Tagged: investor relations

Proportional Response

Proportional Response is the art of defusing geopolitical conflict.

Proportional Response is also efficient effort. With another earnings season underway in the stock market, efficient effort should animate both investment decisions, and investor-relations for public companies.

I’ve mentioned the book The Man Who Solved the Market, about Jim Simons, founder of Renaissance Technologies. There’s a point where an executive is explaining to potential investors how “RenTec” achieves its phenomenal returns.

The exec says, “We have a signal. Sometimes it tells us to buy Chrysler, sometimes it tells us to sell.”

The investors stare at him.

Chrysler hadn’t been a publicly traded stock for years (they invested anyway – a proportional response).

That executive – a math PhD from IBM – didn’t care about the companies behind stocks. It didn’t bear on returns. There are vast seas of money rifling through stocks with no idea what the companies behind them do.

RenTec is a quant-trading firm. Earnings calls are irrelevant save that its models might find opportunity in fleeting periods – even fractions of seconds – to trade divergences.

Divergences, tracking errors, are the bane of passive money benchmarked to indexes. If your stock veers up or down, it’ll cease for a time to be used in statistical samples for index and exchange-traded funds (ETFs).

And hedge funds obsess on risk-adjusted returns, the Sharpe Ratio (a portfolio’s return, minus the risk-free rate, divided by standard deviation), which means your fundamentals won’t be enough to keep you in a portfolio if your presence deteriorates it.

Before your eyes glaze over, I’m headed straight at a glaring point.  Active stock-pickers are machinating over financial results, answers to questions on earnings calls, corporate strategy, management capability, on it goes.

On the corporate side, IR people as I said last week build vast tomes to help execs answer earnings-call questions.

Both parties are expending immense effort to achieve results (investment returns, stock-returns). Is it proportional to outcomes?

IR people should have their executive teams prepared for Q&A. But let’s not confuse 2020 with the market in 1998 when thousands of people tuned to Yahoo! earnings calls (that was the year I started using a new search engine called Google).

It’s not 2001 when about 75% of equity assets were held by active managers and some 70% of volume was driven by fundamentals.

It’s 2020. JP Morgan claims combined indexed money, ETFs, proprietary trading and quant funds are 80% of assets. We see in our data every day that about 86% of volume comes from a motivation besides rational thought predicated on fundamental factors.

Proportional Response for IR people is a one-page fact sheet for execs with metrics, highlights, and expected Q&A.  The vast preparatory effort of 20 years ago is disproportionate to its impact on stock-performance now.

Proportional response for investors and public companies alike today should, rather than the intensive fundamental work of years past, now incorporate quantitative data science on market structure.

IR people, don’t report during options-expirations. You give traders a chance to drive brief and large changes to options prices. Those moves obscure your message and confuse investors (and cause execs to incorrectly blame IR for blowing the message).

Here’s your data science: Know your daily short-volume trends and what behaviors are corresponding to it, and how those trends compare to previous quarters. Know your market-structure Sentiment, your volatility trends, the percentages of your volume driven by Active and Passive Investment and how these compare to past periods.

Put these data in another fact sheet for your executive team and board.  Provide guidance on how price may move that reflects different motivations besides story (we have a model that does it instantly).

Measure the same data right after results and again a week and a month later. What changed? If you delivered a growth message, did growth money respond? That’s quantitatively measurable. How long before market structure metrics mean-reverted?

Investors, data science on market structure isn’t another way to invest. It’s core to predicting how prices will behave because it reflects the demographics driving supply and demand.

There are just a thousand stocks behind 95% of market cap. You won’t beat the market by owning something somebody else doesn’t. You’ll beat it by selling Overbought stocks and buying Oversold ones.  Not by buying accelerating earnings, or whatever.

The stock market today reflects broad-based mean-reversion interspersed with divergences. RenTec solved the market, we’re led to conclude, by identifying these patterns.  The proportional response for the rest of us is to learn patterns too.

What Matters

Happy New Year!

I hope you enjoyed our gift:  A two-week break from my bloviating!  We’d planned to run best-of columns and thought better, because everybody deserves a respite.

We relished the season in the Colorado mountains, as this album shows (see world-class ski-race video too).  If the album eludes you, this is Steamboat Springs 2020, and us on snowshoes, and the view up high where it’s always 3 o’clock (a superb ski run).

I’m thinking about 2020.  And I’m reading “The Man Who Solved the Market,” about quant hedge fund Renaissance Technologies, by Wall Street Journal reporter Greg Zuckerman.  You should read it, too.

