting to equities with infinite supply (ETFs can theoretically create as many shares as demand requires – but inevitably leverage increases). Japan is even contemplating paying banks and businesses to borrow. Why? Because debt creates money and more money keeps prices from falling.

The effort fails because consumers buy more when prices fall and less when they rise. So the very attempt to drive economic growth is in fact undermining it. Plus, the soundness of our currencies today depends on the capacity of governments to pay on their debts.

Summarizing, the world is indebted so it needs money. Central banks supply money by exchanging it for debt.  Creating money paradoxically reduces the capacity of consumers to buy things because prices rise. So they have to go into debt.  The cycle repeats like two parties munching opposite ends of a strand of spaghetti.

Back to stocks. When they vary inversely with the dollar it’s contraction or expansion of multiples, not real growth.  And that means consumers are losing purchasing power.  Since consumption drives economies now, it inevitably leads to slower growth.

And that’s what the planet’s got. Circular reasoning obfuscates facts.  The solution is a stable currency so all of us can understand fair value for stocks and everything else. But we’ll start with identifying the destructive force – and it’s not the kids.

Dollars and Sense

I looked back at what we wrote Dec 2, 2008. It was two weeks before Madoff (pronounced “made off” we’d observed bemusedly) became synonymous with fraud. Markets were approaching ramming speed into the Mar 2009 financial-crisis nadir.

In that environment on this date then, we introduced you to Ronin Capital, a Chicago proprietary trader. It had exploded through the equity data we were tracking. Today it’s a top-twenty proprietary trader in equities but not the runway model.

Yet it’s thriving. It has 350 employees. Its regulatory filings show $9.5 billion of assets including financial instruments valued at $6.4 billion, with government securities comprising $4.5 billion, derivatives about $1.1 billion, and equities about $700 million.

As the Federal Reserve contemplates a rate-increase in two weeks, Ronin Capital is a microcosm for the whole market. Its asset-mix describes what we see behaviorally in your trading, clients: Leveraged assets, dollars shifting from equity trading to derivatives, producing declining volumes and paradoxically rising prices. In a word, arbitrage.

The Fed Funds rate is the daily cost at which banks with reserves at the Fed loan them to each other.  The Fed last raised it June 29, 2006 to 5.25%, marking a pre-crisis zenith. As the housing market trembled, the Fed backpedaled to 4.25% by December 2007. On Dec 16, 2008 the Fed cut to 0.00%-0.25%, where it remains.

Since the Fed began tracking these rates following departure from the gold standard in 1971, the previous low was 1% in June 2003 as the economy was trudging up from the 9/11 swale. The high was 20% (overnight!) in May 1981.  It’s averaged about 5%.

Now for almost ten years – the life of the benchmark US Treasury – there has been no rate-increase. Since 2008, it’s been close to free for big banks to loan each other money. Backing up to Nov 30, 2006, the Fed’s balance sheet showed bank reserves at $8.9 billion, lower than (but statistically similar to) $11.2 billion at Nov 29, 1996. But at Nov 27, 2015, the Fed held $2.6 trillion of bank reserves, an increase of 29,000%.

Lest you seethe, this money was manufactured by the Fed and paid to banks that bought government debt and our mortgages.  It didn’t exist outside the Fed.

The construction of the financial instruments held by Ronin Capital describes how these polices have affected market activity.  First, the pillar of the asset base is government debt, the most abundant security in the world (a commodity – something available everywhere – cannot be the safest asset, by the way).  Governments need buyers for debt so rules manufacture a market. All the big banks hold gobs of government debt.

Second, Ronin holds equity swaps, equity options, options on futures, and currency forward contracts which collectively are 34% greater than underlying equity assets. We infer that Ronin makes money by leveraging into short-term directional trades in options and currencies. It’s worked well. It did in real estate too ten years ago, until mortgage-backed derivatives devalued as appreciation in the underlying asset, houses, stalled.

