Tagged: Stocks

The Rising

Can’t see nothing in front of me. Can’t see nothing coming up behind. 

Those of you who know me know I would never write “can’t see nothing.” But Bruce Springsteen can get away with it.

He and the E Street Band put out the eponymous album on July 30, 2002, and it was appropriate for the stock market as the S&P 500 bottomed October 4, 2002 at 800 and proceeded with The Rising, traveling steadily upward to 1,561 by October 12, 2007. 

We didn’t return until Mar 2013, taking longer to get back than to arrive in the first place.

Now we’ve had variations on a Rising theme for eight years. The market bottomed this week in 2009, on Mar 6, at 683 for the S&P 500, lower than when our troubadour from Long Branch, NJ first commanded in gravel and guitar that we come on up for the rising.   

As with the last lyric in Bruce the Bard’s melody, it’s on wheels of fire that we’ve come rolling down here to 2017 in the stock market, blistering records and burning up the tape. 

We at ModernIR study equity data in our inimitable way, the cross of our calling, Bruce might say.  And that’s all the poetry I can muster.  But I’ve got some facts.

We measure Sentiment on a purely mathematical basis, tracking how the four big reasons people buy and sell interact with market prices and where these wax and wane.

We’re good at capturing short-term asset-price changes. We’ve been doing it for a long time. Our five-day forecasts are roughly 95% correlated to the actual average prices for stocks after the five projected days have elapsed – statistically interchangeable.  

Putting it in English, in short spans we can foretell the future, using math, because the money in the market is using math in ways we can observe with precision. 

Here’s what we know about market Sentiment and short-term prices. For 77 consecutive days now, back to Nov 14, 2016, the stock market has been about 5.0 or higher on our 10-point Sentiment Index.  Since June 2012, some 1,200 trading days, 715 have been 5.0 or higher. It’s been a bull market.  But ten percent are in a row since the election. 

Remarkable. (Aside: If you want to kick this around, catch me Friday at the NIRI Silicon Valley Spring Seminar.)

To our knowledge, the previous record for extended neutral or better Sentiment without a single tip to negative was 53 days, from Feb 22 to May 6 last year.  Back in 2013 when we had a momentum stock market, our Sentiment gauge would carom from below 4.0 to over 9.0 – a rocking Richter event – about every month. 

Here’s the thing:  When last year’s epic Sentiment run concluded in May, we were never able to rise sustainably again – until November. It required an extraordinary catalyst in the form of the Wildly Unexpected Donald Trump. The S&P 500 finished October 2016 lower than it wrapped May 2016. Even with another massive catalyst, the Brexit Boomerang, between. 

This is not scientific. It’s not fundamental. It’s not a factor model. But it IS mathematical, and it does reflect how money behaves today. Here’s my conclusion: Without an extraordinary event, a catalyst, when this long Sentiment run atop 5.0 stops, it will mark the end of this particular bull market. 

What’s a real-world application for investor-relations people? We track Sentiment for you.  When you’re Overbought your price will fall, absent a catalyst. When you’re Oversold, barring a tsunami, your shares will rise. It’s not rational. It’s math.  

You can use this data to your advantage.  When you’re a 10, call a couple of your good value holders to check in, because you’re likely to dip, and if your holder buys (you will be on their minds), you might revert to 5.0 quicker – and 5.0 stocks are the bedrock of solid investment portfolios. 

And vice versa. You’re 1.0?  Pick up the phone. The first investor to buy probably makes money (and will remember to look when next you call) and you’ll return to 5.0. It’s not what you say. It’s that you call that counts. Put yourself on the screen.

Won’t that work for the market? Sure.  At Feb 11 last year, the market was a 1.0/10.0. Great time to buy, turned out.  It was a Rising. 

We don’t know what’s ahead. Don’t know what’s coming up behind. But the math says we’ve had it good for a record stretch. It’s hard to keep setting records. 

Metrics

How many of you wear a Fitbit?

I remember the last time I saw Jeff Morgan, erstwhile NIRI CEO.  I said, “Jeff, you’ve lost weight. You’re a lean machine!”

He tapped his wrist, and said, “Fitbit. You can appreciate it, Tim. It’s just measuring data, right? Burn more than you take in.”

When we were roaming Barcelona last September, Karen’s phone was a cheering section congratulating us for achieving footstep goals.  Because there’s an app for that of course.

We’ve now bought a Peloton for our home gym, a finessed stationary bike replete with interaction and data. You can measure everything. You mark progress and capability.

On Friday the 13th the Wall Street Journal ran a story about online life insurance. Companies are using algorithms that parse lifestyle data from prescription-drug, motor-vehicle and credit-card sources to meter risk in place of testing blood and urine.

Data reveal facts about conditions. That’s the starting point. The next step is comparing data gathered in one period with the same metrics from another to see what’s changed. It’s what your doctor does.