About 47% in, my Kindle says, Zuckerman writes, “One day, a data-entry error caused the fund to purchase five times as many wheat-futures contracts as it intended, pushing prices higher.

“Picking up the next day’s Wall Street Journal, sheepish staffers read that analysts were attributing the price surge to fears of a poor wheat harvest.”

There’s so much going on behind stock-prices that’s something other than we think. The point for IR people and investors is why do we do what we do?

In fact, it’s a human question. We do things on the belief they count.

For instance, the quarterly “Q&A bible,” the compendium of earnings-call questions, dominated holiday discussion in NIRI eGroups.

Discourse is great.  But does all that preparatory effort matter?

If we’re spending the same time and effort in 2020 on earnings-call Q&A that we did in 2000, well, why?  In 2000, more than 70% of the money was rational. Today it’s 14%.

Tesla is up 42% the past year, which included an earnings call where CEO Elon Musk trashed an analyst during Q&A.  The Twittersphere blew up.

The stock didn’t.

You should have your executive team prepared for questions, investor-relations professionals. But you don’t need a bible in 2020 because rational behavior is a paltry part of why stocks move.

Equal to preparation for questions should be the time directed to educating your executives and board on what can move price with results, and why, and what historical data indicate are risks, and why risk exists in the first place – and if you can mitigate it by changing WHEN you report and how you notify investors.

And if you’re 10/10 Overbought and 60% short before you report, put your best VALUE foot forward. Data, not Q&A, should driver call-prep.

Human beings do things because they ostensibly matter and produce returns.  If we’re going through motions because it’s tradition, then 2020 should be the year you change tradition.

And investors. What matters to you?  Returns, right?

The average S&P 500 component moves 36% every month, intraday (1.6% each day between highest and lowest prices), change often lost in closing prices.  In a perfectly modulated, utterly quantitative Shangri-La, you’d capture ALL of that by buying low and selling high.  You could make 432% per year.

That’ll never happen. Eugene Fama, legendary University of Chicago economics professor, who’s 80 years old and still teaching, won a Nobel Prize for demonstrating the return-diminishing pugnacity of volatility.

But if there’s so much volatility, why expend immense effort finding great companies when the odds are roughly 1% that doing so will produce market-beating returns?

Wouldn’t it be smarter – wouldn’t it matter more – to surf volatility waves in today’s market?

I find in traveling around the country – we’re headed to Austin Thursday – talking to IR people and investors that they’re depressed by these things.

If what we learned doesn’t matter, should we rend garments, gnash teeth and weep?

No.

That’s like being depressed by passing time.  Time is a fact.  We can make the most of it, or we can rue its passage.  What’s it gonna be?

So what, IR people, if you don’t need a 400-page Q&A document that requires a software package to manage?  A single Word page, stored to the cloud so you can cross-reference in future quarters, is proportionate.  You’ve saved TIME to do things that MATTER.

What matters?  If you want to be in the US equity markets in 2020 as a public company, an investor-relations professional, an investor, what matters is knowing what money is doing.

It’s a law of success.  It’s not what you know about YOU that matters.  It’s what you know about life, the environment you’re in, the job you’re doing, about how to build relationships.

Right?

We should stop spending all our time understanding our businesses, and none understanding the market that assigns value to them.  That’s the flaw of IR.  Nothing more.  Let’s change it in 2020.

And you investors, why all the Sisyphean work finding great businesses without first understanding how the market transforms those businesses into products with fleeting and ever-evolving value?

If you could capture just 10% of the daily volatility of the S&P 500 by buying stuff low and selling it high, you’d win. It’s provable, useful math. That matters.

Resolve to make 2020 the year you learn what the money is doing.  It matters. We at ModernIR figured out the road map. Ask us how to start on the journey.

Boxed Yellow Pencils

“How do you think about ESG?” said my friend Moriah Shilton at a San Francisco NIRI summit some weeks back with hedge fund Citadel.

Silence. The four panelists shifted around.  A couple whispered to each other. Finally, somebody offered with a throat-clearing cough, “It doesn’t factor into our portfolio decisions.”

For those not fluent in Investor Relations (IR) Speak, ESG is “Environmental, Social, Governance.”  NIRI is the National Investor Relations Institute, professional association for the liaison between public companies and Wall Street.

ESG dominates the contemporary IR educational platform. NIRI has made a policy statement on ESG. There are at least two ESG sessions here at the NIRI Senior Round Table meeting (and NIRI national board meeting) this week in Santa Barbara.

The ESG heat isn’t coming from stock-picking investors, the “long-only” audience of public companies spending billions annually on communication through compliance-driven reports like 10Ks, 10Qs, press releases and proxies and via proactive outreach aimed at increasing share-ownership.