Ronin Capital, big banks, derivatives, currencies, equities and interest rates are interlaced. When money lacks inherent worth, speculation increases. Government debt is today’s real estate market underpinning massive leverage in today’s mortgage-backed securities, the sea of derivatives delivering short-term arbitrage profits.

To see the potential Fed rate increase Dec 16 as but a step toward normalization is to misunderstand the foundation of capital today. Raising rates to 0.25%-0.50% is good. But it’s at least 29,005% different from raising rates to 5.25% in 2006.

You don’t have to grasp all the mechanics, IR professionals. You do have to understand that if fundamentals have been marginalized by arbitrage the past seven years, wait till the calculus in arbitrage changes.  It’s happening already. We saw a steep drop in shorting the past two weeks. Sounds good, right? But it means borrowing is tightening.

Don’t blame Ronin Capital for adapting.  In fact, forget blame, though it’s apparent where it lies. Let’s instead think about the implication for our task in the equity market. It’s about to get a lot more interesting, and not because of fundamentals.

The good news is that it’s never been more vital to measure your market structure and report facts to management. This is when IR careers are made.

Relativity and Dollars

How do you prove relativity?

When Einstein proffered the preposterous suggestion that all motion is relative including time, people clearly had not yet seen Usain Bolt. Or what happens to stocks after options-expirations when the spread between the dollar and equity indexes is at a relative post-crisis zenith.

Let me rephrase that.

As you know if you get analytics from us, we warned more than a week ago that a reset loomed in equities. Forget the pillars on which we lean – Behavior and Sentiment. Yes, Sentiment was vastly neutral. Behavior showed weak investment and declining speculation –signs of dying demand – all the way back in mid-August.

Let’s talk about the dollar – as I’m wont to do.

There is a prevailing sense in markets that stocks are down because earnings are bad. No doubt that contributes. But it’s like saying your car stopped moving because the engine died, when a glance earlier at the fuel gauge on empty would have offered a transcendent and predictive indicator.

Stocks are down because money long ago looked a data abounding around us. From Europe clinging together through printed Euros, to steadily falling GDP indicators in the US and China, to the workforce-participation line in US employment data nose-down like it is when economies are contracting not recovering, there were signs, much the way a piercing shriek follows when you accidentally press the panic button on your car’s key fob, that stuff didn’t look great.

We know institutional money didn’t wake up yesterday, rub its eyes, and go, “Shazzam! Earnings are going to be bad!” (more…)

Stocks, dollars and Newtonian physics

Isaac Newton posited 334 years ago in his third law of motion that mutual forces of action and reaction between two bodies are equal.

I wonder what he’d think of the relationship between the US dollar and equities, where this small action produces that decidedly unequal reaction.

After the Federal Reserve acted to shore up bank balance sheets by buying long bonds and mortgage-backed securities last week, the dollar trampolined and markets dropped like Newton’s apple.

Pundits blamed dismal economic data. Yet we saw money market-wide shifting from equities September 16 with quad-witching. Before the Fed offered a dim economic portrait. If money was reacting, it sure had a funny, proactive, organized way of showing it.

Today and Monday, the dollar weakened and stocks zoomed skyward in a Newton-flummoxing frenzy to reclaim paradise lost. How many believe this is rational investment behavior? If you do, there’s a solar-panel plant in California that might interest you. (more…)

Soft Dollars and Investor Relations

A note on trading today: The dollar dropped out of the gate this morning, buoying stocks. Talk about soft dollars. The price of shares is a construct of the Fed at present.

Anyway, after sharing the Hyatt in downtown Seattle with the Kansas City Chiefs (convincing victors Sunday), we returned to Denver Monday, body-scanned once but otherwise briskly processed through airport security. So we’re a day late with The Map.

Speaking of body scans, the SEC’s current insider-trading probe is poking at the squishy Wall Street practice of rebating trading costs with “soft dollars.” We should know about soft dollars in the IR profession. Chances are, the last sizeable institutional position taken in your stock involved them. (more…)

The derivative we need is a weather swap. The Winter Olympics would pay a premium for that spare snow lying around unused on the east coast.

