Tagged: Options

Core Reality

“Our stock dropped because Citi downgraded us today.”

So said the investor-relations chief for a technology firm last week during options-expirations.

For thirty years, this has been the intonation of IR. “We’re moving on the Goldman upgrade.”  “UBS lifted its target price, and shares are surging.” “We’re down on the sector cut at Credit Suisse.”

But analyst actions don’t buy or sell stocks.  People and machines do. Thirty years ago you could be sure it was people, not machines.  Now, machines read news and make directional bets. And why is a sellside firm changing its rating on your stock smack in the middle of expirations?

We’ll get to that. Think about this. Investors meet with you privately to learn something about your business or prospects somebody else might overlook.  Analyst actions are known to all. You see it on CNBC, in new strings, from any subscription feed.

How could it be uniquely valuable information proffering investment opportunity?

Let me phrase it this way. Why would a sellside firm advertise its views if those are meant to differentiate?  If you’re covered by 50 analysts with the same view, how is that valuable to anyone?

Indexes and exchange-traded funds track benchmarks. Call them averages.  Brokers must give customers prices that meet averages, what’s called “Best Execution.” If most prices are average, how are we supposed to stand out?

Now we get to why banks change ratings during expirations. Citi knows (Citi folks, I’m not picking on you. Bear with me because public companies need to learn stuff you already know.) when options expire. They’re huge counterparties for derivatives like options, swaps, forwards, reverse repurchases.

In fact, yesterday’s market surge came on what we call “Counterparty Tuesday,” the day each month following expirations when the parties on the other side of hedged or leveraged trades involving derivatives buy or sell to balance exposure. They were underweight versus bets (our Sentiment Index bottomed Monday, signaling upside).

Sellside research is a dying industry. Over 40% of assets now are in passive-investment instruments like index and exchange-traded funds that don’t buy research with trading commissions as in the old days.

How to generate business?  Well, all trades must pass through brokers.  What about, say, nudging some price-separation to help trading customers?

How?  One way is right before the options on stocks are set to lapse you change ratings and tell everyone.  No matter who responds, from retail trader, to high-speed firm, to machine-reading algorithm, to counterparty backing calls, it ripples through pricing in multiple classes (derivatives and stocks).  Cha-ching. Brokers profit (like exchanges) when traders chase spreads or bet on outcomes versus expectations.

We’re linear in the IR chair. We think investors buy shares because they might rise, and sell them when they think they’re fully valued. But a part of what drives price and volume is divergences from averages because that’s how money is made.

In this market of small divergences, your shares become less an investment and more an asset to leverage. Say I’m a big holder but your price won’t diverge from the sector. I get a securities-lending broker and make your shares available on the cheap.

I loan shares for trading daily and earn interest. I “write” puts or calls others will buy or trade or sell, and if I can keep the proceeds I boost yield.

I could swap my shares for a fee to the brokers for indexes and ETFs needing to true up assets for a short time.  I could sell the value of my portfolio position through a reverse repurchase agreement to someone needing them to match a model.

Here’s why traders rent. Say shares have intraday volatility – spread between daily highest and lowest prices – of 2%, the same as the broad market. A high-speed algorithm can buy when the price is 20 basis points below intraday average and sell when it’s 20 basis points over (rinse, repeat).

If the stock starts and finishes the month at $30, the buy-and-hold investor made zero but the trader capturing 20% of average intraday price volatility could generate $4.80 over the month, before rental fees of say half that (which the owner and broker share).  That’s an 8% return in a month from owning nothing and incurring no risk!

Let’s bring it back to the IR chair.  We’d like to think these things are on the fringe. Interesting but not vital. Across the market the past twenty days, Asset Allocation was 34% of daily volume. Fast Trading – what I just described – was 37%. Risk Management (driving big moves yesterday) was almost 14% of volume.

That’s 85%. The core reality. Make it part of your job to inform management (consistently) about core realities. They deserve to know! We have metrics to make it easy, but if nothing else, send them an article each week about market-function.

Verve and Sand

The whole market is behaving as though it’s got an Activist shareholder.

In a sense it does.  More on that in a minute.