Nor is it, apparently, coming from hedge funds like Citadel, the other key audience – and I’d argue now the vital IR constituency because of its capacity to compete with the Great Passive Investment Wave – for public companies.

In fact, the Citadel team later said, “We vote with management on proxy matters, or we vote with our feet by selling shares.”

It’s passive money that’s obsessed with ESG. Passive investment to us is any form of capital allocation for a day or more (by contrast Fast Trading is an investment horizon of a day or less) driven by rules. That’s index investing, Exchange Traded Funds, or any variety of quantitative investment, from global macro to statistical arbitrage.

True, passives may oppose a proxy measure that doesn’t comport with an ESG platform. They will, however, continue owning the stock. Index funds pegged to a benchmark like the S&P 500 are required to own the securities comprising the benchmark.

It’s cognitively dissonant to own things you oppose.

But aren’t they trying to promote practices that make companies better stewards for stakeholders?

From my first exposure to it, good business has been sound financial management, the right people, products, markets, capital structure, the advancement of the best interests of your customers, employees, communities. These are essential strands of business DNA.

In fact, turning those into a checklist promotes the possibility that mediocre firms are treated the same as stellar ones by virtue of filling out a form.  Rules breed uniformity.

Nowhere is that more apparent than in the stock market, where rules push prices toward a mean. Track the midpoint – as Passive money does – and returns become superior by pegging the average.

The investor-relations profession, the pursuit of excellence, Warren-Buffett-style investment strategies, are about unique differentiation.  What makes a company better, superior?

Rules-based investing makes things the same. Passive money has boomed because shares of companies are increasingly products defined by shared criteria, like ESG. The more of that there is, the greater the probability the market will become homogeneous.

Without dismissing its merits, I’m perplexed by why public companies and stock-picking investors would promote shared criteria like ESG (why not differentiate with ESG if you’re so moved?).  We don’t want the stock market to become a bunch of yellow pencils in a box.

I think a form of guilt has gripped the passive-investment colossus like what manifests among the Silicon Valley nouveau riche who ofttimes with minimal effort realize vast wealth, and then feel compelled to browbeat the rest about the “greater good.”

How one favors the greater good should be individually chosen, not directed by rules.

So from atop vast heaps of assets gained through doing nothing more than tracking a benchmark, Massive Passives are compelled to berate the market over purpose.

If that purpose is an ESG checklist, the purpose is a dictated set of rules.  The very thing passive investment promotes.  Ironic, right? By subtly suggesting moral superiority, passive investment advances its own self-interest: rules-based investing.

Rather than mindlessly embracing ESG as good for all, a sentient species capable of staggering creativity and achievement through the individual pursuit of happiness that inures to the benefit of the masses owes itself moments of objective reflection.

And the question to ponder is whether a uniform ESG blanket tossed over the capital markets furthers the pursuit of the excellence the IR profession and stock-pickers seek.

In Control

This is what Steamboat Springs looked like June 21, the first day of summer (yes, that’s a snow plow).

Before winter returned, we were hiking Emerald Mountain there and were glad the big fella who left these tracks had headed the other way (yes, those are Karen’s shoes on the upper edge, for a size comparison).

A setup for talking about a bear market?  No.  But there are structural facts you need to know.  Such as why are investor-relations goals for changes to the shareholder base hard to achieve?

We were in Chicago seeing customers and one said, “Some holders complain we’re underperforming our peers because we don’t have the right shareholder mix. We develop a plan to change it.  We execute our outreach. When we compare outcomes to goals after the fact, we’ve not achieved them.”

Why?

The cause isn’t a failure of communication. It’s market structure.  First, many Active funds have had net outflows over the last decade as money shifted from expensive active management to inexpensive passive management.

It’s trillions of dollars.  And it means stock-pickers are often sellers, not buyers.

As the head of equities for a major fund complex told me, “Management teams come to see my analysts and tell the story, but we’ve got redemptions.  We’re not buying stocks. We’re selling them. And getting into ETFs.”

Second, conventional funds are by rule fully invested.  To buy something they must sell something else.  It’s hard business now.  While the average trade size rose the past two weeks from about 155 shares to 174 shares, it’s skewed by mega caps.  MRK is right at the average.  But FDX’s average trade size is 89 shares.  I saw a company yesterday averaging 45 shares per trade.

Moving 250,000 shares 45 at a time is wildly inefficient. It also means investors are continually contending with incorrect prices. Stocks quote in 100-share increments. If they trade in smaller fractions, there’s a good chance it’s not at the best displayed price.