And it’s the heart of financial reporting. We can debate the flaws of the requirement, but every quarter public companies are providing metrics to investors and analysts, who in turn model the data to understand business outcomes.

In fact, it’s the beat of the market. Every week data pours forth from governments and central banks on producer-prices and purchasing managers and jobs and consumer sentiment and on and on it goes.

I think it’s too much, promoting arbitrage on expectations versus outcomes. But think of the cognitive dissonance in our profession, investor-relations.  While everyone is measuring short-term, IR is trying to manage long-term. Yes, we want long-term commitment to our shares.  But that’s not how prices are set.

Unless you measure something the way it functions, you’ll get incorrect conclusions.

Much of the IR community isn’t measuring at all. We react. Right? The stock moves, and we call people for explanations.  How can answers be accurate without comparatives?  You don’t know what’s changed. No Fitbit is delivering data supporting conclusions.

The key to good management is consistent measurement. It’s the only way to understand an ecosystem and sort what you can control from what’s systemic.

Suppose I declare that I will float across the room.  Well, gravity, the rule governing the movement of bodies in this universe, says on this planet my pronouncement is flawed.

The gravity of the stock market is Regulation National Market System.  It defines how money moves from point A to point B.  We can observe those movements.

I showed a company yesterday how shares climbed from $60 to $70 during election week last November on Asset Allocation, and from $70 to $72 on Risk Management. That means ETFs and derivatives boosted shares.  Active money didn’t buy until the stock was at $75, even though it was selling the stock at $61 right before the election. Active money didn’t know what to do.

What followed? Fast Traders sold and shorted because the last fools to the party were the Active stock-pickers unaware of how the market works now.  No wonder many lag the averages.

If investors making rational decisions set the prices of stocks more than 50% of the time, the market can be called rational. Otherwise, it’s got to be called something else.  IR professionals, it’s your job to help management see the market realistically.

All the people talking about stocks are of a breed. The sea of money using models isn’t telling others what it’s doing!  But it’s setting prices.

You must measure now. What’s your Fitbit for the IR job?  Is it calibrated to the market we have today or one that no longer exists?

Case in point: I told a healthcare company recently that the data showed they would be unable to hold any gains until short volume were no longer consistently 65%.

“But our short interest is well below sector averages,” they said.

“That measure is from 1975,” I said. “It doesn’t reflect how the market works now.”

The stock dropped 8% yesterday and remains at the same average price it’s had since short volume rose over 60% well more than a quarter ago. The data – the Fitbit for IR – will tell them when conditions have changed.  Fitness can be measured in IR as it is elsewhere.

Measurement is management.  Put key metrics in front of your management regularly. Don’t wait to be asked for information – then it’s too late and you’ve lost control and become a glorified assistant (and they’ll define the job for you).

Create anticipation with metrics. “We’ve had a nice run but Fast Traders are leading, we’re Overbought, and short volume is over 50%, so expect some pressure next week.”

That’s what you should be doing.  Stop calling people for wild guesses unsupported by data AFTER something has occurred. Start measuring and setting expectations – especially around earnings, or events like options-expirations today through Friday.

You can only set expectations if you’re first consistently measuring and comparing key data points. This is evolved IR.  You can invent your own metrics. But we’ve already done that for you.

Verve and Sand

The whole market is behaving as though it’s got an Activist shareholder.

In a sense it does.  More on that in a minute.

We track the effects of Activism on trading and investment behaviors both before it’s widely known and afterward. A hallmark of these event-driven scenarios is behavioral volatility. That is, one or more of the big four reasons investors and traders buy and sell stocks routinely fluctuates day-over-day by more than 10% in target companies.

(Aside: Traders and investors buy and sell stocks for their unique characteristics, when they have characteristics shared by others, to profit on price-differences, and to leverage or protect trades and portfolios. The market at root is just these four simple purposes.)

Event-driven stocks can override normal constraints such as Overbought conditions, high short volume, or bearish fundamentals.  In fact, short volume tends to fall for catalyst stocks because the cost of borrowing shares rises as more want to own rather than rent, and unpredictability of outcomes makes borrowing shares for trading riskier.

Currently in the broad market, shorting trails the 200-day average marketwide. The market has manifested both negative and overbought sentiment and has still risen.

And behavioral volatility is off the charts.

Almost never does the broad market show double-digit fluctuations in behavior because it’s a giant index smoothing out lumps. With quad-witching and quarterly index rebalances Dec 16, Asset Allocation ballooned 16.3% marketwide, signaling that indexes and ETFs are out of step with assets (and may be substituting).

Also on Dec 16, what we call Risk Management (protecting or leveraging trades and portfolios) jumped 12%. It’s expected because leverage with derivatives has been pandemic in markets, with Active Investment and Risk Management – a combination pointing to hedge funds – currently leading.