We track the effects of Activism on trading and investment behaviors both before it’s widely known and afterward. A hallmark of these event-driven scenarios is behavioral volatility. That is, one or more of the big four reasons investors and traders buy and sell stocks routinely fluctuates day-over-day by more than 10% in target companies.

(Aside: Traders and investors buy and sell stocks for their unique characteristics, when they have characteristics shared by others, to profit on price-differences, and to leverage or protect trades and portfolios. The market at root is just these four simple purposes.)

Event-driven stocks can override normal constraints such as Overbought conditions, high short volume, or bearish fundamentals.  In fact, short volume tends to fall for catalyst stocks because the cost of borrowing shares rises as more want to own rather than rent, and unpredictability of outcomes makes borrowing shares for trading riskier.

Currently in the broad market, shorting trails the 200-day average marketwide. The market has manifested both negative and overbought sentiment and has still risen.

And behavioral volatility is off the charts.

Almost never does the broad market show double-digit fluctuations in behavior because it’s a giant index smoothing out lumps. With quad-witching and quarterly index rebalances Dec 16, Asset Allocation ballooned 16.3% marketwide, signaling that indexes and ETFs are out of step with assets (and may be substituting).

Also on Dec 16, what we call Risk Management (protecting or leveraging trades and portfolios) jumped 12%. It’s expected because leverage with derivatives has been pandemic in markets, with Active Investment and Risk Management – a combination pointing to hedge funds – currently leading.

Here’s the thing. The combined increase for the two behaviors last Friday was an astonishing 28%.  Then on Dec 19 as the new series of marketwide derivatives issued, Fast Trading – profiting on price-differences – exploded, jumping 25%.

A 25% change for a stock trading $100 million of dollar-volume daily is a big deal. The stock market is about $300 billion of daily dollar-volume.

Picture a skyscraper beginning to sway.

Looking back, Risk Management jumped 16% with July expirations, the first after searing Brexit gains. The market fell from there to September expirations when again behavioral volatility exploded. The market recovered briefly before falling all the way to the election. With expirations Nov 18, Risk Management shot up 11.2%.

Behavioral volatility precedes price-volatility. We have it now, monumentally.

What’s happened in the broad market is a honeymoon before the wedding. The incoming Trump administration has sparked an investing surge betting on a catalyst – exactly the way Activist investors affect individual stocks.  Fundamentals cease to matter.  Supply and demand constraints go out the window. A fervor takes hold.

The one thing our long bull market has lacked is fervor. It’s the most hated – and now second longest ever – bull market for US stocks because so many have loathed the monetary intervention behind ballooning asset prices.

That’s all been forgotten and a sort of irrational exuberance has set in.

Those who know me know I embrace in libertarian fashion broad individual liberty and limited government because it’s the environment that promotes prosperity best for all. I favor a future with more of it.

We should get the foundation right though. I’ll use a metaphor.  Suppose a giant storm lashes a coast, burying it in sand. Some return to the beach to rebuild homes and establishments but much lies listlessly beneath a great grainy coat.

Then a champion arrives and urges people to build. The leader’s verve lights a fire in the breasts of the people, who commence building a vast structure.

Right on the sand.  Which lies there still unmoved, a shifting layer beneath the mighty edifice rising upon it.

It’s better to remove the sand – all the central-bank buildup from artificial prices, the manufactured money, the warped credit markets.  Otherwise when the next wave comes the damage will be that much greater.

So call me wary of this surge.

A Year Ago

In Luckenbach, Texas, ain’t nobody feeling no pain. We were just there and I think the reason is the bar out the back of the post office.

A country song by that name about this place released in 1977 by Waylon Jennings begins by asserting that only two things make life worth living, one of which is strumming guitars.

In equities, what makes life worth living is certainty.  TABB Forum, the traders’ community, had a piece out yesterday on the big decline in listed options volume, off 19% from last July to a 14-month low. TABB attributed the drop to falling demand for hedges since the Brexit, the June event wherein the UK voted to leave the European Union and exactly nothing happened.

The folks at Hedgeye, responding to a question about whether volume matters anymore since it’s dried up as stocks have risen to records said, paraphrasing, big volume on the way down, low volume on the way up, is as valid as it ever was for investors wary of uncertain markets and means what you think it does. You should be selling on the way up so you don’t have to join those people distress-dumping on the way down.