That’s a structural problem that stacks the deck against active stock pickers, who are better off using Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) that have limitless supply elasticity (ETFs don’t compete in the market for stocks. All stock-movement related to creating and redeeming ETF shares occurs off-market in giant blocks).

Speaking of market-structure (thank you, Joe Saluzzi), the Securities Traders Association had this advice for issuers:  Educate yourself on the market and develop a voice.

Bottom line, IR people, you need to understand how your stock trades and what its characteristics are, so you and your executive team and the board remain grounded in the reality of what’s achievable in a market dominated by ETFs.

Which brings us to current market structure.  Yesterday was “Counterparty Tuesday” when banks true up books related to options expiring last week and new ones that traded Monday.  The market was down because demand for stocks and derivatives from ETFs was off a combined 19% the past week versus 20-day averages.

It should be up, not down.

Last week was quad-witching when stock and index options and futures lapsed. S&P indexes rebalanced for the quarter. There was Phase III of the annual Russell reconstitution, which concludes Friday. Quarterly window-dressing should be happening now, as money tracking any benchmark needs to true up errors by June 28.

Where’d the money go?

If Passive money declines, the market could tip over. We’re not saying it’s bound to happen.  More important than the composition of an index is the amount of money pegged to it – trillions with the Russells (95% of it the Russell 1000), even more for S&P indices.

In that vein, last week leading into quad witching the lead behavior in every sector was Fast Trading.  Machines, not investors, drove the S&P 500 up 2.2%, likely counting on Passive money manifesting (as we did).

If it doesn’t, Fast Traders will vanish.

Summing up, we need to know what’s within our control.  Targeting investors without knowing market structure is like a farmer cutting hay without checking the weather report.  You can’t control the weather. You control when you cut hay – to avoid failure.

The same applies to IR (and investing, for that matter) in modern markets.

Dragon Market

As the market fell yesterday like a dragon from the sky (Game of Throners, the data are not good on dragon longevity now), 343 companies reported results, 10% of all firms.

Market fireworks were blamed yet again on tariff fears. Every tantrum is the Fed or tariffs it seems, even with hundreds publishing earnings. What happened to the idea that results drive markets?

Speaking of data, on May 6, the market first plunged like a bungee jumper off a bridge – and then caromed back up to a nonevent.

Behind the move, 21% of companies had new Rational Prices – Active money leading other behaviors and buying. That’s more than twice the year-long average of about 9% and the third-highest mark over the entire past year.

Talk about buying the dip. Smart money doesn’t see tariffs as threats to US interests (and likes the economic outlook, and likes corporate financial results). We’ve been using them to fund government since the Hamilton Tariffs of 1789.

So if not tariffs, why did stocks fall?

Before I tell you what the data show: Come to the NIRI Annual Conference, friends and colleagues. I’m moderating a panel the first day featuring hedge-fund legend Lee Cooperman, market-structure expert and commentator Joe Saluzzi, and SEC head of Trading and Markets Brett Redfearn.

We’ll talk about the good and bad in market-evolution the past 50 years and what’s vital to know now.  Sign up here.

IR folks, you’re the chief intelligence officer for capital markets. Your job is more than telling the story. It’s time to lead your executive team and board to better understand the realities driving your equity value, from Exchange Traded Funds to shorting and event-driven trends. It’s how we remain relevant.

Before you report results, you should know what the money that’s about you, your story, your results, your strategy, is doing – and what the rest of it is doing too. 

Take LYFT, which reported yesterday for the first time. Just 8% of LYFT volume is from Active Investment. By contrast about 22% is quantitative event-driven money, and over 58% is fast machines trading the tick. The balance ties to derivatives.

From that data, one can accurately extrapolate probable outcomes (ask us for your Market Expectation, or LYFT’s, and we’ll show you).

Every IR team should be arming its board and executives with a view of all the money, not just musing on how core holders may react – which is generally not at all.

And investors, if you’re focused only on fundamentals without respect to market structure, you’ll get burned.  I can rattle off a long list of companies beating and raising whose shares fell. The reasons aren’t rational but arbitrage-driven.

Having kept you in the dark like a Game of Thrones episode, let’s throw light on the data behind the late equity swoon: Always follow the money (most in financial media are not).

ETFs are 50% of market volume.  There have been $1.4 trillion (estimating for Apr and May) of ETF shares created and redeemed in 2019 already.

ETF shares are collateralized with stocks, but ETFs do not pool investor assets to buy stocks. In exchange for tax-free collateral, they trade to brokers the right to create ETF shares to sell to investors. The collateral is baskets of stocks – that they own outright.