Here’s the thing. The combined increase for the two behaviors last Friday was an astonishing 28%.  Then on Dec 19 as the new series of marketwide derivatives issued, Fast Trading – profiting on price-differences – exploded, jumping 25%.

A 25% change for a stock trading $100 million of dollar-volume daily is a big deal. The stock market is about $300 billion of daily dollar-volume.

Picture a skyscraper beginning to sway.

Looking back, Risk Management jumped 16% with July expirations, the first after searing Brexit gains. The market fell from there to September expirations when again behavioral volatility exploded. The market recovered briefly before falling all the way to the election. With expirations Nov 18, Risk Management shot up 11.2%.

Behavioral volatility precedes price-volatility. We have it now, monumentally.

What’s happened in the broad market is a honeymoon before the wedding. The incoming Trump administration has sparked an investing surge betting on a catalyst – exactly the way Activist investors affect individual stocks.  Fundamentals cease to matter.  Supply and demand constraints go out the window. A fervor takes hold.

The one thing our long bull market has lacked is fervor. It’s the most hated – and now second longest ever – bull market for US stocks because so many have loathed the monetary intervention behind ballooning asset prices.

That’s all been forgotten and a sort of irrational exuberance has set in.

Those who know me know I embrace in libertarian fashion broad individual liberty and limited government because it’s the environment that promotes prosperity best for all. I favor a future with more of it.

We should get the foundation right though. I’ll use a metaphor.  Suppose a giant storm lashes a coast, burying it in sand. Some return to the beach to rebuild homes and establishments but much lies listlessly beneath a great grainy coat.

Then a champion arrives and urges people to build. The leader’s verve lights a fire in the breasts of the people, who commence building a vast structure.

Right on the sand.  Which lies there still unmoved, a shifting layer beneath the mighty edifice rising upon it.

It’s better to remove the sand – all the central-bank buildup from artificial prices, the manufactured money, the warped credit markets.  Otherwise when the next wave comes the damage will be that much greater.

So call me wary of this surge.

Fed Up

We’re in New York hoping to run into Janet Yellen because today the Federal Reserve probably raises rates.

In December last year the Fed hiked, and markets jumped – and then imploded. Worst January start ever for the stock market.

If you’re not right now feeling a deadening of your senses, you’re an outlier. Assemble a focus group and you’ll find folks have roughly the same reaction to the words “monetary policy” that they do to “dental appointment.”  It’s all floss, scraping and blood.

With stocks at all-time highs due more to the growth of the Fed’s balance sheet than verve in the economy, one wonders if it’s held together with dental floss. The world’s leading currency manipulator by my estimation isn’t China but us. The USA.  We micromanage the supply of dollars, and all currencies turn on the value of the dollar.

So we have to talk monetary policy. If the supply of money expands faster than the economy, inflation will show up somewhere. Inflation simply means your money doesn’t go as far as it used to.  See everything from real estate to education to stocks now.

The Fed from 2009-15 increased the supply of dollars by 62% while the economy grew 24% (about 2% per year). The adult population expanded 7%. Those employed increased 10% (but only 4% if you back up to peak mid-2008 pre-crisis jobs).

The only way an economy grows faster than population is if productivity – doing more with less – increases. Our most productive year by far in recent times was…wait for it…2009.  Yes, when the economy imploded and the value of the dollar exploded, suddenly our money went farther, and the bloat came out, and productivity spiked 5.5%.

But the Fed immediately shoved the entire economy full of bucks. Productivity nose-dived because our money didn’t go as far as it used to, as prices for everything from houses to stocks climbed sharply.  Productivity since has averaged less than 1% growth per year and totals but 5% from 2010 through the third quarter this year.

So if the supply of money is the only thing growing rapidly, we have an economy built on what the sellside analysts call multiple-expansion, which is just another name for your money doesn’t go as far as it used to.  You’re paying more for the same thing.

This, while we’re at it, is how income inequality increases.  When governments expand the supply of money, people with more (the rich) spend it on houses and cars and art and stocks, increasing the prices of those things, and the rich get richer.

But for the poor who do not have assets, the money they have doesn’t go as far because stuff like toilet paper and cereal and toothpaste costs more.  So they have less (we thus have a curious confluence in which the Fed rails against income inequality while promoting it with policies).

The ideal structure is for money to have timeless value so that technology for making things boosts productivity, and prices come down some over time (prices declined by 50% from 1800-1900 and we had our most explosively productive stretch ever) and everybody’s money goes a little farther.

The Trump administration brings a message of opportunity. That unstoppable force of hope is slamming into the immovable object of economic fact. Stocks are up some 10% without underlying change. It says how much we long for the good times to roll again.

