Tagged: AMC

Where’s It Going?

Where’s what going?

Time? Hm.

Money?  Well. Yes.

It abounds and yet it doesn’t go far.  Why that’s the case is another story (I can explain if you like but it usually clears a room at a cocktail party).

First, if you were spammed last week with the MSM, apologies! It was inadvertently set on full-auto.  And one other note, our sister company Market Structure EDGE  is up for several Benzinga Fintech Awards.  As in American politics, you may vote early and often (just kidding!). No, you can vote daily though till about Oct 22, 2021.  We hope you’ll help! Click here, and turn it into a daily calendar reminder.

Today we’re asking where the money gushing at US stocks and bonds like a ruptured fire hydrant is going. Morningstar says it’s $800 billion into US securities the last twelve months through July.

That’s minus a $300 billion drop in actively managed equity assets. Stock-pickers are getting pounded like a beach in a hurricane. Public companies, you realize it?

That’s not the point of this piece. But investor-relations professionals, realize the money you talk to isn’t buying. It’s selling.  There are exceptions and you should know them.  But don’t build your IR program around “targeting more investors.” Build it on the inflows (your characteristics), not the outflows.  If you want to know more, ask us.

So where did the $800 billion go? 

About $300 billion went to taxable bond funds.  Not for income. Appreciation. Bonds keep going up (yields down, prices up). They’re behaving like equities – buy appreciation, not income.

The rest, about $500 billion, went to US equities.  We’re going to look at that. 

$500 billion seems like a lot.  Ross Perot thought a billion here, billion there, pretty soon you’re talking real money. For you who are too young to know it, Google that.

But today $500 billion ain’t what it was. And frankly, five hundred billion deutschemarks wasn’t much in the Weimar Republic either.  The problem wasn’t inflation. The problem was what causes inflation: too much money.

Ah, but Weimar didn’t have derivatives. Silly fools.

For perspective, more than $500 billion of Exchange Traded Funds (ETF) are created and redeemed in US equities every month.  Stocks trade more than $500 billion daily in the US stock market.

And the money supply as measured by the Federal Reserve’s “M2” metric reflecting the total volume of money held by the public, increased by $5 trillion from Feb 2020 to July 2021.  That’s a 32% increase. About like stocks (SPY up 33% TTM).

Wait. The stock market is up the same as the money supply? 

Yup.

Did everybody sell stocks at higher prices?

No. Everybody bought stocks at higher prices.

Okay, so where did the stock come from to buy, if nobody sold?

Maybe enough holders sold stocks to people paying 33% more to account for the difference. Good luck with that math. You can root it out if you want.

But it’s not necessary.  We already know the answer. The money went into derivatives. 

The word “derivative” sounds fancy and opaque and mysterious. It’s not.  It’s a substitute for an asset.  You can buy a Renoir painting. You can buy a Renoir print for a lot less. You can buy a stock. You can buy an option on that stock for a lot less.

Suppose you want to buy the stocks in the S&P 500 but you don’t want the trouble and expense of buying 500 of them (a Renoir). You can buy a swap (a print, No. 347 of 3,900), pay a bank to give you the returns on the index (minus the fee).

Or you can buy SPY, the S&P 500 ETF.  You think you’re getting a Renoir.  All those stocks. No, you’re getting a print somebody ran on an inkjet printer.  It looks the same but it’s not, and it’s not worth the stocks beneath it.

Image courtesy ModernIR, Aug 25, 2021.

See this image?  There is demand.  There is supply. The former greatly exceeds the latter like we’ve seen the last year during a Covid Pandemic (chew on that one for a bit), so excess demand shunts off to a SUBSTITUTE. Derivatives. ETFs, options, futures.

That’s what’s going on. That’s where the money went. Look at GME and AMC yesterday. Explosive gains on no news. Why? Banks squared derivatives books yesterday after the August expirations period. Demand for prints (options), not paintings (stock), vastly exceeded supply.

