Tagged: credit

Short-Term Borrowing

Half the volume in the stock market is short – borrowed. Why?

It’s the more remarkable because stocks since late December have delivered an epic momentum rebound. A 15% gain is a good year. Half the sectors in the market were up 15% in just the last 25 trading days.

Yet amid the stampede from the depths of the December correction, short volume, the amount of daily trading on borrowed shares, rose rather than fell, and remains 48%.  That means if daily dollar-volume is $250 billion, $120 billion is borrowed stock.

What difference does it make? We’ve written before that the stock market now has characteristics of a credit market.  That is, if lending is responsible for half the volume, the market depends on short-term loans rather than long-term investment.

And share-borrowing, credit, will give the market a false appearance of liquidity.

Think about the sudden and massive December declines that included the worst-ever points-loss for the Dow Jones Industrial Average.  Was that a liquidity problem? Does a V-shaped recovery signal a liquidity problem?

Before the Dodd-Frank financial legislation, large banks might carry a supply of shares to meet the needs of customers, especially stocks covered by equity research.

With rigid value-at-risk regulations now, banks don’t hold inventory.  The supply chain for the stock market has shifted to proprietary fast traders, which don’t carry inventory either. They borrow it.

We define liquidity as the number of shares that can be traded before the price changes.  Prior to electronic markets, trade-sizes were ten times larger than today.  The mean trade-size the last five days was 181 shares, or about $13,500 against an average market price of $74.61.

But a few liquid stocks skew the average.  AAPL’s liquidity is over $23,000, its average trade-size. WMT is the average, about $13,000. GIS is half that, about $6,800.

AAPL is also 57% short – over half its liquidity is borrowed.  And AAPL is used as collateral by 270 Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs). Related?

(Side note: Why would AAPL be used more than other stocks in an index if ETFs are tracking an index? Because ETFs only use a sample, often the biggest stocks that are liquid and easy to borrow.)

These three elements – fast traders, high borrowing levels, ETFs – are intertwined and they create risks of inflation and deflation in stocks that bear no correlation to fundamentals.

The market, as we’ve said before, always reflects its primary purposes. If the parties supplying the market with shares are borrowing them, they have an economic interest that will compete with the objectives of those buying shares as an equity investment.

Second, borrowing is a back-office brokerage function. With massive short-term securities lending, the back office becomes as important as the cash equities desk. And it’s a loan business, a credit market (a point made by the insightful academics comprising the Bogan family).

And ETFs? If you want to know how they work, read our white paper. ETFs are not pooled investments. They are collateralized stock substitutes. Derivatives.

Collateral is something you find in a credit market. ETF collateralization, the wholesale market where ETF shares are created and redeemed, is a staggering $400 billion per month in US equities, says the Investment Company Institute.

It’s cheap and easy for brokers to borrow the shares of a basket of stocks and supply them as collateral to the Blackrocks of the world (does Blackrock then loan them out, perpetuating the cycle?) for the right to create and sell ETF shares (or provide them to a hedge-fund customer wanting to short the whole Technology sector).

And how about the reverse? Brokers can borrow ETF shares and return them to Blackrock to receive collateral – stocks and/or cash that Blackrock puts in the redemption basket to offer in-kind for ETF shares.

These are the mechanics of the stock market.  It works well if there’s little volatility – much like the short-term commercial paper market that froze catastrophically during the financial crisis.

We are not predicting doom. We are highlighting structural risks investors and public companies should understand. The stock market depends for prices and liquidity on short-term borrowing. In periods of volatility, that dependency will amplify moves.

In extreme cases, it’s possible the stock market could seize up not through investor panic but because short-term borrowing may freeze.

How might we see that risk? Behavioral volatility. When the movement of money becomes frantic behind prices and volume where only a few firms like ours can see it, market volatility tends to follow (as Sept 2018 behaviors presaged October declines).

Currently, behavioral volatility is muted ahead of the Fed meeting concluding today, loads of earnings, and jobs data Friday. It can change on a dime.