There are two questions here as we conclude. First, do we want to build the future atop a giant pile of wobbly Fed pillows stuffed full of cash, or would it be better to ground it firmly on economic output?  Hope is a powerful elixir but it’s not empirical. Empirically, there should be a massive sale – everything must go – in America before we begin again.

And question number two is will that happen?  The US dollar strengthened sharply before the Internet bubble burst in 2001, putting everything on sale. We have valuations now matched only by those then.  The dollar is at the strongest level since then.

The strong dollar will mean weaker Q4 revenue and profits for multinationals and if it continues into Q1 next year, the economy will first slow before Trump policies may put wind in the sails. When record stock markets mash into falling corporate profits and slowing economic outcomes, expect trouble.

I’m excited about the future in America. Before it comes, we should first get Fed up.  Dump these asset prices created by a vast accumulation of cash.  Start fresh. Will it happen?  That’s the unknowable part.

Long December

Are you a Counting Crows fan?

Karen and I saw the band years ago at Red Rocks, our fabled foothills venue. Front man Adam Duritz lived, he said, in Denver as a child.  One great song goes, “It’s a long December and there’s reason to believe that this year might be better than the last.”

On this last day of November I’m thinking back.  On November 30, 2015, marketwide short volume – daily trading on borrowed shares – was about 43%, a low number versus trailing standards. By January 2016 it had risen to 52%. At Nov 28 this year its 43%, the same as last year.

The dollar then as measured by the DXY Index was the strongest in a decade, at 100.5.  It’s at 101.0 now, a fourteen-year high.

Let’s pause. What’s a strong dollar mean? Using an analogy, a football field is one hundred yards long. Suppose your team is way behind, down 30-0. So the referees shorten the field to 60 yards to give you a chance to catch up.

A strong dollar is a long field. A weak dollar is a short field. Weak dollars shorten play by making prices rise, earnings from abroad converted back to dollars appear stronger, and borrowing cheaper.

From 2009-14, the USA played on a short field, thanks to the Federal Reserve. We were down 30-0. By latter 2014 we trailed about 30-14.  I use that score because by historical measures – housing starts, GDP growth, discretionary income, retail sales (excluding autos), industrial output, productivity and more – we are half what we were.

But we’re catching up, so the Fed is getting set to stretch the field again (Aside: We should never shorten the field. If you’re used to running 60 yards in practice but the games play at 100, your training is all wrong. A steady dollar is what we need.).

DXY

Courtesy Dow Jones Marketwatch

 

Getting back to our December comparisons, in 2015 the Fed inched the cost of overnight borrowing called the Fed Funds Rate up to 0.25%-0.50% (it settles sort of in the middle), the first hike in ten years.  This December it’s widely expected the Fed will mosey the rate up another 25-50 basis points.  Simpatico again.

In December 2015, the bond market was weak, with interest rates on the 10-year US Treasury at 2.33%, up from 1.7% in January, a 39% increase (prices and rates move inversely, so when people sell bonds, rates rise and when they buy them, rates fall). As November 2016 ends, the 10-year Treasury is 2.32%, from 1.4% in July (68% rise).

And the S&P 500 is about 5% higher now. (Speaking of stocks, don’t miss our NIRI webinar tomorrow called Hide and Seek: The Incredible But True Story of How Big Institutions Buy and Sell Your Shares.)

There is one major difference between then and now. Using our long-field/short-field analogy in a different way, when the Fed’s balance sheet has big bank reserves, that’s a short field. Low bank reserves, long field. Between early December 2015 and early January 2016, the Fed took $500 billion out of bank reserves, pushing the playing field to the full hundred yards as it tightened rates.

The whole globe rocked.

Stocks imploded and money screamed into bonds, driving rates down. For awhile at the end of January it seemed downside for the market was bottomless.

By pushing the entire $500 billion back into reserves and chopping the playing field to 60 yards, the Fed got stocks to reverse and soar all the way to the Brexit (they overdid it).

This time they’re starting December where they began January, with a long field and low reserves. They believe they can hike rates December 14 and hack the playing field down to 60 yards by boosting bank reserves, and thus next year will be better than the last.

They might be right.

I’ll tell you the risk should they get it wrong and what would set it off:  If the economy lurches sharply down – despite headlines this week there’s a real chance of a recession next year looking at trends – then the Trump Rally will be a big belly well out over the Fed’s skis as winter hits. If that happens this current year will be better than the next.

I’m hoping for a short December.

Best Of: The GRAR

Editorial Note: Happy Thanksgiving!  We hope you reflect gratefully this season, as we will.  And speaking of reflecting, you might think with markets hitting new all-time highs after the election that we’ve beaten a retreat (what the military calls without irony “advancing to the rear”) from our two-year declamation about coming risk-asset revaluation. We’re by no means complaining about gains. We think prospects for the USA merit giving thanks. 