The motivation, the profit opportunity, for that collateral has got nothing to do with tariffs or earnings or the economy. It’s more like flipping houses.

An Invesco PowerShares rep quipped to one of our team, “You see that coffee cup? I’d take that as collateral if I could flip it for a penny.”

ETF sponsors and brokers in very short cycles flip ETF shares and collateral. As with real estate where it works

Tech Sector Composite Stocks — Behavioral Data

great until houses start to fall in value, the market craters when all the parties chasing collateral try to get out at once (and it happens suddenly).

ETF patterns for the top year-to-date sector, Tech, are elongated way beyond normal parameters (same for two of three other best YTD sectors). It suggests ETFs shares have been increasing without corresponding rises in collateral.

With the market faltering, there’s a dash to the door to profit on collateral before the value vanishes. One thing can trigger it. A tweet? Only if a move down in stocks threatens to incinerate – like a dragon – the value of collateral.

How important is that for IR teams, boards, executives and investors to understand?

Driverless Market

Suppose you were human resources director for a fleet of driverless taxis.

As Elon Musk proposes streets full of autonomous autos, the market has become that fleet for investors and investor-relations professionals.  The market drives itself. What we measure as IR professionals and investors should reflect a self-driving market.

There’s nothing amiss with the economy or earnings. About 78% of companies reporting results so far this quarter, FactSet says, are beating expectations, a tad ahead of the long-term average of 72%.

But a closer look shows earnings unchanged from a year ago. In February last year with the market anticipating earnings goosed by the corporate tax cut of 2017, stocks plunged, and then lurched in Q3 to heights we’re now touching anew, and then nosedived in the fourth quarter.

An honest assessment of the market’s behavior warrants questioning whether the autonomous vehicle of the market has properly functioning sensors. If a Tesla sped down the road and blew a stop sign and exploded, it would lead all newscasts.

No matter the cacophony of protestations I might hear in response to this assertion, there is no reasonable, rational explanation for the fourth-quarter stock-implosion and its immediate, V-shaped hyperbolic restoration. Sure, stocks rise and fall (and will do both ahead). But these inexplicable bursts and whooshes should draw scrutiny.

Investor-relations professionals, you are the HR director for the driverless fleet. You’re the chief intelligence officer of the capital markets, whose job encompasses a regular assessment of market sensors.

One of the sensors is your story.  But you should consistently know what percentage of the driving instructions directing the vehicle are derived from it.  It’s about 12% marketwide, which means 88% of the market’s navigational data is something else.

Investors, the same applies. The market is as ever driven by its primary purpose, which is determined not by guesses, theory or tradition, but by what dominates price-setting.  In April, the dominating behavior is Exchange-Traded Funds.  Active investment was third of four big behaviors, ahead only of Fast Trading (curious, as Fast Traders avoid risk).

ETF shares are priced by spreads versus underlying stocks. Sure, investors buy them thinking they are consuming pooled investments (they’re not). But the motivation driving ETFs is whether they increase or decrease in price marginally versus stocks.

ETF market-makers supply stocks to a sponsor like Blackrock, which grants them authority to create an equal value of ETF shares to sell into the market. They aim to sell ETFs for a few basis points more than the value of exchanged shares.

The trade works in reverse when the market-maker borrows ETF shares to return to Blackrock in exchange for a group of stocks that are worth now, say, 50 basis points more than the stocks the market-maker originally offered.

If a market-maker can turn 30-50 basis points of profit per week this way, it’s a wildly winning, no-risk strategy. And it can and does carry the market on its updraft. We see it in patterns.

If it’s happening to your stock, IR professionals, it’s your job to know. Investors, you must know too, or you’ll draw false conclusions about the durability of cycles.

Big Market Lesson #1 in 2019: Learn how to measure behaviors. They’re sensors. Watch what’s driving your stock and the market higher (or lower – and yes, we have a model).

Speaking of learning, IR people, attend the 50th Anniversary NIRI Annual Conference. We have awesome content planned for you, including several not-to-be-missed market-structure sessions on hedge funds, the overall market, and ETFs.  Listen for a preview here and see the conference agenda here.  Sign up before May 15 for the best rate.

Big Market Lesson #2: Understand what stops a driverless market.

ETF-led rallies stall when the spread disappears. We have a sensor for that at ModernIR, called Market Structure Sentiment™ that meters when machines stop lifting or lowering prices.

It’s a 10-point scale that must remain over 5.0 for shares to rise. It’s averaged 6.2 since Jan 8 and has not been negative since. When it stalls, so will stocks, without respect to earnings or any other fundamental sensor.