So banks bought the underlying paintings called GME and AMC – and sold traders ten times as many prints. Options. Derivatives. It’s implied demand. The stocks shot up.

Bad? Well, not good. The point isn’t doom. The point is understanding where the money is going. Every trader, investor, public company, should understand it. 

It’s all measurable if you stop thinking about the market like it’s 1995. It’s just math. About 18% of the market is in derivatives.  But about 75% of prices are transient things with no substance.  Prints, not paintings.

Public companies, know what part of your market is Renoir, what part is just a print.  Traders, do the same.

We have that data.  Everybody should always know where the money is going.

Rewards of Risk

Investor relations involves risk.  And that’s good. 

Don’t you mean investing involves risk, Tim? And why is it good?

Well, yes, investing is a risky endeavor. But I mean the role of “investor relations,” the liaison to Wall Street at public companies, requires taking risk.

It’s not a “yes” job.  You’ll need the courage and occasional temerity to tell your executive team and board what each needs to understand about the equity market – and occasionally what not to do.

Time would fail me to tell you about all the times I’ve had conversations with IR folks who say, “I’m not sure my Board is willing to….” Pick your thing.

In my case, it happens when I explain that 10% of trading volume is rational stock-picking.

Some recoil in horror.  What am I going to do if the executives know 90% of our trading volume is something we can’t control?

If they don’t know, you’ll face unrealistic expectations.  Considered that possibility?  If your board and executive team don’t know how the stock market works, is that a good thing or a bad thing?

We’re still getting to what’s good about risk.

It’s our job to know how the stock market works and to be able to articulate what’s controllable and what’s not. Take the so-called meme stocks like AMC.  I credit AMC leadership for raising capital while the market embraces the stock.  They didn’t make the rules that permit crazy trading. They’re adapting.

And do you know how a stock with 450 million shares outstanding can trade 650 million in a day?  Yes, Fast Trading, in part.  Machines moving the same shares over and over.

But the big reason reaches back to the basics of how today’s stock market works under contemporary rules.  All shares must pass through a broker-dealer. All stocks must trade between the best bid to buy and offer to sell.  And all brokers who are registered to trade stocks must make a minimum bid and offer, both, of 100 shares.

Well, what if there aren’t 100 shares available?  There are no appliances available to install tomorrow in your house.  The electrical market is running out of GFCI outlets. Sherwin Williams is running out of paint.  You may not be able to get a load of lumber.

Yet somehow, magically, there is always 100 shares of your stock for sale. 

It’s not magic. It’s rules.  Rules require brokers and stock exchanges to connect to each other electronically. If they’re registered and not using “Unlisted Trading Privileges” to bid or offer rather than do both, brokers must commit to 100 shares each direction.

Well, it’s impossible. There aren’t 100 shares of everything available at every moment without artificial intervention.

So the SEC let’s brokers create shares under Rule 203(b)(2), the market-maker short-locate exemption, in order to assure 100 are always available.  Well, technically they’re shorting it without having to locate it.  Those trades have to be marked short.  And AMC has had short volume of 50-60% of total trading for two weeks running.

Brokers are manufacturing stock. That’s how the meme stocks scream. Brokers are selling buyers shares that don’t exist. If you’re in the IR profession, should you know these things?

So, why is risk good?  Mitch Daniels, President of Purdue University and ever a ready source for well-turned phrases, told graduates last month, “Our faculty has determined that data analysis, as we now call it, should be as universal a part of a Boilermaker education as English composition.”

We IR people are good at English composition. We need to be great at data.  Because, quoting President Daniels, certainty is an illusion. Just like those shares of AMC, and a swath of the whole market.

But leaders offer the capacity to understand the knowns and unknowns and make confident choices and recommendations.

I think data analytics are as vital to the IR job now as knowing Reg FD and Sarbanes-Oxley. The market translates our companies into digital value.  We need to understand it.

Otherwise we’ll be too fearful to lead our execs and boards boldly through the market we’ve got today.  Sure, there’s risk.  But the rewards of bold leadership never go out of style.  And we need that now more than ever.

