Tagged: Stocks

Root Cause

Karen and I are in the Windy City visiting the NIRI chapter and escaping gales on the Front Range that were delaying flights to Denver and blowing in spring snow due Friday while we’re in Palo Alto for the Silicon Valley NIRI Spring Seminar (we sponsor both chapters). Hope to see you!

I’m going to challenge economic orthodoxy. Whatever your reaction as an adult to hearing the term “Santa Claus” (follow me here; it’s a mechanism, not commentary on religion or culture), you know the imagery of adolescent expectations is a myth. Even so, parents perpetuate it generationally.

Today we’ll unravel the Saint Nicholas Theory of economics. Because at root equities reflect economics even when the barometer is errant. Economic orthodoxy – conventional wisdom on economies – says we need rising prices. For businesses selling things it’s called “pricing power,” the capacity to increase the cost of goods and services. The Federal Reserve and other global central banks have an “inflation target,” and bureaucrats wearing half-glasses at droll news conferences pore over boorish scripts about “structural malaise” and the exigency of combating deflation.

Few know what they’re saying except we gather they think prices should rise. Yet we consumers stop spending when things cost too much. If our spending is the engine of the economy – what economists call consumption – how is it that rising prices are going to drive more of it? In fact when stuff’s not selling, businesses hold sales. They cut prices.QuastCurve

Big Economic Idea No. 2 (we all know from childhood what “number two” means) is that access to credit – borrowed money – is the key to more consumption. If the economy slows, the problem, we’re told, is we need more spending. Central banks the world round want you whipping out a credit card lest the global economy slip into falling prices.

This is Santa Claus Economic Theory. It says spending drives the economy, which grows when prices rise. There is only one reliable way to drive up prices: Inflation.  Milton Friedman taught us “inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.” While prices temporarily increase when more buyers chase fewer goods (say, Uber at rush hour), costs will revert when supply and demand equalize. So inflation – rising prices – is sustainable only if the supply of money increases faster than economies produce things.

Money as we presently know it can only expand one way:  Through debt. If the Federal Reserve wants to increase currency in circulation, it buys debt from the Treasury with cash it manufactures (backed by you and me).  Likewise, when you use a credit card, you create money. A bank isn’t reaching into dInflationeposits to pay a bill you incurred. The bank creates electronic funds.  When you pay your bill, that electronic money disappears.

Stay with me. We’ve almost arrived at the bizarre and impossible logic that animates the entire global monetary system, as I’ve illustrated with three charts here.  Today Janet Yellen will try to convince us we need inflation.  Rising prices. What drives prices up? More money. How does the global monetary system create money? Through debt.  So we’re left to conclude that prosperity can only happen if debt and spending perpetually rise. Because if you pay off debt, money is destroyed and prices fall.

Two weeks ago I was on CNBC with Rick Santelli declaiming how rising debt and rising prices are the enemies of prosperity, and purchasing power is the engine of growth. Purchasing power is when your money buys more than it did before, not less.  Example:  Uber.  It used to cost $100 for a cab to the Denver airport. Uber is about $40. Guess what? Cabs are coming down.  Purchasing power is improving.

Central banks are perpetuating a myth that will destroy the global economy, and I’ve proved it with three charts. The first – call it the Quast Curve – shows what happens to the US economy if the value of the money denominating goods and services is consistently diminished over time.  Growth rises but then collapses (eerily, in this model it topped in the 1960s before we left the gold standard and hit zero around 2008). USDebt

What will follow from the Quast Curve is rising debt and rising prices, illusions of growth – exactly what images two and three show. As money buys less and less, prices go up, and consumers have to replace the missing money with debt, a terminal cycle.  It’s now on the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve.

Real economies are simple. If money has stable value, and enterprising humans create things that improve lives, costs should stay steady or decline, not rise, which increases purchasing power and wealth rather than debt.  It’s infinitely sustainable.  Economist Herb Stein said if something cannot last forever it will stop.  You never want an economy built on things that will stop. What should stop instead are bad policies.

Receding

The X-Files are back on TV so the pursuit of paranormal activity can resume. Thank goodness, because the market appears to be paranormal (X-Files theme in background).