I look forward to driverless cars. But we’ll want perfected technology before trusting them. The same should apply to a driverless stock market.

 

Activism Science

In fourteen years, we’ve not missed an Activist.

“Chest-thumping, Quast?” you say.

No, a market structure lesson, a way for investor-relations professionals to be valuable.

Activism has become the de jour Value Investment proposition for modern markets. Our data indicate 10% of all US stocks – just 12% of daily volume is driven by Active Investment – have footprints of Activism.

Think about the enormous sums spent on Activism defense.  Surveillance firms that (no offense, friends!) almost never catch Activist presence proactively because Activists have had 35 years to know how to hide their footprints from settlement-based market intelligence.

The lawyers.  The bankers. The proxy solicitors. The communications consultants.  The running taxicab meter for expenses.

I’m not saying these advisors are pointless by any stretch. But wouldn’t it be prudent to observe what the money is actually doing?  I can offer a litany of examples (scores, but here just a few).

We saw footprints of Activism more than a quarter ahead of the advent of Activism in a small-cap.  Nine months later, the Activist pushed the company into a merger with a competitor.

Maybe a deal was best. But clunky Activist steps were crudely apparent in the data. We’d see a burst of derivatives bets – and five days later the Activist would issue some public declamation. So we could always tell the company when the Activist was about to spout off again.

At no point during the process were investors enthusiastic – but management quit early. The data clearly indicated they could win. The bankers didn’t have that data. Neither did surveillance or the proxy solicitors. I don’t know what those advisors told the team. Isn’t it wise to check and balance your advisors too?

Our data in the hands of a management team with temerity would have produced a fight – and maybe a much better deal.

Market Structure Analytics are like an EKG. We can see how the heart of investment is responding. Is there a burst of adrenaline? We’ll measure it. Apathy? We’ll see that too.

We warned another small-cap two quarters before Elliott showed up in 13Fs (and surveillance was utterly unaware throughout). We have algorithms that remove subjectivity. They are indiscriminate in identifying hedge funds, which half the time are not nefarious. But it’s better to know than not, right?

Advance warning put management in a strong position, and while that situation too also concluded in a deal, the company drove it rather than the other way around, which is always best for executive teams. And too, investor-relations is frontline defense, chief of intelligence for its boards and executive teams. That earns rewards, kudos.

In a high-profile case, we observed pervasive deal-arbitrage in a large-cap with a controlling shareholder. We told the IR team we were flummoxed, but the data were irrefutable. People were betting on a deal. They had no answer.

Then they and we both learned that indeed a deal was in the works that no one (apparently not no one!) ostensibly knew about, including the IR team.

Then an Activist manifested. Every time the Activist would publicly oppose the plan, we saw short-covering and long bets hidden behind headline selling – telling us the Activist really favored the plan but wanted a bone, an appeasement.

That data was vital for decision-making and led to a solution favorable to all parties.

Behavioral data isn’t a silver bullet freeing you from the travails of event-driven behavior (Market Structure Analytics are equally effective at predicting deals and their success, signaling where arbs expect news, predicting and tracking the arc – including success or failure – of short attacks, and spotlighting big bets on surprises around financial results).

The market is mathematical. It’s unwise in event-driven situations to spend all your resources on qualitative input from wildly expensive advisors, when affordable quantitative data offers the most accurate, predictive, unvarnished and timely view of success, failure, threats, opportunities.

If you want to know how we see Activism, deal-arbitrage, short attacks and more, ask us. We can look back historically and show patterns around your own experiences – which lays the foundation for future warning. And we have a compendium of event-driven situations we’ve addressed.

What’s better than glimpses into the future? Would that we had more of them in life – but you can have them in the stock market. It’s math. And science.

Surly Furious

Surly Furious would be a great name for a rock band. And maybe it describes stocks.  It’s for certain the name of a great Minnesota beer.

We are in Minneapolis, one of our favorite cities, where Midwest client services Director Perry Grueber lives, and where nature sprays and freezes into the artful marvel of Minnehaha Falls, and where over pints of Furious IPA from Surly Brewing we deconstructed investor-relations into late evening.

It got us thinking. ModernIR launched Sector Insights this week to measure how money behaves by sector. The data we track show all sectors topping save Consumer Staples.

“Wait, topped? The market has been declining.”

We’re not surprised that closing prices are reverting to the mean, the average, after big swings. You need to understand, public companies and investors, that the market isn’t motivated by your interests.

It’s driven by profit opportunity in the difference in prices between this group of securities or that, over this period or that.