Metastable

Editorial Note:  A giant thank you to Client Services Director Perry Grueber for penning last week’s Map.  He’ll be back regularly, by popular demand. This week you’re stuck again with me. -TQ

Something is worth what another is willing to pay for it.

That’s the lesson of the maelstrom in financial markets, from wood pulp futures, to bitcoin, to GME, to AMC, to wherever the next Dutch tulip bulb of the 21st century showers the shocked with inflationary sparks.

Before we get to that, we’re back from riding the trade winds around Antigua, where high season in the Caribbean looks like turnout for a vegan tour at an abattoir. Nobody is there.  And the Caribbean has no central bank doling out cash for sitting home trading in a Robinhood account.  We did our best to offer economic support.

I’ve posted some photos of our circumnavigation here.

Oh, and you’ll recall that my Jan 27 Map said, “Congrats, Tom Brady. We old folks relish your indomitable way.”  When you’re going to sea, always bet on the buccaneers. And the old guy.

We were saying a thing is worth what somebody is willing to pay.

Yesterday GME closed at $50.31.  On the Benzinga Premarket Prep Show Jan 25, right before we grabbed our flipflops and duffle bags and bolted with our Covid19 negatives for the airport, I told the audience, “Market Structure shows GME is going to go up.”

I didn’t know it would rise to $483 while we were at sea.  But somebody was willing to pay more. Until they weren’t.

Right now, AMC, BB, BBBY, NOK, and so on, are outliers.  What if the scatterplot gets crowded?

Most of the people on what Karen calls the “What Do You Think of THIS Stock?” TV shows are still talking about the PE ratio. Earnings growth. Secular trends. Economic drivers. You get the idea.

Investor-relations people, are you prepared for a market full of Gamestops – surging highs, avalanche tumbles? How about you, investors? 

In physics and electronics, “metastability” is the capacity of a system to persist in unstable equilibrium. That is, it seems solid but it’s not.  Like the stock market.

Don’t blame Reddit.  I love the flexed muscle of the masses.  I’d like to see it in society elsewhere, frankly.  A horde of people who refuse to be told what to do or told they can’t.  A mob of unruly traders is wholly American.

But all those people, and all the rest of us in the capital markets, ought to understand the metastability that makes a GME or an AMC possible.

Most retail orders are sold to intermediaries trading at extreme speeds.  Those firms aren’t calculating PE ratios. They’ll pay somebody for a trade so long as they know somebody else in the pipeline is willing to pay more.

Hordes of limit orders hit the pipeline, and intermediaries see the whole hierarchy. They race prices up, skipping swaths of limits by raising the price past them. So those traders, if they’re greedy and willing to chase, jump out of line and enter new, higher limit orders.

And mania ensues because somebody is willing to pay more. 

When the high-speed intermediaries see that limit orders to buy and sell are equalizing, they stop filling limit orders, they short stocks, and they skip limit orders on the way down, and the whole cavalcade reverses.

And it’s not just retail flow or big high-speed penny-pickers in the middle. Quant firms do it. Hedge funds do it.

Two factors make a metastable stock market possible.  First, rules require a spread between the bid to buy and offer to sell.  So somebody will always have a split-second motivation to pay more for something than somebody else.

Indeed, it’s what regulators intended. How do you foster a market that never runs out of goods? Give them a reason to always buy and sell (exchanges pay them for best prices to boot). And regulators let those Fast Traders manufacture shares – short them – that don’t exist, and persist at it for weeks.

The market is nearly riskless at any price for the raciest members moving unseen through the Reddit ranks. They bought the trades. They know what everybody is doing.

And that’s why we have a metastable market.

The alternative? You might not be able to buy FB or sell NFLX at times.

Would we rather have a false market with ever-present orders or a real market occasionally without them? Regulators chose the former. So did the Federal Reserve, by the way.

And that’s why everybody in the US stock market better know how it works. We do. Ask us for help, public companies, and investors.