I got a kick out of that. Sure enough, checking I found that SPY, the world’s most active stock (an ETF) traditionally trading $25 billion daily is down to $11 billion.  Whether it’s August is less relevant than volume.

On August 24 a year ago, the market nearly disintegrated on a wildly delirious day.  August options-trading set a near-period record.

Now what’s that mean to investor-relations folks trying to understand stock-valuation and trading? We’ve long said that behavioral volatility precedes price-volatility. You can apply it anything. As an example, if housing starts plunge, that’s behavioral volatility.  If a movie starts strong and viewership implodes the second week, that’s behavioral volatility.  Both point to future outcomes.

We track market behaviors. They tend to turbulence anyway around options-expirations, which occurred in the past week, and August 2016 was no exception.  On Aug 19, triple-witching, Asset Allocation (investment tracking a model such as indexes and ETFs) surged nearly 11%, Risk Management – counterparties for derivatives – by 3%.

It’s the double-digit move that got our attention.  Double-digit behavioral change is a key indicator of event-driven activity, or trading and investing following a catalyst such as Activism or deal-arbitrage.  It’s very rare in the whole market.

We also tracked a whopping jump since Aug 15 in Rational Prices, or buying by fundamental money.  When it’s coupled with hedging, it implies hedge-fund behavior.  In effect, the entire market was event-driven under the skin yet not by news. Nor did it manifest in prices or volume (Activism also routinely does not).

We’ve got one more data point for this puzzle. Volatility halts in energy, metals and emerging-markets securities have returned after vanishing in June and July.  Remember, market operators have implemented “limit-up, limit-down” controls to stop prices from moving too much in a short period.

So though the VIX is dead calm other things are moving.  Short volume marketwide is nearly identical (44%) to where it was in latter November preceding December volatility and the January swoon.

We conclude that currency volatility may surge, explaining volatility halts in commodities.  Hedge funds are shifting tactics. The dearth of options trading may rather than mean a lack of hedging instead signal the absence of certainty.

Pricing options accurately requires knowing prices of the underlying securities, plus volatility, plus time.  Volatility isn’t the faulty variable. It’s got to be either the prices of the underlying or the uncertainty of time.

Now it may be nothing. But our job here is to help you understand the market’s contemporary form and function. If behavioral volatility precedes change, then we best be ready for some.  We may all want to pull on the boots and faded jeans and go away.

But hang onto your diamond rings (and that’s all the obscure country-music humor I’ve got for today!).

Rational Signals

The market message appears to be: If you want to know the rest, buy the rights.

While rival Nintendo is banking on Pokemon Go, Sony bought the rights to Michael Jackson’s music catalog for an eye-popping $750 million. This may explain the sudden evaporation of Jackson family discord. Cash cures ills.

In the equity market, everybody buys the rights to indexes and exchange-traded funds. TABB Group says indexes and ETFs drove 57% of June options volume, with ETFs over 45% of that and indexes the balance. TABB credits money “rushing into broad-market portfolio protection” around the Brexit.

Could be.  But that view supposes options are insurance only.  They’re also ways to extend reach to assets, tools for improving how portfolios track underlying measures and substitutes for stock positions. I’ve wondered about the Russell rebalances occurring June 24 as the Brexit swooned everything, and whether indexers were outsized options buyers in place of equity rebalancing – which then aided sharp recovery as calls were used.

We can see which behaviors set price every day.  On June 24, the day of the dive, Asset Allocation – indexes and ETFs primarily – dominated.  On June 27 Fast Traders led but right behind them was Risk Management, or counterparties for options and futures.

The tail can wag the dog. The Bank for International Settlements tracks exchange-traded options and futures notional values. Globally, it’s $73 trillion (equaling all equity markets) and what’s traded publicly is about half the total options and futures market.

Sifma, the lobbying arm of the US financial industry, pegs interest-rate derivatives, another form of rights, at more than $500 trillion. You’d think with interest rates groveling globally (and about 30% of all government bonds actually digging holes) that transferring risk would be a yawn.  Apparently not.  You can add another $100 trillion in foreign-exchange, equity and credit-default swaps tracked by Sifma and the BIS.