Volatility signals behavioral-change, the meaning of which lies in patterns. Sounds like something Fox Mulder would utter but we embrace that notion here at ModernIR. It’s not revolutionary, but it is universal, from ocean tides to personalities, weather forecasts to stock-market trading.  Volatility, patterns.

Stocks are volatile. Where’s the pattern?

Let’s find it. A headline yesterday splashed across news strings said CEOs have “unleashed recession fears” on earnings calls. Fact Set’s excellent Earnings Insight might buttress that assertion with data showing S&P 500 earnings down 5.8% so far, revenues off 3.5%. It marks three straight quarters of declines for earnings, the worst since 2009, and four in a row for revenues, last seen in late 2008.

What happened then was a recession. That’s a pattern, you say.

Hard to argue your reasoning. We’re also told it’s oil pulling markets down. China’s slowing growth is pulling us down.  Slowing growth globally is the problem, reflected in Japan’s shift to negative interest rates. First-read fourth-quarter US Gross Domestic Product (GDP) last week was a wheezing 0.6%.  Slowing is slowing us, is the message.

But what’s the pattern?  One would expect a trigger for a recession so where is it?  In 2008, banks had inflated access to real estate investments by securitizing mortgage debt on the belief that demand was, I guess, infinite. When infinity proved finite, leverage shriveled like an extraterrestrial in earth atmosphere. Homes didn’t vanish. Money did. Result: a recession in home-values.

It spread.  In 2007, the gap between stock-values and underlying earnings was the widest until now, with the S&P 500 at 1560 trading more than 10% higher than forward earnings justified. Oil hit $150.

But by March 2009 oil was $35 and the S&P 500 below 700. To reverse this catastrophic deflation in asset prices, central banks embarked on the Infinite Money Theorem, an effort to expand the supply of money in the world enough to halt the snapping mortgage rubber band.  Imagine the biggest-ever long-short pairs trade.

It worked after a fashion. By the end of 2009, a plunging dollar had shot oil back to $76.  The S&P 500 was over 1100 and rapidly rising earnings justified it. Trusting only broad measures, investors in pandemic uniformity stampeded from stock-picking to index-investing and Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs).

The Infinite Money Theorem reached orbital zenith in Aug 2014 when the Federal Reserve stopped expanding its balance sheet.  The dollar shot up.  Oil began to fall. By Jan 2015 companies were using the words “constant currency” to explain why currency-conversions were crushing revenues and profits.  In Aug 2015 after the Chinese central bank moved to devalue the yuan, US stocks caterwauled.

On Nov 19, 2015, the Fed’s balance sheet showed contraction year-over-year. Stocks have never returned to November levels. On Dec 16, 2015, the Fed lifted interest rates.  Stocks have since swooned.

Pattern? Proof of the paranormal?  No, math. When a trader shorts your stock – borrows and sells it – the event raises cash but creates a liability. Borrow, sell shares, and reap cash gain (with a debt – shares to return).  When central banks pump cash into the global economy, they are shorting the future to raise current capital.

How?  Money can’t materialize from space like something out of the X-Files. The cash the Fed uses to buy, say, $2 trillion of mortgages is from the future – backed by tax receipts expected long from now. That’s a short.

We’re getting to the root.  Say the global economy fell into a funk in 2008 from decades of overspending and never left it. Let me explain it this way.  One divided by one is one.  But one divided by 0.9 is 1.11.  The way the world counts GDP , that’s 11% growth.  But that growth is really just a smaller denominator – a weaker currency.

Now the dollar is revaluing to one and maybe more (it did the same in 2001 and in 2008). Why? Since the financial crisis trillions of dollars have benchmarked markets through indexes and ETFs.  In 2015, $570 billion flowed to Blackrock and Vanguard alone.  All that money bought rising markets until the excess money was used up by assets with now sharply higher prices.

The denominator is reverting and the economic growth we thought we had is receding back toward its initial shape, such as $35 oil (with stretch marks related to supply/demand issues). That’s what’s causing volatility. This is the pattern.  It’s colossally messy because the dollar is the world’s reserve currency and thus affects all other currencies (unevenly).

Volatility signals behavioral-change, the meaning of which is in patterns. This is it. A boomerang (read Michael Lewis’s book by that title for another perspective).  The dollar was made small to cause prices to grow large and create the illusion of growth in hopes it would become reality.  At the top of the orbit nothing had really changed and now that seven-year shadow on the planet is receding.