But there will be no escaping the consequences of artificial asset-price inflation. You can’t blow a balloon full of air and suppose it’ll float forever.  Runs here in November will have a profound reversal magnified by the meteoric dollar-rise. Whether it happens in days or weeks, it’s coming. The question for the new administration will be whether it possesses the fortitude to let prices find proper equilibrium so the economy can actually find “escape velocity” finally, in its aftermath.  -TQ

Originally posted Nov 9, 2016:

Power changed hands in the USA today.

I don’t know in what way yet because I’m writing before election outcomes are known, and about something for the market that will be bigger than which person sits in the oval office or what party holds congressional sway.

The GRAR is a lousy acronym, I admit. If somebody has got a better name, holler.  We started talking about it in latter 2014.  It’s the Great Risk Asset Revaluation. We had the Great Recession. Then followed the Great Intervention. What awaits the new Congress and President is the GRAR.

I’ll give you three signs of the GRAR’s presence.  Number one, the current quarter is the first since March 2015 for a rise in earnings among the S&P 500, and the first for higher revenues since October 2014. Until now, companies have been generating lower revenues and earning less money as stocks treaded water, and the uptick still leaves us well short of previous levels.

Since 1948, these recessions in corporate financials of two or more quarters have always accompanied actual recessions and stock-retreats. The GRAR has delayed both.

Second, gains off lows this year for the Dow Jones Industrial Average have come on five stocks primarily. One could use various similar examples to make this point, but it’s advances dependent on a concentrated set of stocks.  This five – which isn’t important but you can find them – include four with falling revenues and earnings. Counterintuitive.

Finally, the market is not statistically higher (adding or subtracting marketwide intraday volatility for all prices of nearly 2% daily) than it was in December 2014.

That’s remarkable data.  It says prices are not set by fundamentals but intervention.

We might think that if earnings growth resumes, markets will likewise step off this 2014 treadmill and march upward. And that’s independent of whatever may be occurring today – soaring stocks or falling ones, reflecting electoral expectations versus outcomes.

In that regard, our data showed money before the election positioned much as it was ahead of the Brexit vote:  Active buying, market sentiment bottomed, short volume down – bullish signals.

You’ve heard the term “delayed gratification?” It means exercising self-discipline until you’re able to afford desired indulgences.  Its doppelganger is delayed consequences, which is the mistaken idea that because nothing bad arises from bad decisions that one has escaped them.

The bad decision is the middle one – The Great Intervention.  The Great Recession was a consequence arising from a failure to live within our means. When we all – governments, companies, individuals – spend less than we make, nobody ever needs a bailout.

But you don’t solve a profligacy problem by providing more access to credit.  The breathtaking expansion of global central-bank balance sheets coupled with interest rates near zero is credit-expansion. To save us from our overspending, let’s spend more.

If I held in my palms a gold coin and a paper dollar and I said to you, “Pick one,” which would you take?

If you said “the dollar bill,” I can’t help you and neither can Copernicus, who first described this phenomenon that explains the GRAR 500 years ago. Nearly everybody takes the gold, right? We inherently know it’s more valuable than the paper, even if I tell you they have the exact same value.  This principle is called Gresham’s Law today.

Credit does not have the same value as cash.  But assets in the world today have been driven to heights by credit, the expansion of which diminishes the value of cash.

What happens when the people owning high-priced assets such as stocks, bonds, apartments in New York, farmland in Nebraska and so on want to sell them?  All the cash and credit has already been consumed driving prices up in the first place.

What will follow without fail is the GRAR. Depending on who got elected, it might come sooner or later.  But without respect to the winner, it’s coming.  The correct solution for those now in power is to avoid the temptation to meet it with credit again, and to let prices become valuable and attractive. Painful yes, but healthy long-term.

That’s the path out of the GRAR. I hope our winner has the discipline to delay gratification.

Volume and Interest

In the five trading days ended Oct 17, 49.1% of average daily stock volume was short.

“Wait, what?” you say.  “Half the stock market is short?”

Yes, that’s right.  Short volume last topped 49% marketwide in mid-April. The market glided gently downward from there to May options-expirations. Speaking of expirations, we’re in them for October this week, so it’s a good time to talk about shorting.

Short volume hit a last marketwide low July 12 at 43%, which roughly corresponded to the high point of the Brexit Bounce.  At Nov 30 last year short volume was 42.9% and December and January were horrific for markets.  And on Jan 7, 2016, short volume was 52%. A month later the market bottomed and soared till April.

If short-volume history is a guide, the market is nearing a temporary bottom. It’s unwise to use a single data point, and we don’t (we use six key measures, plus a small supporting cast, as you clients know). The flow and behavior of money count, and we track both.

“Back up,” you say.  “You lost me at ‘short volume.’ What do you mean by that?”

Short volume is trading derived from borrowed shares.