Today VIX derivatives expire. The CBOE gauge measures volatility in the S&P 500.  Yesterday VXX and UVXY, exchanged traded products (themselves derivatives), traded a combined 90 million shares, among the most actively traded stocks. Yet the VIX is unstirred, closing below 12. Why are people buying volatility when there’s none? For perspective, it peaked last August over 40 and traded between 25-30 in January and February this year and again with the Brexit in late June.

The answer is if the VIX is the hot potato of risk, the idea here isn’t to hedge it but to trade the hot potato. And for a fear gauge the VIX is a lousy leading indicator.  It seems only to point backward at risk, jumping when it’s too late to move. Maybe that’s why everybody buys rights?  One thing is sure: If you’re watching options for rational signals, you’ll be more than half wrong.  Might as well flip a coin.

We learned long ago that rational signs come only from rational behavior. In the past week right through options-expirations starting Thursday the 14th, Active Investment was in a dead heat with Risk Management, the counterparties for rights. That means hedge funds were everywhere trying to make up ground by pairing equities and options.

But options have expired.  Do hedge funds double down or is the trade over?  Short volume has ebbed to levels last seen in November, which one might think is bullish – yet it was the opposite then.

Lesson: The staggering size of rights to things tells us focus has shifted from investment to arbitrage. With indexes and ETFs dominating, the arbitrage opportunity is between the mean, the average, and the things that diverge from it – such as rights.

Don’t expect the VIX to tell you when risk looms. Far better to see when investors stop pairing shares and rights, signaling that the trade is over.

Side Deals

Yesterday on what we call Counterparty Tuesday, stocks plunged.

Every month options, futures and swaps expire and these instruments represent trillions of notional-value dollars. Using an analogy, suppose you had to renew your homeowners insurance each month because the value of your house fluctuated continually.  Say there’s a secondary market where you can trade policies till they expire. That’s like the stock market and its relationship to these hedging derivatives.

As with insurance, somebody has to supply the coverage and take the payout risk. These “insurers” are counterparties, jargon meaning “the folks on the other side of the deal.”  They’re banks like Deutsche Bank, HSBC, Morgan Stanley, Citi.

Each month the folks on the other side of the deal offer signals of demand for insurance, a leading indicator of investor-commitment. We can measure counterparty impact on market volume and prices because we have an algorithm for it.  Last week (Feb 17-19) options and futures for February expired and the folks on the other side of the deal dominated price-setting, telling us that trading in insurance, not the assets themselves, was what made the market percolate. That’s profoundly important to understand or you’ll misinterpret what the market is doing.

On Monday Feb 22, a new series of derivatives began trading. Markets jumped again. Yesterday on Counterparty Tuesday, the folks on the other side of the deal told us they overshot demand for options and futures or lost on last week’s trades.  And that’s why stocks declined.

The mechanics can be complicated but here’s a way to understand. Say in early February investors were selling stocks because the market was bearish. They also then cut insurance, for why pay to protect an asset you’re selling (yes, we see that too)?

Around Feb 11, hedge funds calculating declines in markets and the value of insurance and the distance to expirations scooped up call options and bought stocks, especially ones that had gone down, like energy and technology shares and futures.

Markets rose sharply on demand for both stocks and options. When these hedge funds had succeeded in chasing shares and futures up sharply in short order, they turned to the folks on the other side of the deal and said, “Hi. We’d like to cash these in, please.”

Unless banks are holding those stocks, they’re forced to buy in the market, which drives price even higher. Pundits say, “This rally has got legs!” But as soon as the new options and futures for March began trading Monday, hedge funds dumped shares and bought puts – and the next day the folks on the other side of the deal, who were holding the bag (so to speak), told us so. Energy stocks and futures cratered, the market swooned.

It’s a mathematical impossibility for a market to sustainably rise in which bets produce a loser for every winner. If hedge funds are wrong, they lose capacity to invest.  If it’s counterparties – the folks on the other side of the deal – the cost of insurance increases and coverage shrinks, which discourages investment.  In both cases, markets flag.

Derivatives are not side deals anymore but a dominant theme. Weekly options and futures now abound, more short-term betting. Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs), derivatives of underlying assets, routinely populate lists of most active stocks. Both are proof that the tail is wagging the dog, and yet financial news continues casting about by the moment for rational explanations.