We’ll be fine. We humans always are.  But this is no short-term event. It’s a huge short.

The Frontier

A war of words is unfolding in our profession.

In case you’ve not followed, it’s about the market for the product you manage as investor-relations officers. Many of you have read Flash Boys, Michael Lewis’s (The Big Short is soon coming to movie screens) engaging story of high-speed trading in equities. IEX, the upstart Lewis profiles, aims now to become a stock exchange, listing and trading your shares. Its application is up for public comment.

The dirt’s flying. IEX is accused by establishment exchanges of operating an unfair structure. The broker earned its stripes by offering investors a transparent alternative trading system characterized by the Magic Shoe Box – a fiber optic coil standardizing access to prices. You ought to read what’s been said and how IEX is responding.  We suspect its future fellows may regret having hurled recriminations. Seriously. See the comment letters from foes and friends (Southeastern Management’s supportive letter, signed by fellow investment managers in Declaration of Independence fashion, is a must-read. We’re finalizing ours now.).

Why care from the IR chair? Can your CFO explain to the Board how the company’s shares trade?  Public companies have left responsibility for the market to somebody else. The small city of Bell, CA followed this strategy and later found its managers were paying themselves a million dollars. Do you know what your exchange sells?

We’re picking no fights with the Big Two though you regular readers know we’re critical of their arbitrage incentives, how exchange revenue-drivers shift focus from investment to setting prices. When they match a baseline percentage of trades in your shares (and quote best prices often enough), then under the rules of the Consolidated Tape Association, exchanges receive the lion’s share of market-data revenues from the national system tracking prices and volumes. I think the establishment simply resists sharing with IEX a piece of this pie (how about growing the pie bigger?).

By setting prices continuously the exchanges create additional proprietary data that they sell back to traders and market centers. Why do they buy it?  Any participant serving customers must offer best prices and to ensure that they do, rules say they must buy all the data. Fee schedules for the exchanges show data-feeds can cost vast sums.

Yet in a perverse irony that cannot be blamed solely on the exchanges, traders with no customers often set most prices. These firms are the high-frequency traders about which Flash Boys unfolds its racy narrative.

IEX won’t be paying fast traders to set prices. It’s got a straightforward approach to matching customers. Read the comments on both sides and send a couple along to your executives. Ultimately the equity market exists for you, public companies, and your active investors, not so traders can arbitrage some split-second spread. We should then ask why legacy exchanges are paying for split-second prices.

We admire our friends at IEX and want them to succeed. Where companies once listed on many exchanges – Pacific, Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, Cincinnati and other markets – the choices today are Either Or.  BATS has no current plans for listings beyond ETFs so it’s a duopoly. Our profession should welcome a fresh third option.

As the tryptophan turkey high tomorrow washes by and you give thanks (in the USA we worship turkey on the 4th Thursday of November, international readers), be glad about the ever-present opportunity for say on market structure, about which issuers are notoriously silent. Resolve to be louder.  Go forth boldly and lay claim to the frontier.

Stein’s Law

Why are stocks rising if earnings and revenues are falling?

FactSet’s latest Earnings Insight with 70% of the S&P 500 reporting says earnings are down 2.2% versus the third quarter last year, revenues off 2.9%.  Yardeni Reseach Inc. shows a massive stock-disconnect with global growth. Yet since the swale in August marked a correction (10% decline), stocks have recouped that and more.

We’re not market prognosticators. But the core differentiation in our worldview from an analytical standpoint is that we see the stock market the way Google views you:  possessing discrete and measurable demographics. When you search for something online you see what you sought served up via ads at Google, Facebook, Twitter, etc. Advertising algorithms can track your movement and respond to it. They don’t consider you just another human doing exactly the same things as everybody else.

If your stock rises because your peer reports good results, your conclusion shouldn’t stop at “we’re up thanks to them,” but should continue on to “what behavior reacted to their results and what does it say about expectations for us?” Assuming that investors are responsible for the move requires supposing all market behavior is equal, which it is not.

I saw a Market Expectation yesterday for one of our clients reporting today before the open predicting a higher price but not on investor-enthusiasm. Fast traders were 45% of their volume, active and passive investors a combined 40%. So bull bets by speculators trumped weak expectations from investors.  Bets thus will drive outcomes today.

