Tagged: IPOs

Spread Too Thin

What if?

Those two words branded with a question mark may rank 2nd all-time behind “what is the meaning of life?”

What if…public companies could set spreads in their own trades?

Before we ponder that, let’s tip hats to IROs Moriah Shilton at Tessera Technology (TSRA) and Kate Scolnick at Seagate (STX), who demonstrated such adroit command of market structure in yesterday’s NIRI webinar on why trading matters in the IR chair (replay available for NIRI members). Expertise like theirs is the future of our profession. Knowledge, as always and ever, is power.

Speaking of knowledge, the SEC yesterday convened a round table on price-spreads in trading, commonly known as “tick-size.” On the panels were finance professors, representatives from major exchanges, venture capitalists, folks from Fidelity and Invesco – and thankfully, David Weild at Grant Thornton/Capital Markets Advisory Partners, and Pat Healy from Issuer Advisory Group, both strong advocates for the interests of public companies.

But there wasn’t a CEO, CFO or IRO from a public company (Moriah Shilton and Kate Scolnick should be on these panels!).

Here’s the issue. Ever since increments between the best prices to buy and sell shares were set by law in 2001 with Decimalization, trading volume has exploded but ranks of public companies and broker-dealers have fallen. In 1997, there were 7,500 public companies. Today there are 3,700 in the National Market System.

At the time, a belief prevailed that small investors couldn’t get a fair shake because brokers and specialists controlled prices in stock markets. So the SEC mandated that prices be set in penny increments. No more trading in eighths or sixteenths of a dollar.

In 1983 there were roughly 450 IPOs in the USA. Thirteen years later in 1996, about 700. The last year US markets remotely approached “hundreds” of IPOs – and thus, hundreds of IR jobs – was in 2000, right before Decimalization. (more…)

Clouds and Wind Without Rain

We’re in glorious Cincinnati where the land is rushing headlong into spring. Even a photo snapped in haste northward at night from Covington at the John Roebling Bridge seems cast in ethereal light.

Speaking of rushing headlong, if you’re here in the heartland, join us at the noon NIRI Tri-State chapter meeting today. We’ll talk about what’s got markets hasting.

There’s a saying from the bible: “Like clouds and wind without rain is a man who boasts of a gift he does not give.”

It made me think of volume. Enough of you have written asking about what may underlie declines in market volume that it deserves a community answer. We hope ours will do.

In 1980, Wilshire Associates was tracking about 3,500 publicly traded companies in its index that would become the Wilshire 5000, the category-leading total-market index. The Dow Jones Industrial Average closed that year at 963. Average daily trading volume was 45 million shares on the NYSE.

By 1990, the Wilshire 5000 had over 5,000 companies as IPOs outpaced consolidation. Average daily volume across the NYSE, Nasdaq and American Stock Exchange was 302 million shares, and the Dow Jones Index closed at 2,633.

In 2000, total companies had slipped from the 1998 zenith of 7,460. But daily volume had mushroomed to 2.8 billion shares. The Dow concluded Y2K at 10,786.

Volume built to helium-laughter level of about 7 billion shares daily in 2009. But in 2012 so far, markets are averaging 3.6 billion shares daily. The Dow is up. But the number of public companies is down. Way down. Care to guess how many make up the Wilshire 5000 in 2012? (more…)

Karen and I are getting in boat shape ahead of a trip to Antigua (Motto: “Don’t ever say the name ‘Allen Stanford’ around here”). But we’ve encountered obstacles to the cycling part of the regimen: Wind and fire. One more, such as earth, and we’ve have a good name for a rock band. It’s been bone-dry and breezy on the Front Range, and already several range fires have burned black swaths.

Speaking of fires, we’re marching through them with the Issuer Data Initiative. The Number One Need is more names behind it. If you haven’t committed support for better trading data, do so today. Your peers will thank you someday, and you can remind them then that they owe you.

Before we get to what happened Mar 16-21 in trading markets, a word on BATS Exchange. The Kansas City operator of the third-largest American trading venue has made no secret of its interest in listing companies for public trading. BATS made it official today, announcing plans to offer IPOs another path to global liquidity.

Provided BATS offers competitive listing prices and good data, it can compete. We hope exchange executives will consider the key data points in the Issuer Data Initiative. BATS has a reputation for data excellence already, providing a great deal of free data to its trading clients.

We see too that BATS filed a proposed rule change with the SEC last month that will require customers to mark trades as principal (for their own accounts), agency (on behalf of others) or riskless principal (buying from or selling to a customer). See, issuers? Exchanges file rules to change how things are done. Issuers are participants in markets too. If they want something changed, they too can ask.

What drove trading markets roughly March 16-21 also speaks to the importance of good data. Somebody always must execute the trade and report it. That’s the way we all know the volume for any stock. On March 16, the G-7 countries announced a concerted effort to devalue the Japanese yen by flooding markets with currency. March 16-18 also included the monthly options-expirations cycle, and S&P quarterly index rebalances.

During the same period, we observed uniformity in trading activity for a set of “primary dealers” that work with central banks in the United States, Europe and Japan. Across the market-cap and sector spectrum, the same behavior occurred for this set of primary dealers.

We surmise that central banks armed these large brokerages with cash, which is how central banks engage in “quantitative easing.” The brokerages, also all commercial banks today, deployed it by buying securities from selling institutions. It had the desired effect, stabilizing equity markets and reducing upward pressure on the yen.

We’ve seen that many stocks have returned to their pre-March-10 “rational price” levels. But the behaviors producing those prices aren’t rational. If these were riskless principal transactions, do governments now own a bunch of equities with taxpayer dollars? Or were these all principal trades and so the brokers now have high levels of inventory?

Let’s suppose it’s the latter. Fine, so long as markets rise. Brokers can sell inventory as more buyers return to equities. It’s bad, however, if, say, Portugal defaults, causing the Euro to weaken and the dollar to rise. US equities would slide, and brokers would dump inventory to protect themselves as markets fell.

So everybody get out there and buy something made in Portugal.