Every day we’re tracking price-setting data (if you don’t know what sets your price the problem is the tools you’re using, because it’s just math and rules).  Right now, it’s the counterparties. Short volume remains extreme versus long-term norms, telling us horizons are short. Active investment is down over $3 billion daily versus the long-term.

You can and should know these things. Stop doing what you’ve always done and start setting your board and your executives apart. Knowledge is power – and investor-relations has it, right at our fingertips.

Volatility

You’ve heard the saying that’s it all in your perspective. It applies to volatility.

Volatility is up 150% since the post-financial-crisis nadir of 10.32 for VIX Volatility in mid-2014. The “Fear Index” closed yesterday over 26, the highest since August 2015 when it topped 28 (way below 43 in 2011 and nearly 80 in 2008). VIX expirations are hitting today.

I’ve been seeing Mohamed El-Erian, whom I admire, chief economic advisor to Allianz and former right hand to Bill Gross at PIMCO, also now gone from the bond giant, on the business TV circuit saying central banks are ending programs designed to dampen financial volatility.

I think he’s got a point, and he means they’re starting to broaden trading ranges in everything from interest rates to currencies (as if we want them setting prices). But volatility is price-uncertainty reflecting evolving valuation.  Conventional measures often fail to reveal change because behaviors in markets morph while the metrics used to understand them don’t.

Figure 1

Figure 1

I can prove it.  In the first chart here (Figure 1), a small-capitalization technology stock on the Nasdaq hasn’t moved much in the year ended Dec 16, 2015 (I’ll explain that date shortly) but the stock rose from a 200-day average price of $20.67 to a five-day mean of $21.05, up 1.8%.  Not too great – but the Russell 2000 Index was off 1.3% in the year ended Dec 16, 2015. Perspective matters.

Now notice:  Daily volatility, or the difference between highest and lowest prices each day, is greater than the change in average price in all four periods.  Think about that. The price changes more every day than it does in moving averages for months and quarters.

Now see Figure 2 showing short volume Dec 1, 2015-Jan 15, 2016 for the same stock. The upper half is long volume (owned shares), the bottom short volume, or rented stock. The blue line is closing price. The data further back show short volume over the trailing 200 days averaged 60.2% daily.

Figure 2

Figure 2

Combine the charts. The stock moved less than 2% on average over the entire period but 60% of the shares trading every day were borrowed, and the spread between high and low prices was nearly 3% every single day.

Do you understand? On the surface this stock is not volatile. But up close it’s torrid – on rented shares. For a solid year, traders have kept this stock in stasis by borrowing and trading, borrowing and trading, because the cost of borrowing was substantially lower than daily price-movement. That’s market-neutral arbitrage.

Everything changed recently. Short volume in Figure 2 plunged Dec 22, 2015.  On Dec 16 (here’s that date now) the Federal Reserve bumped short-term rates to 0.25-0.50%. On Dec 17-18 vast swaths of interest-rate swaps tied to options-expirations lapsed. On Dec 21, the new series of options and futures (and interest-rate swaps) began trading. And on Dec 22, our small-cap’s short volume imploded, finally landing at 33% Jan 11, down from 71% Dec 10, a decline of 54%.

We’ve slung numbers here, I know. But the conclusion is simple. Whatever traders were doing in this small-cap, the Fed’s rate-hike ended it.  We think that’s good. But markets have been addicted for years to cheap credit, which includes borrowing shares for next to nothing, which shifts attention from long-term owning to short-term renting. That changed when the Fed bumped rates. And equites corrected.

There’s another lesson by extension.  What sets your stock’s price may be radically different than you think.  We’ve offered one example that shows short-term borrowing fueled persistent volatility trading masked by apparent long-term placidity. When interest rates crept up minutely, the strategy stopped working.

What’s your stock show?  Price-performance isn’t story alone, perhaps even over the long run, as we’ve just shown. There’s so much to see when measurements reflect current behavior (as ours do). Volatility is price-uncertainty that thanks to policies promoting short-term behavior is now concentrated intraday.  Sorting this out will take time. We won’t change seven fat years with a lean month. The good news is it’s all measurable.

Weighing Options

There’s no denying the connection between tulips and derivatives in 1636.