Which leads back to the market. We separate monetary behaviors into distinct groups with different measurable motivation. By correlating behavioral changes we can see what sets prices. For instance, high correlation between what we call Risk Management – the use of derivatives including options and futures – and Active Investment is a hallmark of hedge-fund behavior. The combination dominated October markets. And before the rebound swung into high gear, we saw colossal Risk Management – rights to stocks.

What led markets higher in October are the very things that led it lower Aug-Sep. The top three sectors in October: Basic Materials, Technology, Energy.  Look at three representative ETFs for these groups and graph them over six months: XLB, XLK, XLE.

We might define arbitrage as a buy low, sell high strategy involving two or more securities. The data imply arbitrage involving derivatives and equities. Sell the derivatives, buy the stocks, buy the derivatives, exercise the derivatives.

That chain of events will magnify recovery because it forces counterparties like Deutsche Bank (cutting 35,000 jobs, exiting ten countries), Credit Suisse (raising capital), Morgan Stanley (weak trading results), Goldman Sachs (underperformance in trading) and JP Morgan (underperformance in trading) among others to cover derivatives.

And since the market is interconnected today through indexes and ETFs, an isolated rising tide lifts all boats.  A stock that’s in technology ETFs may also be in broad-market baskets including Russell, midcap, growth, S&P 500, MSCI and other indices.  As these stocks, rise, broad measures do.

At October 22, the ModernIR 10-point Behavioral Index (we call it MIRBI) was topped, signaling impending retreat. That day, the European Central Bank de facto devalued the Euro. The next day, the Chinese Central Bank did the same.  The Federal Reserve followed suit October 28 by holding rates steady. Stocks suddenly accelerated and haven’t slowed. The MIRBI never fell to neutral and is now nearing a back-to-back top.

You’ll recall that Herb Stein, father of famous Ben, coined Stein’s Law: “If something cannot last forever, it will stop.” The rally in stocks has been led by things that cannot last. In fact, the conditions fueling equity gains – everywhere, not just in the US – are comprised of what tends to have a short shelf life (options expire the week after next). Bear markets historically are typified by a steep retreat, followed by a sharp recovery, followed by a long decline.

Whatever the state of the market, what’s occurring won’t last because we can see that arbitrage disconnected from fundamental facts drove it. Understanding what behavior sets prices is the most important aspect of market structure. And it’s the beginning point for great IR.

Water Down

Why are my shares down when my peers are up?

The answer most times isn’t that you’ve done something poorly that your peers are doing well. That would be true if 100% of the money in the market was sorting differences and was in fact trading you and your peers, and if the liquidity for you and your peers were identical at all times.

What is liquidity? Images of precipitation come to mind, which prompts recollection of that famous quip by whoever said it (Mark Twain gets credit but there’s no proof it was his utterance) that bankers will lend you an umbrella only when it’s sunny and take it back at the first hint of rain.

The Wall Street Journal yesterday carried a story about distressing levels of assets in big bond funds locked in positions that “lack liquidity.” Public companies, your bankers and shareholders have probably complained at some point about your “lack of liquidity.”

What it means is among the most profoundly vital yet most commonly overlooked (and misunderstood) aspects of markets. Things are finite. Public companies spend the great bulk of their investor-relations resources on Telling the Story. Websites, earnings calls, press releases, non-deal road shows, sellside conferences, targeting tools, on it goes.

But do you know how much of the product you’re selling is available to purchase? One definition of liquidity is the capacity of a market to absorb buying or selling without substantially altering a product’s value.

The WSJ’s Jason Zweig yesterday tweeted a great 1936 observation by Hungarian-born German émigré Melchior Palyi, longtime University of Chicago professor of economics: “A liquid structure never liquidates. Only the illiquid one comes under the pressure of liquidation.”

Think about that in terms of your own shares.  A liquid market can absorb the ingress and egress of capital without destroying the value of the supporting assets.

What’s your stock’s liquidity?  It’s not volume. We ran a random set of 11 stocks with market capitalization ranging from $300m-$112 billion. Mean volume for the group was 1.1m shares but varied from 50,000-5.6 million. Leaving out the biggest and smallest in each data set, we had a group with an average market cap of $6 billion, average daily volume of 755,000 shares, and average dollars per trade of $5,639.