Speaking of derivatives, the dollar retreated today, and US equities rebounded. We all want it to be about investing. Commentary everywhere today polished bullishness to an economic sheen. But that won’t make it reflect reality. Money keeps buying short-term love because the direction of the dollar is like a blacksmith’s bellows on equities. (more…)

Suppy Chain Trouble

If you go to the store for a shirt and they don’t have your size, you wait for the supply chain to find it.  There isn’t one to buy. Ever thought about that for stocks?

I just looked up a client’s trade data. It says the bid size is 2, the ask, 3.  That means there are buyers for 200 shares and sellers of 300.  Yet the average trade-size the past 20 days for this stock, with about $27 million of daily volume, is 96 shares.  Not enough to make a minimum round-lot quote.

That means, by the way, that the average trade doesn’t even show up in the quote data. Alex Osipovich at the Wall Street Journal wrote yesterday (subscription required) that the market is full of tiny trades. Indeed, nearly half are less than 100 shares (I raised a liquidity alarm with Marketwatch this past Monday).

Back to our sample stock, if it’s priced around $50, there are buyers for $10,000, sellers of $15,000. But it trades in 96-share increments so the buyer will fill less than half the order before the price changes. In fact, the average trade-size in dollars is $4,640.

The beginning economic principle is supply and demand. Prices should lie at their nexus. There’s an expectation in the stock market of endless supply – always a t-shirt on the rack.

Well, what if there’s not? What if shares for trades stop showing up at the bid and ask?  And what might cause that problem?

To the first question, it’s already happening. Regulations require brokers transacting in shares to post a minimum hundred-share bid to buy and offer to sell (or ask). Before Mr. Osipovich wrote on tiny trades, I’d sent data around internally from the SEC’s Midas system showing 48% of all trades were odd lots – less than 100 shares.

Do you see? Half the trades in the market can’t match the minimum. Trade-size has gone down, down, down as the market capitalization of stocks has gone up, up, up.  That’s a glaring supply-chain signal that prices of stocks are at risk during turbulence.

Let’s define “liquidity.”

I say it’s the amount of something you can buy before the price changes. Softbank is swallowing its previous $47 billion valuation on WeWork and taking the company over for $10 billion. That’s a single trade. One price. Bad, but stable.

The stock market is $30 trillion of capitalization and trades in 135-share increments across the S&P 500, or about $16,500 per trade.  Blackrock manages over $6.8 trillion of assets. Vanguard, $5.3 trillion. State Street. $2.5 trillion.

Relationship among those data?  Massive assets. Moving in miniscule snippets.

Getting to why trade-size keeps shriveling, the simple answer is prices are changing faster than ever.  Unstable prices are volatility.  That’s the definition.

I’ll tell you what I think is happening: Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) are turning stocks from investments to collateral, which moves off-market. As a result, a growing percentage of stock-trades are aimed at setting different prices in stocks and ETFs. That combination is leading to a supply-chain shortage of stocks, and tiny stock-trades.

ETFs are substitutes dependent on stocks for prices. The ETF complex has mushroomed – dominated by the three investment managers I just mentioned (but everyone is in the ETF business now, it seems) – because shares are created in large blocks with stable prices. Like a WeWork deal.

A typical ETF creation unit is 50,000 shares.  Stocks or cash of the same value is exchanged in-kind. Off-market, one price.

The ETF shares are then shredded into the stock market amidst the mass pandemonium of Brownian Motion (random movement) afflicting the stocks of public companies, which across the whole market move nearly 3% from high to low every day, on average.

Because there are nearly 900 ETFs, reliant on the largest stocks for tracking, ever-rising amounts of stock-trading tie back to ETF spreads. That is, are stocks above or below ETF prices? Go long or short accordingly.

Through August 2019, ETF creations and redemptions in US stocks total $2.6 trillion.  From Jan 2017-Aug 2019, $10.1 trillion of ETF shares were created and redeemed.

ETFs are priced via an “arbitrage mechanism” derived from prices in underlying stocks. Machines are chopping trades into minute pieces because the smaller the trade, the lower the value at risk for the arbitragers trading ETFs versus stocks.

