Tagged: stock market

Impassively Up

A picture is worth a thousand words.

See the picture here, sparing you a thousand words (for a larger view click here). It explains our rising stock market.  Look at the line graphs.  Three move up and down, reflecting normal uncertainty and change. Just one is up like the market.  Passive Investment.

Stock market behaviors

At ModernIR, we see the market behaviorally. There are four big reasons investors and traders buy and sell, not one, so we quantify market volume daily using proprietary trade-execution metrics to see the percentages coming from each and trend them.

Were the market only matching risk-taking firms with risk-seeking capital, valuing the market would be simpler. But 39% of volume trades ticks, gambling on fleeting price-moves. About 12% pairs stocks with derivatives, down from over 13% longer term.

Less than 14% of trading volume ties directly to corporate fundamentals. So rational thought isn’t pushing stocks to records. In a sense that’s good news because most stocks don’t have financial performance justifying the 20% rise for the S&P 500 the past year.

Alert reader Alan Weissberger sent data from the St Louis Federal Reserve (click the “1Y” button at top right) showing falling corporate profits the past year. To be sure, profits don’t always connect to markets or the economy. There were rising corporate profits during the 1970, 1991 and 2001 recessions.

And corporate profits were plunging in 2007 when the Dow posted its second-fastest 1,000-point rise in history (the one from 22,000-23,000 just now is the third fastest, and both trail the quickest, in 1999 when profits were likewise falling).

Now, I’ll qualify: This picture reflects a model. Eugene Fama, the father of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, said models aren’t reality.  If they explained everything then you would need to call them reality.

But the market as we’ve modeled it with machines that bring a taciturn objectivity to the process has been driven by the sort of money that views fundamentals impassively.

You might think it surreal that 36% of volume derives from index and exchange-traded funds and other quantitative investment. Yet it makes logical sense. Blackrock and Vanguard have taken in a combined $600 billion this year says the Wall Street Journal and the two now manage nearly $12 trillion that’s largely inured to sellside analysts and your earnings calls, public companies.

And the number of public companies keeps falling, down a third the past decade. I suspect though no one has offered the math – I will buy a case of our best Colorado beer for the person with the data – that total shares of public companies (all the shares of all the companies minus ETFs and closed-end funds) has also fallen on net, 2007-present.

There you have it.  Money that simply buys equities as an asset class sliced in various ways is doing its job.  But it becomes inflation – more money chasing fewer goods. Wall Street calls it “multiple expansion,” paying more for the same thing (current Shiller PE is the highest in modern history save the dot-com bubble).

And because passive money like Gene Fama’s models doesn’t ask whether prices are correct and merely accepts market prices as they are, there’s no governor, no reasoning, that prompts it to assess its collective behavior. So as other behaviors drop off, passive money becomes the dominant force.

In that vein, look at Risk Mgmt. It reflects counterparties to investors and traders using options, futures, forwards, swaps and other derivatives to protect, substitute for or leverage stock positions. The falling percentage suggests the cost of leverage is rising.

It fits. A handful of banks like Goldman Sachs dominate the business. Goldman’s David Kostin publicly expressed concern about market values. Kostin says the stock market is in the 88th percentile of historical valuations. If banks think downside risk is higher, the cost of insuring against it or profiting on rising markets increases.

Where in the past we worried about exuberance, we should be equally wary of the impassive face of passive investment that doesn’t know it’s approaching a precipice.

I don’t think a bear market is near yet but volatility could be imminent. By our measures the market has not mean-reverted since Sept 1. It suggests target-date and other balanced funds are likely overweight in equities. When it tries to rebalance, we could have severe volatility – precisely because this money behaves passively. Or impassively.

The Math

“Making investment decisions by looking solely at the fundamentals of individual companies is no longer a viable investment philosophy.”

So said Steve Eisman, made famous in Michael Lewis’s book The Big Short, upon shutting down his new investment fund in 2014.  Actor Steve Carrell portrayed Eisman as Mark Baum in last year’s hit movie from the book.

Michael Burry, the quirky medical doctor running Scion Capital in the book and the movie (played by Christian Bale), first earned street credibility via posts about stocks on Silicon Investor, the online discussion forum huge before the dot-com bubble burst.

But in the ten years after Regulation National Market System transformed the stock market in 2005 from a vibrant human enterprise into a wide-area data network, 98% of all active stock-pickers failed to beat the S&P 500, proving Mr. Eisman correct.  You can’t pick stocks on merits alone now.

That’s contrary to the legacy objective of the investor-relations profession, which is to stand the company’s story apart from the rest.

As with finding the root of the mortgage-industry rot, today the market is all about data.  Everything is.  Google Analytics examines internet traffic patterns.  ZipRecruiter is analytics for hiring. Betterment is analytics for personal investing.  HomeAdvisor and Angie’s List are analytics for home-repair. Pandora is analytics for music you like.

Pick your poison. Everything is data. So why, ten years after Reg NMS, is the IR profession calling someone to ask, “How come my stock is down today?” All trades pricing the market under Reg NMS must by law be automated.

If you’re calling somebody to ask about your stock, I’m sorry but you’re doing IR like a caveman. And, paraphrasing Steve Eisman, running the IR department solely by telling the story to investors is no longer a viable industry philosophy.

Why? Because it begins with the flawed premise that the money buying and selling your shares is motivated by fundamentals alone.  For the past decade – the span of Reg NMS – trillions have departed active stock-picking portfolios and shifted to indexes and Exchange-Traded Funds, because tracking a benchmark is a better path to returns.