That last figure is the true measure of liquidity. How much stock can trade without materially changing the price? In our group, it’s $5,639 worth of shares. So in a market with over $24 trillion of product for sale – US market capitalization – the going rate at any given movement is about the amount you’d spend on a Vespa motor scooter.  Now look at the dollar amount of your shares held by your top ten holders.

The stock market is incapable of handling significant movement of institutional assets. It’s a critically faulty structure if investors were to ever begin to pick up the pace of stock-redemptions. They are trying.  For the 20 trading days end Sept 18, the share of market for indexes and ETFs – Blackrock, Vanguard – is up 120 basis points over the long-run average, and stocks are down measurably.  Now, 1.2% might not seem like much but that’s more than $2 billion daily, sustained over 20 trading days. The S&P 500 is down about 5%.  At that ratio, if 10% of investors in indexes and ETFs wanted to sell, the market could decline 50%.

We’re not trying to make you afraid of water!  But this is the market for the financial product all public companies sell: Shares.  That it’s demonstrably ill-formed for a down market is partly the fault of us in the issuer community, because we’re participants and ought to be fully aware of how it works and when and where it may not, and should demand a structure supporting liquidity, not just trading.

Action items:  Know the dollar-size of your average daily trade (a metric we track), and compare it to the dollar-amount held by your biggest holders.  When your management team needs a risk-assessment, you’ll be ready.

Dark Costs

Credit Suisse. Deutsche Bank. ITG. Pipeline. Barclays. UBS. BNP Paribas. Citadel. Goldman Sachs. Liquidnet. Bank of America Merrill Lynch. Citigroup.

What commonality unites these firms? All have been fined for violating rules on so-called dark pools, private stock-trading venues.  At least three are now defunct, Pipeline shutting in 2012, Citi halting its Lavaflow unit last December after paying $5 million to regulators for compromising customer data, and Citadel saying in March this year it would mothball its Apogee platform.

Morgan Stanley and JP Morgan have been investigated but as yet have had no knees capped in the twilight. This is no collection of backwater outfits but a brokerage Who’s Who. These firms are running your buybacks and underwriting your offerings, the pillars upholding equity market-making and liquidity for shareholders.

Ask any Vice President of Marketing at a public company how the firm’s products and services are sold and you’ll get an unhesitant response. But your CFO likely doesn’t know what a dark pool is or why the big brokers running them are continually afoul of rules. You’re the product manager of the equity market if you’re occupying the IR chair. You’ve got a golden opportunity (and in a sense a duty) to be the expert.

Word is ITG, a publicly traded firm itself and among the largest independent operators of markets serving as alternatives to the big exchanges, will pay more than $20 million to settle allegations of trading against customer orders in 2010. It’ll be a test for the company to survive a wallop of this proportion.

Citadel, the hedge fund founded by mogul Ken Griffin, has been fined more than 20 times for breaching various rules. A bad actor?  Visit the Finra newsroom (formerly the National Association of Securities Dealers, Finra is the watchdog for stock brokers) and you’ll see a continuous litany. In the past month alone Goldman Sachs, Raymond James, Wells Fargo, LPL Financial and Aegis Capital were fined tens of millions collectively for demeaning market rules. In May and June, Morgan Stanley paid $3 million.

If everybody is paying regulators, could it be market rules are like the tax code – so byzantine that everybody is routinely in violation? We could countenance a concatenation of penalties for fringe firms jobbing the innocent. But fines are the central tendency. It feels like Las Vegas when Bugsy Siegel ran it.  You’re gonna pay the vig. (We think regulators want to end dark pools. Since they created the rules – Regulation ATS and the Order Handling Rules – that birthed dark pools, they don’t want to reverse themselves. So they may instead penalize alternative venues out of existence.)

Why would public companies accept a market so complicated that Goldman Sachs can’t comply? It gets once more to the IR job today.  At minimum we should understand and measure its performance as we would any other market to ensure that our best interests and those of customers and shareholders are being served. If you want to sell in China, the market is big but what determines whether you can or not is structure.

“Dark pools” is an inaccurate term but if you’re an investor-relations officer you should understand them.  Exchanges like the NYSE cannot give preference and must post prices. They’re public markets.