ETFs are the dominant investment vehicle now. Arbitrage is the dominant trading activity. What if we’re running out of ETF collateral – stocks?

It would explain much: shrinking trade-sizes because there is no supply to be had. Rising shorting as share-borrowing is needed to create supply. Price-instability because much of the trading is aimed at changing the prices of ETFs and underlying stocks.

Now, maybe it’s an aberration only. But we should consider whether the collateralization feature of ETFs is crippling the equity supply-chain. What if investors tried to leave both at the same time?

All public companies and investors should understand market liquidity – by stock, sector, industry, broad measure. We track and trend that data every. Data is the best defense in an uncertain time, because it’s preparation.

Spread Spoofing

I’ve never bet on sports, but the bulk of wagers is on the spread – whether the outcome will be above or below a range.

In the stock market spreads rule too, and data suggest market-makers are gambling on which things will move. The most shocking spread is the one between assets flowing to Exchange Traded Funds and the dollar-volume of ETF shares.

Wall Street Journal writer Akane Otani reported last weekend (subscription required) using data from Strategas that US equity ETFs saw about $36 billion of inflows to date this year, the majority into low-volatility strategies favoring defensive plays like large-caps and Utilities.

To accommodate these flows, ETF shares must be created. Data from the Investment Company Institute through August 2019 (the latest available) show a staggering $2.6 trillion of ETF shares have been created and redeemed this year.

Put another way, actual increases in ETF assets are 1.4% of total ETF share-transactions.  Talk about a spread.

I wonder what effect that’s having on the stock market?

First, let’s understand “creations” and “redemptions.”  We’ve written about them before and you can read our ETF white paper for more.  ETF shares are manufactured by brokers, which receive that right from Blackrock and other ETF sponsors in (tax-free) exchange for stocks and cash of equal value.

Say investors are buying Utilities ETFs because they want to avoid volatility. Communication Services sector stocks like Facebook and CBS are 84% more volatile on average over the past 50 trading days (we study that data) than Utilities stocks like Southern Co. and Duke Energy.

Brokers will find (buy, borrow, substitute) Utilities stocks worth, say, $12 million, and receive in trade from an ETF sponsor like State Street (XLU is the Utilities sector ETF) authority to create $12 million worth of ETF shares to sell to the eager investing public.

The data are saying the process of creating and redeeming ETF shares is vastly more peripatetic behind stocks than the actual dollars coming from investors.

Why? We’ll come to that.

Continuing the explanation, ETF shares are created off the market in giant blocks typically numbering 50,000 or more. The price does not move.  These shares are then sold in tiny trades – about 130 shares at a time – that move wildly, as do the prices of stocks exchanged for ETF shares.

There is, as the statistics folks would say, mass Brownian Motion (random movement) amid stocks – and the pursuit of profits via instability is leviathan.

We’ve done the math. An average of $325 billion of ETF shares are created and redeemed every month.  Barely more than a tenth of that has been invested in equity ETFs en toto in 2019.

What’s going on? What we’ve been telling financial reporters and the SEC for the last three years – to withering recrimination from ETF sponsors and resounding silence from the press and regulators.

ETF shares are being created and redeemed so short-term money can profit on the spreads that develop between stocks and ETFs (ironically, the same parties doing this are decrying short-termism).

Create ETF shares, and prices of ETFs will deteriorate versus stocks. Redeem (remove them) and prices firm. Contraction/expansion is relentless and way bigger than flows.

That’s not investing.  It’s gambling on (and fostering) spreads.  The math on its face says nearly 99% of creation/redemption volume is a form of gambling, because it doesn’t match investment-flows.

No doubt now there’s epithet-riddled screaming and shouting occurring across ETF trading rooms and ETF boardrooms.  Perhaps some part of the spread is legitimate.

But I’ll say again, regulators:  You owe the investing public a look into why trillions of dollars of ETF shares are created to serve billions of dollars of investment-flows. And we don’t know who the parties to creations and redemptions are, or what’s being exchanged.

