Tagged: Volatility

On the Skids

If electoral processes lack the drama to satisfy you, check the stock market.

Intraday volatility has been averaging 4%. The pandemic has so desensitized us to gyrations that what once was appalling (volatility over 2%) is now a Sunday T-shirt.

Who cares?

Public companies, your market-cap can change 4% any given day. And a lot more, as we saw this week.  And traders, how or when you buy or sell can be the difference between gains and losses.

So why are prices unstable?

For one, trade-size is tiny.  In 1995, data show orders averaged 1,600 shares. Today it’s 130 shares, a 92% drop.

The exchanges shout, “There’s more to market quality!”

Shoulder past that obfuscating rhetoric. Tiny trades foster volatility because the price changes more often.

You follow?  If the price was $50 per share for 1,600 shares 25 years ago, and today it’s $50 for 130 shares, then $50.02 for 130 shares, then $49.98 for 130 shares, then $50.10 for 130 shares – and so on – the point isn’t whether the prices are pennies apart.

The point is those chasing pennies love this market and so become vast in it. But they’re not investors.  About 54% of current volume comes from that group (really, they want hundredths of pennies now).

Anything wrong with that?

Public companies, it demolishes the link between your story and your stock. You look to the market for what investors think. Instead it’s an arbitrage gauge. I cannot imagine a more impactful fact.

Traders, you can’t trust prices – the very thing you trade. (You should trade Sentiment.)

But wait, there’s more.

How often do you use a credit or debit card?  Parts of the world are going cashless, economies shifting to invisible reliance on a “middle man,” somebody always between the buying or selling.

I’m not knocking the merits of digital exchange. I’m reading Modern Monetary Theory economist Stephanie Kelton’s book, The Deficit Myth.  We can talk about credit and currency-creation another time when we have less stuff stewing our collective insides.

We’re talking about volatility. Why stocks like ETSY and BYND were halted on wild swings this week despite trading hundreds of millions of dollars of stock daily.

Sure, there were headlines. But why massive moves instead of, say, 2%?

The stock market shares characteristics with the global payments system.  Remember the 2008 financial crisis? What worried Ben Bernanke, Tim Geithner and Hank Paulson to grayness was a possibility the plumbing behind electronic transactions might run dry.

Well, about 45% of US stock volume is borrowed. It’s a payments system. A cashless society. Parties chasing pennies don’t want to own things, and avoid that by borrowing. Covering borrowing by day’s end makes you Flat, it’s called.

And there are derivatives. Think of these as shares on a layaway plan.  Stuff people plan to buy on time but might not.

Step forward to Monday, Nov 9. Dow up 1700 points to start. It’s a massive “rotation trade,” we’re told, from stay-at-home stocks to the open-up trade.

No, it was a temporary failure of the market’s payments system. Shorting plunged, dropping about 4% in a day, a staggering move across more than $30 trillion of market-cap. Derivatives trades declined 5% as “layaways” vanished.  That’s implied money.

Bernanke, Geithner and Paulson would have quailed.

Think of it this way. Traders after pennies want prices to change rapidly, but they don’t want to own anything. They borrow stock and buy and sell on layaway.  They’re more than 50% of volume, and borrowing is 45%, derivatives about 13%.

There’s crossover – but suppose that’s 108% of volume – everything, plus more.

That’s the grease under the skids of the world’s greatest equity market.

Lower it by 10% – the drop in short volume and derivatives trades. The market can’t function properly. Metal meets metal, screeching. Tumult ensues.

These payment seizures are routine, and behind the caroming behavior of markets. It’s not rational – but it’s measurable.  And what IS rational can be sorted out, your success measures amid the screaming skids of a tenuous market structure.

Your board and exec team need to know the success measures and the facts of market function, both. They count on you, investor-relations professionals. You can’t just talk story and ESG. It’s utterly inaccurate. We can help.

Traders, without market structure analytics, you’re trading like cavemen. Let us help.

By the way, the data do NOT show a repudiation of Tech. It’s not possible. Tech sprinkled through three sectors is 50% of market-cap. Passive money must have it.

No need for all of us to be on the skids.  Use data.  We have it.

-Tim Quast

Placid

The data are more placid than the people.

When next we write, elections will be over. We may still be waiting for the data but we’ll have had an election. Good data is everything.  Story for another time.

The story now is how’s money behaving before The Big Vote? Depends what’s meant by “behave.” The Wall Street Journal wrote for weeks that traders saw election turmoil:

-Aug 16:  “Traders Brace for Haywire Markets Around Presidential Election.” 