Dark pools are not public. You need permission from the market’s operator to use one, and most don’t list prices for shares because the reason they exist is to escape a bizarre feature of the stock market: List a price and somebody will attempt to be above or below it in order to keep your price from being matched. Prices are today like the way a friend of ours in California describes using turn signals when driving: A sign of weakness.

So dark pools decide who gets to enter, and the products in dark pools like your shares are listed by amounts, not price. If a pool has 10,000 shares of XYZ, the price will be halfway between the best bid to buy them and offer to sell them in the public market. Ostensibly nobody knows I’m after at least 5,000 shares so I get more at a decent price.

See?  Now think about that. A mall brings people wanting to consume things together with retailers selling them.  In the stock market, complex rules make it challenging to find anyone selling what you want to buy, and the moment you lift a finger, the price changes (this is why your investors increasingly use ETFs and other derivatives – it’s too complicated to get big amounts of the underlying asset).

You say, “I’m a road warrior, a vagabond of highways and jetways, a troubadour of the corporate story. I don’t have time for this stuff!”

Have we got it backwards? Shouldn’t we first understand – and have a say in – the market for our shares before we market our wares?  (I fashioned that rhyme myself.)  Structure counts. Caveat emptor.  Latin but timeless.

Three Days

Some energy-sector clients lost 40% of market-capitalization in three days last October.

A year and a half cultivating share-appreciation and by Wednesday it’s gone.  How so?  To get there let’s take a trip.

I love driving the Llano Estacado, in Spanish “palisaded steppe” or the Staked Plains. From Boise City, OK and unfolding southward to Big Spring, TX lies an expanse fit for nomads, an unending escarpment of mottled browns and khakis flat as iron rail stretching symmetric from the horizon like a sea.

Spanish explorer Francisco Coronado wrote, “I reached some plains so vast that I did not find their limit anywhere I went.” Here Comanches were dominating horse warlords for hundreds of years. Later sprouted first the oil boom early last century around Amarillo and again in the 21st century a neoclassical renaissance punctuated by hydraulic fracturing in the Permian Basin.

The air sometimes is suffused with mercaptan, an additive redolent of rotten egg that signals the otherwise invisible presence of natural gas. But the pressure of a relentless regimen silts away on a foreshortened compass, time seeming to cease and with it the pounding of pulses and devices.  It’s refreshing somehow.

And on a map one can plot with precision a passage from Masterson to Lampasas off The Llano and know what conquering that route demands from clock and fuel gauge.

Energy stocks in August 2014 were humming along at highway speed and then shot off The Llano in October, disappearing into the haze.

(Side note: If you want to discuss this idea, we’re at the NIRI Tristate Chapter in Cincinnati Wed Mar 18 and I’m happy to entertain it!)

What happened?  There are fundamental influences on supply and demand, sure. But something else sets prices. I’ll illustrate with an example. Short interest is often measured in days-to-cover meaning shares borrowed and sold and not yet bought and returned are compared to average daily trading volume. So if you move a million shares daily and your short interest is eight million, days-to-cover is eight, which may be good or bad versus your average.

Twice in recent weeks we’ve seen big blocks in stocks, and short volumes then plunged by half in a day. Both stocks declined. Understand, short interest and short volume differ. The former is shares borrowed but not yet covered. It’s a limited measure of risk.  Carry a big portfolio at a brokerage with marginable accounts and you can appropriate half more against it under rules.

Using a proxy we developed, marketwide in the past five days short volume was about 44%, which at 6.7 billion total shares means borrowed shares were 2.95 billion. Statistically, nearly 30% of all stocks had short volume above 50%.  More shares were rented than owned in those on a given day. (more…)

Listing

Why do you need an exchange?

Between the Tiber River and the Piazza del Quirinale in Rome sit the remains of Trajan’s Market, built around 100 AD by that Roman emperor famed for militaristically expanding the empire to its zenith.

Considered the world’s first covered multistory shopping mall, Trajan’s Market, designed by Greek Damascan architect Apollodorus, ingeniously and conveniently clustered vendors and shoppers. Thus that era’s real estate industry saw the importance of location, a timeless lesson.

Taking queue from the ancients, our financial forebears on Broad Street in New York City similarly fashioned a marketplace in 1792, after for some time trading stocks under a buttonwood tree. The bazaar they birthed called the New York Stock Exchange aggregated the investors with cash and the growth enterprises needing it. Investing leapt toward the modern era.