How do we know?  Because it’s what market rules and investment objectives promote. Prices in stocks are set by the best bid to buy or offer to sell – which can never be the same – and motivated most times not by effort to buy or sell stocks but instead by how the price will change.

Who cares?  You should, investors and public companies.

Suppose I told you that in this hotel where you’re staying the elevator only goes to the 5th floor.  You decide it’s immaterial and you set out to reach the 6th floor. You lead your board of directors and executives to believe it should be their expectation that they can reach the 5th floor. Yet as you arrive at the elevator you learn it goes only to the 4th floor.

Whose fault is that?

The beer that put Minneapolis on the map is from Surly Brewing, an India Pale Ale called Furious. What’s better in a name than Surly Furious?  It’s worth drinking.

When the market is surly and furious, you should know it. We can see it first in Market Structure Reports (we can run them for any company), and then in Sector Insights (just out Dec 10) and in the broad market.

Number one question: How does it change what I do?  Investors, it’s easy. Don’t buy Overbought sectors or markets. Don’t sell Oversold sector or markets, no matter how surly and furious they may seem.

Public companies, we expend immense effort and dollars informing investors. Data suggest disclosure costs exceed $5 billion annually for US public companies.

If we discovered the wind blows only from the west, why would we try to sail west? If we discover passive investors are attracting 100% of net new investor inflows, and investors don’t buy or sell your stock, should you not ask what the purpose is of all the money you’re spending to inform investors who never materialize?

We can fear the question and call it surly, or furious. Or we can take the data – which we offer via Market Structure Reports and Sector Insights – and face it and use it to change investor expectations.

Which would you prefer? We’ve now released Sector Reports. If you’d like to know what Sentiment indicates for your stock, your sector — or the broad market — ask us.

Deal Data

From another rumor that game-maker Zynga might have a buyer, to a Trian bid for Papa John’s, to Bill Ackman’s stake in Starbucks, deals and rumors of them abound. Suppose it’s your company, investor-relations professionals. How do you add value for your executives?

These situations are often chess games.  Here’s an example, since much of the drama is now old news.  When Disney battled Comcast for 21st Century Fox and before bids were hiked, patterns of deal arbitrage signaled starkly that a war would ensue.

One could say it’s logical that the price would rise, and so it was.  But there is no certitude like the power of data – patterns of long bets, covered bets. They are stark in the market if one knows how to measure the data (which we do).

After Disney won the bidding war, data then showed high expectation Comcast would win Sky Broadcasting, the European unit partly owned by Disney.  Data then signaled a sudden turn toward accelerated bidding – before the UK Takeover Panel announced that a speeded process would indeed follow.

Think about the data-powered value investor-relations, so armed, delivers to those making important decisions.

I’ll give you more examples.  Two years ago, longtime client Energy Transfer tried a combination with The Williams Companies that would have created an energy giant. The deal-arbitrage data were woeful. Active money stopped buying. Massive short bets formed and never wavered. Ultimately, the firms called off the effort.

A later plan to consolidate Sunoco, an Energy Transfer unit, presented challenges. It would cut cash distributions by roughly a quarter.  Would holders support it?

Data patterns were opposite what we’d seen in the Williams deal – strong, long bets, solid Active investment. We were confident shareholders would approve. And they did.

The company is now consolidating its Master Limited Partnership into the general partner.  We highlighted big positive bets at September options expirations. A week later, both Glass Lewis and ISS came out in favor of the transaction.

Data are every bit as powerful an IR tool as telling the story.  Maybe more so, because we have a mathematical market today riven with behaviors that arbitrage events and track benchmarks passively, motivations fueled by mathematical probabilities and balances more than story.

Oh, did I mention? We have never yet missed an Activist in the data. We’ve always warned early. And we’ve seen a bunch of them.  We know legacy market intelligence struggles to find them because, as we wrote last week, routinely 98% of trading volume fails to manifest in settlement data.

In one instance years ago, Carl Icahn took a major stake in a pharmaceutical company that had two high-paid surveillance providers watching. Neither saw it. Suddenly, Icahn filed with over 8 million shares – accumulated without buying a single share (he used European-style puts.).

We showed the company Market Structure Analytics and the stark patterns of derivatives.  They hired us. Subsequently, our data showed investors were betting against Icahn. His proxy bid to put a slate of directors on the board failed.  We then tracked his gradual withdrawal in the data. Not through shares owned but in patterns of behavior (nearly realtime, at T+1).

Lips can lie. Data those behind it believe are hidden from view – but which shine like light through night-vision goggles for us – is truth.  We have an unfolding situation now where what hedge funds are doing and saying are diametrically opposite. That’s a negotiating tactic. Since management knows, they have the stronger hand.