“I read back in August on Zero Hedge that nobody’s short stocks. Trading from borrowed shares is 2% of the S&P 500, near a three-year low.”

You’re talking about short interest, the long-in-the-tooth risk-assessment tool derived from a 1975 Federal Reserve rule called Regulation T. Shorting and derivatives exploded after the US scrapped the gold standard and the Feds wanted to track margin accounts.

“Are we talking about the same short interest? The amount of total shares outstanding or float that’s borrowed and sold and not yet covered?”

Yes. Forty-one years later it’s still a standard market-risk measure. Yet it’s largely useless predictively. It didn’t shoot up until well after Bear Stearns foundered. In late 2007 it was 1.6%.

“So you’re saying it’s a crappy measure. What’s short volume then?”

Short volume is the amount of daily trading volume that’s borrowed. If a stock trades a million shares a day and short volume is 53%, then 530,000 shares of it were borrowed.  With over 40% of all market volume coming from Fast Traders wanting to own nothing, a great deal of this is short-term trading.

“Okay, I’m following. But what’s it tell me?”

Short volume signals several things but in sum it’s what you think: High short volume, lower price.  Why? Shorting is at root the continual adding of supply to the market. So if demand doesn’t keep up, price falls.

Here’s more:

High short volume means weak expectation for gains. No matter what company fundamentals are, if more volume comes from borrowed shares than owned shares, Fast Traders weighing tick data with high performance machines predict investors would rather lend shares for a return than spend money buying and holding them.

High short volume points to rotation. If the machines want to be short, they’re betting holders are selling and trying to hide it by passing shares through multiple brokers. The converse is true too: If you’ve been short and shorting falls, rotation is probably done.

Persistent high shorting reflects uncertainty about corporate strategy.  Not to pick on Tesla (because it’s not alone by any stretch) but its 200-day average short volume is 55%. Investors say it’s a trading vehicle, not an investment opportunity.  By contrast Qualcomm’s 200-day average is 42%. The two have inverse performance the past year.

Tangentially, high short volume CAN mean ETFs are seeing outflows. Exchange Traded Funds don’t directly buy or sell stocks but they create big volume because ETFs track other measures, such as indexes, that are in turn composed of other issues, such as stocks.

Traders measure deviation between ETFs and these other things and arbitrage (profit on price-differences) the spreads.  When investors sell ETF shares, ETF market makers or authorized participants (parties designated to create and redeem ETF shares) might short components to raise cash in order to buy ETF shares and retire them to rebalance supply.

In sum, short volume is a sensor situated near the beating heart of the money behind price and volume. And while algorithms driving trades today are designed to deceive, they can often be unmasked through short volume (with a couple other key measures).

For the rest of this week though, don’t be surprised if the market shows us not a beating heart but expirations-related palpitations.

Two Faces

In Roman mythology, Janus is the two-faced god of beginnings and endings.  In Denver, Janus is the god of investing. In the news, Janus is merging with UK money manager Henderson.

The move reflects the two faces of the stock market, beginnings and endings and gates and doorways, like the figure from Rome’s old religion.  Today’s market is the inverse of the one prevailing when Tom Bailey launched Janus from a one-room Denver office in 1969, choosing the front-range town over New York to avoid Wall Street GroupThink.

For the next three decades, Janus boomed through a culture of camaraderie built around proprietary financial modeling to find the most dynamic, well-run companies. Janus was a stock-picker of the highest caliber with a penchant for bucking the crowd and going long, big.  Star fund manager Tom Marsico epitomized the Janus style with his Focus Fund backing typically 20 stocks.

Janus embraced the New Economy and chased technology. Though Marsico left in 1997 in a dispute with management, Janus, which was then owned by Kansas City Southern before spinning out publicly as part of Stilwell Financial, became the best mutual-fund company in the business, peaking at $330 billion of assets in 1999.

Then the Internet Bubble burst. In latter 2000 as tech stocks cratered, Janus was losing $1 billion a day in asset-value. In 2001, the firm cut half its staff and saw assets under management dip below $200 billion. The name Stilwell, a moniker fashioned to honor rail tycoon Arthur Stilwell, went away and the two-faced god returned as a public firm.

But the US stock market emerged from the 20th century fundamentally altered, a National Market System. Well, there is no “market system.” It’s one or the other. A market is organic commercial interaction – a dynamic environment where shrewd analysis and the search for the best is a recipe for the success that bred Janus. A system is a process and method. Success in a system turns on stripping out cost and following a model.

The National Market System today is a process and method. GroupThink. Exactly what Janus eschewed. Blackrock and Vanguard have roared past yesterday’s stock-picking heroes like Janus by stripping cost out and tracking averages, thriving at GroupThink.

It’s remarkable testament to the state of the market that being average is the key to being best. And how did we get a market where average is king? Process and method. Rules.