That worked well until exuberance and mushrooming Federal Reserve currency supplies collided in 1929. Then the government said, “All right, everybody, out of the pool.”

With the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the government sought to introduce safety to markets by eradicating fun and frivolity.  No longer would stock brokers hold court without a king, insouciantly supposing they could match buyers and sellers on merits without a bunch of paperwork with alphanumeric identifiers that governments so prefer.

As a result, some 82 years after Government ordered everybody to stand in lines and fill out forms, public companies in these here United States in 2015 need an exchange to list shares if they want the public to trade them (there are exceptions on the smaller end, the over-the-counter market, which has many thousands more companies than the big National Market System – but that’s a story for another time).

The question now is does it matter where you list your shares? We can prove in less than a blink of an eye that location, location, location is irrelevant (that should be our first clue that something is amiss) today in the equity market.

No, really.  We can show you in a split-second.  If you’ve never seen it, watch these ten milliseconds (the blink of an eye is about 300 milliseconds) of MRK trading compiled by data firm Nanex and posted to Youtube. (more…)

Risk

We figured if The President goes there it must be nice.

Reality often dashes great expectations but not so with Martha’s Vineyard where we marked our wedding anniversary. From Aquinnah’s white cliffs to windy Katama Beach, through Oak Bluffs (on bikes) to the shingled elegance of Edgartown, the island off Cape Cod is a winsome retreat.

Speaking of retreat, my dad, a Korean Police Action era (the US Congress last declared war in 1943, on Romania. Seriously.) veteran, told me his military commanders never used the word retreat, choosing instead “advance to the rear!”

Is the stock market poised for an advance to the rear? Gains yesterday notwithstanding, our measures of market sentiment reflected in the ten-point ModernIR Behavioral Index dipped to negative this week for the first time since mid-August. Risk is a chrysalis formed in shadows, studied by some with interest but generally underappreciated.

It happened in 2006 in housing, when trader John Paulson recognized it and put on his famous and very big short. Most missed the chrysalis hanging rather elegantly in the mushrooming rafters of the hot residential sector.

It happened in the 17th century Dutch tulip bubble, an archetype for manic markets.  Yet then tulips and buyers didn’t suddenly explode but just the money behind both, as ships from the New World laden with silver and gold flooded Flanders mints with material for coin. Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.

It’s hard to say if mania is here hanging pupa-esque on the cornices of the capital markets. Most say no though wariness abounds. Mergers are brisk and venture capital has again propagated a Silicon Valley awash in money-losing firms with eye-popping values. Corporate buybacks will surpass $1 trillion in total for 2013-2014, capital raking out shares from markets like leaves falling from turning September trees. (more…)

CYNK Me

Movie tip:  Karen and I took our visiting teenaged nephew to see Edge of Tomorrow, starring Tom Cruise. Hysterically entertaining. Appropriate for teens (scary monsters but no gore), and gripping for adults!

There was a 1982 movie called The Scarlet Pimpernel (from the 1905 novel by Baroness Emma Orczy) in which the dashing protagonist Percival Blakeney (played by Anthony Andrews in the film) goes around saying, “Sink me!” with a lilting accent. Great movie.

I thought of it when this week’s theme came to us through alert reader Emily Walt at Carbonite, who first gave us a salacious peek at a firm burning up the pink sheets:  CYNK Technology (OTCMKTS:CYNK).

Most of you may now know that CYNK rose from nothing to $6 billion between June 17 and July 10, a return of 20,000%. Last Friday the SEC abruptly halted trading, with market cap still at $4 billion.

The pink sheets or the grey market, or what used to be called the OTC market, should not be confused with “over the counter,” which often refers to shares on the Nasdaq or securities trading between brokers. This is the market where standards are loose and risk is high.

CYNK Technology is run by a guy in Belize. This one fellow is listed as CEO, President, CFO, Board Secretary and the only director. SEC documents suggest the company has no revenues and no real business plan and few if any assets.

But something got folks going and it seems the germinating seed was the suggestion that the company’s website offers introductions to celebrities for a fee.  It aims, we gather, to be the social networking site where common everyday dweebs and goofballs can meet Johnny Depp and Angelina Jolie. (more…)