It feels like spoofing – issuing and canceling trades to distort supply and demand. What effect is it having on the prices of stocks that both public companies and investors think reflect investment behavior?

I’ll wager there’s an answer.  Do you want to take the over or under?


There’s a story going around about an epochal rotation from momentum (growth) to value in stocks. It may be a hoax.

I’ll explain in a bit. First the facts. It began Monday when without warning the iShares Edge MSCI USA Value Factor ETF (VLUE) veered dramatically up and away from the iShares Edge MSCI USA Momentum Factor ETF (MTUM).

CNBC said of Monday trading, “Data compiled by Bespoke Investment Group showed this was momentum’s worst daily performance relative to value since its inception in early 2013.”

The story added, “The worst performing stocks of 2019 outperformed on Monday while the year’s biggest advancers lagged, according to SentimenTrader. This year’s worst performers rose 3.5% on Monday while 2019’s biggest advancers slid 1.4%, the research firm said.”

A tweet from SentimenTrader called it “the biggest 1-day momentum shift since 2009.”

It appeared to continue yesterday. We think one stock caused it all.

Our view reflects a theorem we’ve posited before about the unintended consequences of a market crammed full of Exchange Traded Funds, substitutes for stocks that depend for prices on the prices of stocks they’re supposed to track.

To be fair, the data the past week are curious. We sent a note to clients Monday before the open. Excerpt:

“Maybe all the data is about to let loose. It’s just. Strange.  Fast Trading leading. ETFs more volatile than stocks. Spreads evaporating. Sentiment stuck in neutral. More sectors sold than bought….Stocks should rise. But it’s a weird stretch ahead of options-expirations Sep 18-20.  It feels like the market is traversing a causeway.”

That stuff put together could mean rotation, I suppose.

But if there was a massive asset shift from growth to value, we’d see it in behavioral change. We don’t. The only behavior increasing in September so far is Fast Trading – machines exploiting how prices change.

What if it was AT&T and Elliott Management causing it?

If you missed the news, T learned last weekend that Activist investor Elliott Management had acquired a $3.2 billion stake in the communications behemoth and saw a future valuation near $60.  On that word, T surged Monday to a 52-week high.

T is the largest component of the MSCI index the value ETF VLUE tracks, making up about 10% of its value.  ETFs, as I said above, have been more volatile than stocks.

Compare the components of MTUM and VLUE and they’re shades apart. Where T is paired with VLUE, CMCSA ties to MTUM, as does DIS.  MRK is momentum, PFE is value. CSCO momentum, INTC, IBM value. PYPL, V, MA momentum, BAC, C, value.

Look at the market. What stuff did well, which did poorly?

The outlier is T. It’s a colossus among miniatures. It trades 100,000 times daily, a billion dollars of volume, and it’s been 50% short for months, with volatility 50% less than the broad market, and Passive Investment over 20% greater in T than the broad market.

T blasted above $38 Monday on a spectacular lightning bolt of…Fast Trading. The same behavior leading the whole market.  Not investment. No asset-shift.

What if machines, which cannot comprehend what they read like humans can, despite advances in machine-learning, artificial intelligence (no learning or intelligence is possible without human inputs – we’re in this business and we know), improperly “learned” a shift from growth to value solely from T – and spread it like a virus?

Humans may be caught up in the machine frenzy, concluding you gotta be in value now, not realizing there’s almost no difference between growth and value in the subject stocks.

Compare the top ten “holdings” of each ETF. Easy to find. Holdings, by the way, may not reflect what these ETFs own at a given time. Prospectuses offer wide leeway.

But let’s give them the benefit of the doubt. What’s the difference between MRK and PFE? V, MA, and PYPL and C, BAC and, what, GM and DIS?

Stock pickers know the difference, sure.  Machines don’t. Sponsors of ETFs wanting good collateral don’t.  Except, of course, that cheap collateral is better than expensive collateral, because it’s more likely to produce a return.

Such as: All the worst-performing stocks jumped. All the best-performing stocks didn’t.