That’s IR in the age of Big Data.  And it’s fun to boot!  Seeing patterns of behavior and reporting it to executives and board directors puts IR in the right-hand advisory seat.  Right where it belongs in this era of fast machines and market reavers.

If you want a confidential analytics assessment of what’s behind your price and volume (which are not metrics but consequences of behaviors), let us know.

Block Monopoly

This year’s rare midweek July 4 prompted a pause for the Market Structure Map to honor our Republic built on limited government and unbounded individual liberty. Long may it live.

Returning to our market narrative: Did you know that 100% of Exchange Traded Fund creations and redemptions occur in block trades?

If you’ve got 48 minutes and a desire to understand ETFs, catch my podcast (you can get our ETF White Paper too) with IR Magazine’s Jeff Cossette.

In stocks, according to publicly reported data, three-tenths of one percent (0.3%) of NYSE trades are blocks (meaning 99.7% are non-block).  The Nasdaq compiles data differently but my back-of-the-envelope math off known data says blocks are about the same there – a rounding error of all trades.

Blocks have shrunk due to market regulation. Rules say stock trades must meet at a single national price between the best bid to buy and offer to sell.  That price relentlessly changes, especially for the biggest thousand stocks comprising 95% of volume and market cap (north of $2.5 billion to make the cut) so the amount of shares available at the best price is most times tiny.

We track the data.  At July 9, the average Russell 1000 stock traded 13,300 times per day in 160-share increments.  If you buy and sell shares 200 at a time like high-speed traders or algorithmic routers that dissolve and spray orders like crop-dusters, it’s great.

But if you buy cheese by the wheel, so to speak, getting a slice at a time means you’re not in the cheese-wheel buying business but instead in the order-hiding business. Get it? You must trick everybody into thinking you want a slice, not a wheel.

The cause? Market structure. Regulation National Market System, the regime governing stock trades, says one exchange must send to another any trade for which a better price exists there (so big exchanges pay traders to set price. IEX, the newest, doesn’t).

Put simply, exchanges are forced by rules to share prices. Exchanges cannot give preference to any customer over another.

ETFs get different rules. Shares are only created in blocks, and only traded between ETF creators and their only customers, called Authorized Participants.

I’m not making this up. When Blackrock wants more ETF shares, they create them in blocks only.  From Blackrock’s IVV S&P 500 ETF prospectus: Only an Authorized Participant may engage in creation or redemption transactions directly with the Fund. The Fund has a limited number of institutions that may act as Authorized Participants on an agency basis (i.e., on behalf of other market participants).

Why can ETFs offer preference when it’s against the law for exchanges? Fair question. There is no stated answer. The unstated one is that nobody would make markets in ETFs if a handful of firms didn’t have an unassailable competitive advantage, a sure chance to make money (why ETF fees are so low).

Again from the IVV prospectus:

Prior to trading in the secondary market, shares of the Fund are “created” at NAV by market makers, large investors and institutions only in block-size Creation Units of 50,000 shares or multiples thereof.

Each “creator” or authorized participant (an “Authorized Participant”) has entered into an agreement with the Fund’s distributor, BlackRock Investments, LLC (the “Distributor”), an affiliate of BFA. A creation transaction, which is subject to acceptance by the Distributor and the Fund, generally takes place when an Authorized Participant deposits into the Fund a designated portfolio of securities (including any portion of such securities for which cash may be substituted) and a specified amount of cash approximating the holdings of the Fund in exchange for a specified number of Creation Units.

And down a bit further (emphasis in all cases mine):

Only an Authorized Participant may create or redeem Creation Units with the Fund. Authorized Participants may create or redeem Creation Units for their own accounts or for customers, including, without limitation, affiliates of the Fund.

Did you catch that last bit? The creator of ETF shares – only in blocks, off the secondary market (which means not in the stock market) – may create units for itself, for its customers, or even for the Fund wanting ETF shares (here, Blackrock).

And the shares are not created at the best national bid to buy or offer to sell but at NAV – Net Asset Value.

Translating to English: ETF shares are created between two cloistered parties with no competition, off the market, in blocks, at a set price – and then sold to somebody else who will have to compete with others and can only trade at the best national price, which continually changes in the stock market, where no one gets preference and prices are incredibly unstable.

It’s a monopoly.

Two questions:  Why do regulators think this is okay? The SEC issued exemptive orders to the 1940 Investment Company Act (can the SEC override Congress?) permitting it.

We wrote about the enormous size of ETF creations and redemptions. Which leads to Question #2: Why wouldn’t this process become an end unto itself, displacing fundamental investment?