The Dutch Tulip Mania is often cited as the archetype for asset bubbles and the madness of crowds. It might better serve to inform our understanding of derivatives risk. In 1636, according to some accounts, tulip bulbs became the fourth largest Dutch export behind gin, herring and cheese. But there were not enough tulips to meet demand so rights were optioned and prices mushroomed through futures contracts. People made and lost fortunes without ever seeing a tulip.

While facts are fuzzy about this 17th century floral fervor, there’s a lesson for 2016 equities. Grasping the impact of derivatives in modern equities is essential but options are an unreliable surveillance device for your stock.

I’ll explain. ModernIR quantifies derivatives-impact by tracking counterparty trade-executions in the percentage of equity volume tracing to what we call Risk Management. We can then see why this implied derivatives-use is occurring.

For instance, when Risk Management and Active Investment are up simultaneously, hedge funds are likely behind buying or selling, coupling trades with calls or puts. If Risk Management is up with Fast Trading, that’s arbitrage between equities and derivatives like index options or futures, suggesting rapidly shifting supply and demand (and therefore impending change in your share-price). Options won’t give you this linkage.

Dollar-volumes in options top a whopping $110 billion daily. But 70% of it is in ETFs.  And almost 48% ties to options for a single ETF, the giant SPY from State Street tracking the S&P 500.

As Bloomberg reported January 8, SPY is a leviathan instrument. Its net asset value would rank it among the 25 largest US equities, ahead of Disney and Home Depot. It trades over 68 million shares daily, outpacing Apple. It’s about 14% of all market volume.  Yet trading in its options are 48% of all options volume – three times its equity market-share.

Why? Bloomberg’s Eric Balchunas thinks traders and investors are shifting from individual equity options where demand has been falling (further reason to question options for surveillance) into index options. SPY is large, liquid and tied to the primary market benchmark.

Bigger still is that size (pun intended) begets size, says Mr. Balchunas. Money has rushed – well, like a Tulip Mania – into ETFs. Everyone is doing the same thing. And just a handful of firms are managing it.  Bloomberg notes that Blackrock, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs and Citadel are the biggest holders of SPY options. Three of these are probably authorized participants for ETFs and the fourth is the world’s largest money manager and an ETF sponsor.

Mr. Balchunas concludes: “The question is how much more liquidity can ETFs drain from other markets—be they stocks, commodities, or bonds—before they become the only market?”

SPY options are an inexpensive way to achieve exposure to the broad market, which is generally starved for liquidity in the underlying assets. As we’ve written, ETFs are themselves a substitute for these assets.

The problem with looking at options to understand sentiment, volatility and risk is that it fails to account for why options are being used – which manifests in the equity data (which can only be seen in trade-executions, which is the data we’ve studied for over ten years).  If Asset-allocation is up, and Risk Management is up, ETFs and indexes are driving the use of derivatives. These two behaviors led equity-market price-setting in 2015. If you were reporting changes in options to management as indications of evolving rational sentiment, it was probably incorrect.

In the Tulip Mania, people used futures because there was insufficient tulip-bulb liquidity. The implied demand in derivatives drove extreme price-appreciation. But nobody had to sell a bulb to pop the bubble. It burst because implied future demand evaporated (costing a great lost fortune).

Options expire tomorrow and Friday, and next Wednesday are VIX expirations (two inverse VIX ETNs, XIV and TVIX, traded a combined 100 million shares Tuesday). Vast money in the market is moving uniformly, using ETFs and options to gain exposure to the same stocks. This is why broad measures don’t yet reflect the underlying deterioration in the breadth of the market (the Russell 2000 this week was briefly down 20% from June 2015 highs).

And now you know why. People tend to frolic in rather than tiptoe through the tulips. Be wary when everybody is buying rights.

Turnover

Earnings season.

Late nights for IR professionals crafting corporate messages for press releases and call scripts. Early mornings on CNBC’s Squawk Box, the company CEO explaining what the beat or miss means.

One thing still goes lacking in the equation forming market expectations for 21st century stocks: How money behaves. Yesterday for instance the health care sector was down nearly 2%. Some members were off 10%. It must be poor earnings, right?

FactSet in its most recent Earnings Insight with 10% of the S&P out (that’ll jump this week) says 100% of the health care sector is above estimates. That makes no sense, you say. Buy the rumor, sell the news?