The Order Handling Rules in 1997 decreed that stock markets must display prices set by Electronic Communications Networks, which obliterated a fixture of exchanges back to the 1792 Buttonwood Agreement that brokers not undercut each other on price.  Regulation ATS required all trades to occur through brokers or exchanges, putting the brokers who created exchanges into competition with their progeny. Decimalization in 2001 wiped out the market-making spread necessary for investment banks to fund small-cap stock research (small-cap IPOs plunged by 90%).

Then Regulation National Market System, a product of Congressional legislation, crafted a single marketplace functioning like a data network around the best national bid or offer. A network of linked nodes isn’t competition. It’s a system. The process and method for navigating the network determines success. Machines navigate it best, so the biggest source of volume today is Fast Trading, which writes no research, carries no inventory, underwrites nothing.

In the decade ended Dec 31, 2015 spanning the creation of the National Market System, 98% of all stock-pickers have failed to beat the average – the S&P 500.  The reason isn’t prowess from passives but how indexes and ETFs strip out cost and construct portfolios around the average prices that now securities regulators require (“Best Execution”).

If you’re looking for outliers like Janus, this market is the wrong one for you (and if you seek that money as the investor-relations profession does, it’s stacked against you too). So money is rushing with great sound and fury from them and into indexes and ETFs.

Mergers are driven by effort to strip out cost.  Henderson is paying $2 billion for Janus to form a manager with $300 billion of assets – smaller than Janus in 1999. Ironically, the amount Henderson is paying equals the investment outflows from the two in 2016.  Janus CEO Dick Weil will co-head the company with Henderson CEO Andrew Formica and will move from Denver to London.

Regulators: Is there not one of you paying attention? You did this. You are wrecking the market for stock-picking, for small-caps, for American capitalism. Now you’ve driven Janus out of Denver.  We don’t need a two-faced market where just one smiles.  Keep this up and you’ll foster the mother of all backlashes.

Three Acts

Spain rocks.

We’re back from pedaling the Pyrenees and cruising the rollers of the Costa Brava on bikes, where the people, the food, the wine, the scenes, the art, the land and the sea were embracing and enriching.

To wit, we traversed 200 miles, thousands of feet of climbing and even walked some 40 miles around Barcelona and Girona and I still gained weight. But I wouldn’t trade a bite of Jamon Iberico or sip of rich red Priorat (I’ll let you look those up!).

After a night home we’re now in Chicago where I’ll speak today to the Investor Relations council for MAPI, the manufacturers’ association, on market structure, and tomorrow we’re in Austin for the NIRI Southwest Regional Conference where we sponsor and I’ll aim to rivet attendees with how IR should navigate modern markets.

Speaking of which, a perspective as September concludes this week that’s shaped by two weeks away and abroad might best work as journal entries:

Journal Entry #1:  CBOE to buy Bats Global Inc.

Years ago I sat in front of Joe Ratterman’s desk in the unassuming Lenexa, KS, BATS offices and talked about things ranging from market structure to Joe’s fondness for aircraft.  Joe is now chairman and should be able to afford a bigger plane.

But the thing to understand here is how the combination is a statement on markets. Derivatives and equities are interwoven with other asset classes. It’s what the money is doing. The market is a Rubik’s Cube where moving one square impacts others and strategies for traders and investors alike manifest in complex combinations (you clients see this all the time in our Patterns view in your Market Structure Reports).

The IR job is about building relationships with long-term money, sure. The challenge is to understand the process and method through which money moves into and out of shares. Without knowledge of the process and method, comprehension wanes – and it’s incumbent on IR to know the market. Investors and traders are not mere buyers or sellers now. Profit and protection often lie in a third dimension: Derivatives.

Journal Entry #2: The Tick Size Study. 

We reflected back to 2014 last week and revisited our comments from December that year. The exchanges at the behest of the SEC are at last embarking next month on a study of bigger spreads for buying and selling small-cap stocks to boost trading activity.

It’s a fundamentally correct idea except for one problem. And you’d think, by the way, that the Federal Reserve could grasp this pedestrian concept. Where spreads are narrow, products and services commoditize and activity moves to the path of least resistance. You understand? Low interest rates shift focus from long-term capital investment to short-term arbitrage.  Low market spreads do the same to stocks.

But the problem is the National Market System. It’s an oxymoron. Something cannot simultaneously be a market – organic commercial interaction – and a system – a process or method.  There’s either a market, or a process and method. The SEC wants to tweak the process and method to revitalize organic commercial interaction. Well, if organic commercial interaction is better, why not just eliminate the system?  The Tick Size Study is a good idea trapped within a process and method that will likely desiccate it of benefit.

Journal Entry #3:  The Market.