A Credit Market

In the stock market the beatings have been consistent while we all wait for morale to improve. What’s causing it?

I’m surprised conservatives haven’t blamed midterm elections. Alert reader Pat Davidson in Wisconsin notes CNBC viewers say tariffs, global economic weakness and Fed rate-hikes are behind the stock swoon.

Is it a coincidence that these are what the media talk about most?

I think stocks are down because of market structure. Exchange Traded Funds infect them with characteristics of a credit market.

The big hand pelting backsides of stocks has been uneven. Broad measures have corrected off highs. I tallied the FAANGs (FB, AMZN, AAPL, NFLX, GOOG) and they’re down 20-40% from peaks. Same with small-caps.

We last week launched our Sector Insights reports that compile readings on composite stocks by sector. Surveying them, only one, Communications Services, showed recent Active buying. The rest were uniformly beset by ETFs. As was the broad market. ETFs were favoring Utilities and shedding everything else.

Two sectors had positive Sentiment, Real Estate and Utilities, but both were in retreat. Financials and Industrials were tied for worst Sentiment at 2.2/10.0.

Note that Monday, Real Estate and Utilities were the worst performers, down nearly 4%. Financials and Industrials were best, down less than the rest.

The point is that our measures are quantitative. They are not rational factors like tariffs, global economic weakness, or Fed rate-hikes. Yet they accurately and consistently predict what stocks, sectors and the market will do, short-term.

Therefore, the cause for much of the short-term behavior in stocks cannot be rational.

Sure, we’ve written about our expectation that a strong dollar would be deflationary for commodities and risk assets. Inflation is low interest rates. Excess availability of capital fostered by artificially depressed costs. It’s not rising prices. When excess availability vanishes, prices fall regardless of whether they first rose.

The Federal Reserve has removed nearly $1 trillion from its balance sheet and excess reserves through policies, which translates on a reserve-ratio basis to a reduction in capital of roughly $8-10 trillion. That will deflate prices.

But the problem isn’t deflation. It’s the inflation that preceded it. Fed, are you listening?  How about not creating inflation in response to crises? How about instead letting things that should fail do so by setting rates high and accepting only good collateral? Then human creativity can restore productivity, and economies can soar anew.

A financial instrument that extends reach to an asset class is a form of credit.  Credit creates bubbles that collapse when the extension of credit is curtailed.

Let’s use the Healthcare sector as an example. Year to date, Healthcare before Friday was the top-performing sector (now eclipsed by Utilities, up nearly 8%). From Nov 15-Dec 3, comparative performance for the sector was positive.

Suddenly in December the sector fell apart, with the red tide coming on green and purple bars, signaling ETFs.  It happened before JNJ plunged 14%. The credit bubble burst.

ETFs are a form of credit. Blackrock itself describes ETFs as a tool that equalizes supply with demand. ETFs are collateralized substitutes for buying and selling stocks. They offer artificially low costs. They permit elastic supplies of money to chase finite US shares.

The result on the way up is soaring equities. The consequence on the way down is collapsing stocks.

Here’s an analogy. Suppose you have a line of credit on your house and you buy something with it – say a vacation home.  Your capacity to borrow derives from the rising value of your house, which in turn is driven by demand for homes around you.

What if banks extending credit are out of lending capacity and lift rates?  Suddenly, demand for houses around yours declines. Home prices begin to fall. The value of your house drops.

And the bank that extended credit to you becomes concerned and wants more collateral.

Suppose that’s happening in the wholesale market where ETFs are created and redeemed. It far outstrips any other form of fund-flows — $4 trillion already this year through November (estimated), $400 billion per month.

If the value of the collateral used to create ETF shares – stocks – is of indefinite and unpredictable and falling value, the capacity to extend credit collapses. And prices start falling everywhere.  Those who borrowed must sell assets to cover obligations.

What if that’s the cause, not the economy or tariffs? That should matter to pundits, investors and investor-relations professionals (and CEOs by extension).

We have the data. Use it. We expect markets to jump Dec 19-21 through the final expirations period of 2018. But it’s a credit market subject to credit shocks.