What if this epochal rotation is nothing more than news of Elliott’s stake in T pushing a domino forward, which dropped onto some algorithm, that tugged a string, which plucked a harp note that caused fast-trading algorithms to buy value and sell momentum?

This is a risk with ETFs. You can’t trust signs of rotation.

We have the data to keep you from being fooled by machine-learning.


Want a big ranch out west?

Apparently you don’t. The Wall Street Journal last month ran a feature (subscription required) on the mushrooming supply of leviathan cattle operations from Colorado to Idaho, legacy assets of the rich left to heirs from the era of Ted Turner and John Malone.

A dearth of demand is saddling inheritors with big operating expenses and falling prices.  Cross Mountain Ranch near Steamboat Springs, CO is 220,000 acres with an 11,000 square-foot house that costs a million dollars annually to run. It can be yours for a paltry $70 million, $320 an acre (I wonder if that price holds for a thousand?).

What have cattle ranches got to do with the stock market?  Look at your holders, public companies.  What’s the concentration among the largest?

The same thing that happened to ranches is occurring in stocks.  The vast wealth reflected in share-ownership came considerably from generations now passing on inheritance or taking required minimum distributions. The youngsters, at least so far, aren’t stockowners. They’re buying coffee, cannabis and café food.

Juxtapose that with what we’ve been saying about liquidity in stocks, and as the WSJ wrote today.

Liquidity to us is how much of something can be bought or sold before the price changes.  Those landed dynasties of western dirt are discovering people eschew large land masses and monolithic homesteads.

In stocks, the same is true.  Back up five years to Sep 4, 2014. The 200-day (all measures 200-day averages) trade size was 248 shares and dollars/trade was $17,140. Short volume was about 42%, the average Russell 1000 stock traded about $230 million of stock daily. And intraday volatility, the difference between highest and lowest daily prices, was about 2.2%.

Five years later? Average trade-size is 167 shares, down 33%.  Dollars/trade is down 26% to $12,760. Shorting is nearly 47% daily. Dollars/day is down 17% to $170 million. Volatility is up 32% to 2.9% daily.

But market-capitalization has increased by some 40%.  It’s as though the stock market has become a giant ranch in Colorado teetering over millennials loitering in a coffee shop. No offense, millennials.

Every investor and public company should understand these liquidity characteristics because they increase risk for raising capital or making stock investments.

Why is liquidity evaporating like perspiration out of an Under Armor shirt?

Rules and behaviors. Rules force brokers – every dollar in and out of stocks passes through at least one – into uniform behavior, which decreases the number capable of complying. Picture a grocery store near dinnertime with just three checkout lanes open.

In turn, concentration means more machination by brokers to hide orders. They break them into smaller pieces to hide footsteps – and machines become more sophisticated at interrupting trades in ever smaller increments to reveal what’s behind them.

And all the liquidity measures shrink. We see it in the data. A blue bar of Active Investment rarely manifests without an array of orange bars swarming to change prices, Fast Traders who have detected the difference in the data where human influence drives machine behavior.

What can you do, public companies and investors?  Prepare for bigger and unexpected gyrations (volatility erodes investment returns and increases equity cost of capital).

Examples: HRB reported results before Labor Day. The quarter is fundamentally inconsequential for a company in the tax-preparation business. Yet the stock plunged. Drivers?  Shares were 71% short and dominated by machines setting prices and over 21% of trading tied to short derivatives bets.

Those structural facts cost holders 10% of market cap.

Same with ULTA. While business conditions might warrant caution, they didn’t promote a 30% reduction in equity value.  Market structure did it – 58% short, 55% of total volume from machines knowing nothing about ULTA and paying no heed to the call.

We have the data. Market structure is our sole focus. No public company or investor should be unaware of liquidity factors in stocks and what they predict.

Put another way, all of us on the acreage of equities better understand now that vast tracts of value are tied up by large holders who don’t determine the price of your stocks anymore than your grandfather’s capacity to buy 100,000 acres will price your big Wyoming ranch now.

What does is supply and demand. And liquidity is thin all over.  Data can guard against missteps.