Take yesterday.  All you had to do was buy technology and materials stocks.  Today it might be something else. The most widely traded stock on the planet is SPY, the S&P 500 ETF.  It traded $7 billion of volume yesterday, ten times BAC, the most active stock.

Here’s another. XLU, the Utilities ETF, was among the 25 most actively traded issues yet the sector barely budged, up 0.04%. Why active then? ETFs fuel arbitrage.  Profiting on price-differences. It’s not where prices close but how they change intraday.

Best trade yesterday?  NUGT, the leveraged gold ETF, was up 7.5% even though gold has been a bust the past month.  The S&P 500 took the whole year to gain 10% and then only on the Trump Bump. Between Dec 30 and Oct 31, the S&P 500 eked out 2% appreciation. You could triple that in a day with NUGT so why invest long-term?

“Boy, Quast,” you say. “It’s the holiday season! What are you, The Grinch?”

Not at all! The opposite in fact. I’m on a quest to make IR central to public companies again. We invented Market Structure Analytics, data for the IR profession to address the demise of IR as Storyteller.  The future for our profession isn’t a command of fundamentals but knowledge of market form and function.

Let me be blunt. Anybody can tell the story. Only IR professionals dedicate themselves to knowing how the market works – and that’s job security, a transferrable skill set.

The way IR shifts back from a rotational role to vital standalone profession is through knowledge of the stock market. If you want to be a biologist, study and understand biology. If you want to be a biology reporter, you just need to know some biologists (no offense to biology reporters).

Which will the IR profession be in 2017?

Having threshed trading data for 15 years now through the regulatory and behavioral transformation of the equity market, I feel a tad like those guys in The Big Short who studied mortgage numbers and concluded it was irrefutable: It was going to blow up.

These data are irrefutable: Over 80% of your volume most days is driven by something much shorter-term than your business strategy.  Ergo, if all you tell your Board and management is how your strategy influences the stock, you’ll at some point be in trouble.

This is the lesson of 2016.  Make 2017 the year IR transforms how the people in the boardrooms of America understand the stock market. That is an invigorating challenge that will breathe value into our profession. The math doesn’t lie.

The GRAR

Power changed hands in the USA today.

I don’t know in what way yet because I’m writing before election outcomes are known, and about something for the market that will be bigger than which person sits in the oval office or what party holds congressional sway.

The GRAR is a lousy acronym, I admit. If somebody has got a better name, holler.  We started talking about it in latter 2014.  It’s the Great Risk Asset Revaluation. We had the Great Recession. Then followed the Great Intervention. What awaits the new Congress and President is the GRAR.

I’ll give you three signs of the GRAR’s presence.  Number one, the current quarter is the first since March 2015 for a rise in earnings among the S&P 500, and the first for higher revenues since October 2014. Until now, companies have been generating lower revenues and earning less money as stocks treaded water, and the uptick still leaves us well short of previous levels.

Since 1948, these recessions in corporate financials of two or more quarters have always accompanied actual recessions and stock-retreats. The GRAR has delayed both.

Second, gains off lows this year for the Dow Jones Industrial Average have come on five stocks primarily. One could use various similar examples to make this point, but it’s advances dependent on a concentrated set of stocks.  This five – which isn’t important but you can find them – include four with falling revenues and earnings. Counterintuitive.

Finally, the market is not statistically higher (adding or subtracting marketwide intraday volatility for all prices of nearly 2% daily) than it was in December 2014.

That’s remarkable data.  It says prices are not set by fundamentals but intervention.

We might think that if earnings growth resumes, markets will likewise step off this 2014 treadmill and march upward. And that’s independent of whatever may be occurring today – soaring stocks or falling ones, reflecting electoral expectations versus outcomes.

In that regard, our data showed money before the election positioned much as it was ahead of the Brexit vote:  Active buying, market sentiment bottomed, short volume down – bullish signals.

You’ve heard the term “delayed gratification?” It means exercising self-discipline until you’re able to afford desired indulgences.  Its doppelganger is delayed consequences, which is the mistaken idea that because nothing bad arises from bad decisions that one has escaped them.

The bad decision is the middle one – The Great Intervention.  The Great Recession was a consequence arising from a failure to live within our means. When we all – governments, companies, individuals – spend less than we make, nobody ever needs a bailout.

But you don’t solve a profligacy problem by providing more access to credit.  The breathtaking expansion of global central-bank balance sheets coupled with interest rates near zero is credit-expansion. To save us from our overspending, let’s spend more.

If I held in my palms a gold coin and a paper dollar and I said to you, “Pick one,” which would you take?

If you said “the dollar bill,” I can’t help you and neither can Copernicus, who first described this phenomenon that explains the GRAR 500 years ago. Nearly everybody takes the gold, right? We inherently know it’s more valuable than the paper, even if I tell you they have the exact same value.  This principle is called Gresham’s Law today.

Credit does not have the same value as cash.  But assets in the world today have been driven to heights by credit, the expansion of which diminishes the value of cash.

What happens when the people owning high-priced assets such as stocks, bonds, apartments in New York, farmland in Nebraska and so on want to sell them?  All the cash and credit has already been consumed driving prices up in the first place.

What will follow without fail is the GRAR. Depending on who got elected, it might come sooner or later.  But without respect to the winner, it’s coming.  The correct solution for those now in power is to avoid the temptation to meet it with credit again, and to let prices become valuable and attractive. Painful yes, but healthy long-term.

That’s the path out of the GRAR. I hope our winner has the discipline to delay gratification.