There are a lot of market aphorisms that don’t match facts.  One of our longtime clients, a tech member of the S&P 500, pre-announced Oct 15 and shares are down 20%.  “The moral of the story,” lamented the IR officer, an expert on market structure (who still doesn’t always win the timing argument), “is you don’t report during options-expirations.”

She’s right, and she knew what would happen. The old rule is you do the same thing every time so investors see consistency. The new rule is know your audience. According to the Investment Company Institute (ICI), weighted turnover in institutional investments – frequency of selling – is about 42%.  Less than half of held assets move during the year.

That matches the objectives of investor-targeting, which is to attract money that buys and holds. It does.  In mutual funds, which still have the most money, turnover is near 29% according to the ICI.

So if you’re focused on long-term investors, why do you report results during options-expirations when everybody leveraging derivatives is resetting positions?  That’s like commencing a vital political speech as a freight train roars by.  Everybody would look around and wonder what the heck you said.

I found a 2011 Vanguard document that in the fine print on page one says turnover in its mutual funds averages 35% versus 1,800% in its ETFs.

Do you understand? ETFs churn assets 34 more times than your long-term holders. Since 1997 when there were just $7 billion of assets in ETFs, these instruments have grown 41% annually for 18 straight years!  Mutual funds?  Just 5% and in fact for ten straight years money has moved out of active funds to passive ones.  All the growth in mutual funds is in indexes – which don’t follow fundamentals.

Here’s another tidbit: 43% of all US investment assets are now controlled by five firms says the ICI. That’s up 34% since 2000.  The top 25 investment firms control 74% of assets. Uniformity reigns.

Back to healthcare. That sector has been the colossus for years. Our best-performing clients by the metrics we use were in health care. In late August the sector came apart.  Imagine years of accumulation in ETFs and indexes, active investments, and quantitative schemes. Now what will they do?

Run a graph comparing growth in derivatives trading – options, futures and options on futures in multiple asset classes – and overlay US equity trading. The graphs are inversed, with derivatives up 50% since 2009, equity trading down nearly 40%. Translation: What’s growing is derivatives, in step with ETFs. Are you seeing a pattern?

I traded notes with a variety of IR officers yesterday and more than one said the S&P 500 neared a technical inflection point.  They’re reporting what they hear. But who’s following technicals? Not active investors. We should question things more.

Indexes have a statutory responsibility to do what their prospectuses say. They’re not paid to take risk but to manage capital in comportment with a model. They’re not following technicals. ETFs? Unless they’re synthetic, leveraging derivatives, they track indexes, not technicals.

That means the principal followers of technical signals are intermediaries – the money arbitraging price-spreads between indexes, ETFs, individual stocks and sectors. And any asymmetry fostered by news.

Monday Oct 19 the new series of options and futures began trading marketwide. Today VIX measures offering volatility as an asset class expire.  Healthcare between the two collapsed. It’s not fundamental but tied to derivatives. A right to buy at a future price is only valuable if prices rise. Healthcare collapsed at Aug expirations. It folded at Sept expirations. It’s down again with Oct expirations. These investments depended on derivatives rendered worthless.

The point isn’t that so much money is temporary. Plenty buys your fundamentals. But it’s not trading you.  So stop giving traders an advantage by reporting results during options-expirations. You could as well write them a check!

When you play to derivatives timetables, you hurt your holders.  Don’t expect your execs to ask you. They don’t know.  It’s up to you, investor-relations professionals, to help management get it.

Interconnection

“I must say as to what I have seen of Texas it is the garden spot of the world.”

Davy Crockett said it and left it at the Alamo. So we’re glad to be inside Austin’s city limits sponsoring the NIRI Southwest Regional Conference.  We doubt temperatures will be kinder than New York’s last week though.

There’s a pattern to what’s unfolding in the market and it impacts us. There’s also chapter tapestry to the investor-relations profession spread unevenly over the fruited plain and knitted in spirit, a durable comforter made hardy by decades and camaraderie. We’re wired to see the world as story. It makes those in this pursuit exceptionally adept at translation.  It’s what we do.

Just as our corps is animated by the inexplicable genius of humanity, a most complex and marvelous machine, so is the evolving investment landscape.  At root, human intelligence presses the button, and the machines thus run.