It too is matriculating in a process and method.  We had the Great Recession, as those who take credit for halting say.  The process and method for constraining it (for now) could be called the Great Intervention.  The third step is the Great Risk Asset Revaluation, currently underway.

In August 2014 the Fed’s balance sheet stopped expanding as the Great Intervention that followed the Great Recession halted.  In latter 2014 the stock market stopped rising. So long as the Fed’s balance sheet increased, the supply of money via credit did too, and that money chased a decreasing supply of product – stocks (because public companies are buying back more shares than they issue, collectively).  There are today fewer public companies than in 2008.  Stocks are trading roughly where they did in December 2014.

Something to ponder:  Generally when growth stocks experience slowing revenues (see Twitter for instance) or earnings, shares fall. The stock market has been in a year-long recession for both. Never in modern history has the economy not also been in recession when that occurred, nor has the market failed to retreat. That it hasn’t is testament to the inertia – a tendency to remain in a uniform state of motion – created by Intervention.

It’ll stop. And stop it must.  We’ll never have a “normal” market until then, so see it cheerfully and not with fear (inertia can last a long time too). Catch you in October.

Balancing Act

If you want to know what a business is capable of doing, look at its balance sheet.

If you want to know what the Federal Reserve is capable of doing too, look at its balance sheet. Having scrutinized it, Karen and I are leaving today to ride bikes in the Pyrenees and will return if the Fed survives.

Just kidding.  Except for the Pyrenees. We’ll report back on Catalonia in a couple weeks.

Meanwhile, there is again a glaring focus on the Fed as markets shudder. Clients know our Sentiment Index had a “four handle” at 4.9/10.0 Sept 8, the first negative read since early July. Volatility bloomed. As with weather, the market reflects preceding patterns.

It’s the same with the Fed’s balance sheet. Monday with Rick Santelli on CNBC’s Squawk on the Street I attempted to describe in a handful of seconds that the Fed can breathe in and breath out and impact rates and market stability.

Simplifying, the Fed has two levers for pushing rates up and down. When the Fed buys assets like mortgages or Treasuries from the big banks supporting our payments system (called the primary dealers), the supply of money expands, which makes credit cheaper and pushes down rates.  These are bank reserves.

On the opposite side, the Fed can borrow money from banks, tightening supply and prompting an increase in borrowing costs.  These are called Reverse Repurchase Agreements (RRPs).

We described last week how both changed little over the two decades preceding 2008. Tweaking one or the other was simple and economical. Need to tighten 2-3%? Boost RRPs by $10 billion.

But now bank reserves are $2.3 trillion, 26,000% more than historical levels. RRPs are 1000% higher than history at $300 billion. The three-to-one ratio the Fed long maintained is now one-to-26.

These facts produce a paradox that traps the Fed. Twenty-five basis points, the increase expected when or if the Fed moves, is no biggie against $10 billion of reserves.  But the Fed pays interest on reserves (and RRPs). Now 50 basis points, the rate would jump 50%.

The interest expense alone boggles the mind. Plus, the government will lose money. A rider on the December transportation-funding bill passed by Congress requires the Fed to send earnings on its massive portfolio over $10 billion to the US Treasury general fund.

Do you see? The data driving the Fed aren’t economic but financial. It’s about the Fed’s balance sheet. And government coffers, dented if the Fed starts paying more interest.

They may still hike but it’s a hindrance. And there’s more. The same giant banks providing margin accounts to traders and derivatives to institutional investors are partners called primary dealers helping implement Fed policy. When the Fed moved $100 billion to RRPs out of excess reserves Sept 1 at the same time that its balance sheet shrank slightly, the impact rippled through all the banks financing hedges and margin-trading.

That ripple is the current tsunami hitting the stock market. The Fed has already unwound these RRPs, returning $100 billion to excess reserves. But the damage was done. The Fed tried similar tactics in December last year when it hiked for the first time since 2006, and markets caved in January and the Fed had to pump up excess reserves by $500 billion – much more than it had moved out of the money supply – before markets stopped falling.

And the Fed oversteered.  Markets shot like a rocket into May, flummoxing all. Our Sentiment pegged the positive needle for weeks.

The same happened around the Brexit vote. The Fed was in the process of tightening by lowering excess reserves and lifting RRPs.  The markets imploded. In two weeks, the Fed reversed. The market shot up, once more prompting global head-scratching.

The Fed cannot seem to calibrate its levers without overshooting or undershooting and in any case creating chaos in stocks and bonds. There is no better evidence of the folly in the size of its balance sheet.

Is there a way out? Sure. The Fed could write off 80% of its balance sheet and put us back to pre-crisis leverage.  But interest rates would explode and the entire globe would fall into depression because that would be a restructuring, a technical default.

Is there another way out?  Yes. Normalize rates and take our chances. But that demands a fortitude that’s missing in the sort of jittery lever-yanking one can observe on the Fed’s balance sheet.