I’ve given this considerable thought in preparation for my TED talk Thursday in Texas. I’ll speak on market structure of course, but it’s more. An aside, make it IR duty to hear this TED video of 15 minutes from Kevin Slavin, masterful on market structure without meaning to be.

Current stock-market distress would move Rod Serling the impresario because it’s a Twilight Zone merger of Man, money and machines. It scares us. Right? We all live by the ticker (so to speak). Our profession is interlaced but now so is the planet.

Ever played poker? You pay twenty bucks for a stack of chips and you play till you win or you’re out. Suppose we floated the value of chips. Rather than a fixed buy-in, every table’s pot value would float versus another table’s, and all the dealers at all the tables would continually add to or subtract from chips in every player’s pile to balance out positions versus players at other tables.

This is what the world is doing with currencies. Money. You need to understand it in the IR chair. We borrow money from China and then depreciate our currency and depress our interest rates to zero so the impact of borrowing will be minimal. China then devalues its currency to keep from losing money on the debt we owe.

On Aug 12, the Chinese government devalued the yuan. There are some $500 trillion of interest-rate and currency swaps globally and if a big currency moves, it’s a de facto change to interest rates.  Investors and their counterparties underwriting rights were caught out. So during options-expirations Aug 19-21, markets fell.  This is Man at work.

Now we come to Exchange Traded Funds, the chief investment vehicle of the modern era. ETFs post positions every day by law. It’s inconvenient to continuously change share-holdings so they routinely use derivatives like options and futures instead, which is permitted by law. And machines modulate it. We last had a material stock pullback in 2011, last saw a bear in 2008. ETF assets have doubled since 2012. We have no idea how ETFs will act in a down market, frankly.

But we just got a clue.  On Aug 24, the new series of options and futures marketwide began trading – and markets imploded. What happened? We think demand from ETFs for options and futures was so poor that markets simply imploded at the open. Lack of demand is as big a price-setter as selling (put that on a t-shirt).

Today, everything is connected.  If ETFs, which are ephemeral supply or demand, stop using derivatives, it means indexes are faltering, which means you and I are getting wary in our 401k’s, which means fast traders are shy about setting prices, and all of it comes back to floating currency values, pontoons upon which global consumption dances in a delicate balance.  Nobody knows what’s real.

It’s not one thing.  And yet it is.  Humans don’t like uncertainty so they transfer its risk to somebody willing to pay to cover it.  Now that process is starting to reverse after seven years.

What we don’t know is who ended up with the risk. What we do know is that IR better be able to explain it.  That’s market structure.  Not story. So don’t miss my session tomorrow in Austin.

Swapping the Future

Whole swaths of stocks moved 3% yesterday. You might thank Dodd-Frank for it, even if David Tepper gets credit (if you heard the Appaloosa Management founder’s interview you know what I mean).

To understand how, ever heard of a Rube Goldberg Machine? It’s an unnecessarily complex device for doing something simple. Cartoonist Reuben “Rube” Goldberg turned his own name into a rubric for obtuse machination with humorous creations like the self-operating napkin.

So your stock rose sharply for no apparent reason. Some will say it’s because David Tepper, who made $2 billion last year on a belief in strong equities, said on CNBC that “shorts should get out the shovels because they’ll be buried.”

But the answer to why your stock and maybe your sector yesterday moved, and how Dodd-Frank is a factor may be more like a Rube Goldberg Machine. MSCI global indexes rebalance today, and ahead of that we’ve seen surging high-frequency trading, telling us money is benchmarking ahead to equity indexes at newly higher rates. Options expire tomorrow and Friday, with VIX volatility instruments lapsing May 22, giving arbitragers better opportunity to pairs-trade.

And Dodd-Frank’s deadlines on swap-clearing rules take effect in June, so this is the last pre-central-swap-clearing options-expirations period, which set dates for swaps too.

Ever heard of single-stock futures? It’s a way to go long or short shares without buying or borrowing. There’s even an exchange called OneChicago owned by the Chicago Board Options Exchange, CME Group, and Interactive Brokers, for electronically trading these contracts where two parties agree to exchange a set number of shares of a given stock in the future at a price determined today. Also popular are Narrow-Based Indexes – futures contracts on a small set of securities, say, from an industry or subsector. (more…)