-Sep 27: “Investors Ramp Up Bets on Market Turmoil Around Election.”

-Oct 3: “Investors Can Take Refuge from Election Volatility.”

Then the WSJ’s Gunjan Banerji wrote yesterday (subscription required) that volatility bets have turned bearish – now “low vol” rather than higher volatility. Markets see a big Biden stimulus coming.

It’s a probable political outcome.

However.

The shift in bets may be about prices, not outcomes.  When there is a probability somebody will pay you more for a volatility bet than you paid somebody else for it, bets on volatility soar.  It hits a nexus and reverses. Bets are ends unto themselves.

On Oct 26, S&P Global Market Intelligence offered a view titled, “Hedging costs surge as investors brace for uncertain election outcome.”

It says costs for hedges have soared. And further, bets on dour markets are far more pronounced in 2021, implying to the authors that the market fears Covid19 resurgence more than election outcomes.

Two days, two diametric opposites.

There’s the trouble. Behaviors are often beheld, not beatified.

One of our favorite targets here in the Market Structure Map, as you longtime readers know, is the propensity among observers to treat all options action as rational. The truth is 90% of options expire unused because they are placeholders, bets on how prices change, substitutes. They don’t mean what people think.

S&P Global says the cost of S&P 500 puts has risen by 50% ahead of the election. Yet it also notes the open interest ratio – difference between the amount contracts people want to create versus the number they want to close out – is much higher in 2021 than it is around the election.

The put/call ratio can be nothing more than profiting on imbalances. And what behavior is responsible for an imbalance, valid or not? Enter Market Structure Analytics, our forte.  You can’t look at things like volume, prices, open interest, cost, etc., in a vacuum.

Let me explain. Suppose we say, “There is a serious national security threat from a foreign nation.”

Well, if the foreign nation is Switzerland, we laugh. It’s neutral. Has been for eons.  If it’s China or Iran, hair stands up.

Context matters. I said the behaviors were more placid than the people. I mean the voters are more agitated than the money in US equities.

Standard deviation – call it degree of change – is much higher in the long-run data for all behaviors, by 20% to more than 130%, than in October or the trailing 30 trading days back before September options-expirations.

Meaning? Eye of the beholder. Could be nothing. Could mean money sees no change.

Remember, there are four reasons, not one, for why money buys or sells. Investment, asset-allocation, speculation, taking or managing risk. None of these shares an endpoint.

Active money is the most agitated and even it is subdued. But it’s sold more than bought since Sep 2.  I think it means people read the stuff other people write and become fearful. It’s not predictive.

The other three behaviors show diminished responsiveness.  Yes, even risk management.

I could read that to mean the machines that do things don’t see anything changing.  The machines may be right in more ways than one! The more things change, the more they stay the same.

One thing I know for sure. I’ve illustrated how headlines don’t know what’s coming.  It’s why investor-relations and investment alike should not depend on them.

The data, however, do know.  And every investor, every public company, should be metering behavior, be it volatile or placid. We have that data.  I just told you what it showed.

Now, we’ll see what it says.

Oh, and this is placid to me, the Yampa River in CO, anytime of the year, and this is Oct 27, 2020.

Vahlcue

You’re wondering what the heck “vahlcue” is. It was up almost 4% in the last hour yesterday as stocks tipped off the diving board.

Meanwhile, cue fall.  The photo at right reminds us that today is a consequence of yesterday. Autumn follows summer. In the Flat Tops near Steamboat, fall flames as summer smolders out.

In the stock market, cue volatility.  Pursuing “vol,” as the traders call it, is big business. It’s everything that depends on an implied price, such as the VIX index tracking implied volatility over the next 30 days in the S&P 500.  It’s priced from options on the index, which in turn is comprised of futures.

Got that?  Volatility is the implied price of an implied price, gleaned from other implied prices.  All instruments derived from implied prices are ways to trade volatility – gaps between rising and falling prices.

Cue intro music.

The Nasdaq, in concert with the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), launched the VOLQ this past Monday, Oct 5, another way to play volatility.

I assume it’s pronounced “vahlcue.”

VOLQ is a futures contract reflecting the implied volatility of the Nasdaq-100, the NDX. It employs a methodology developed by Nations Indexes, innovator in volatility products that isolates the implied volatility of at-the-money options.

Ready to run a power drill through the palm of your hand to stay awake?  If you want intricate details about how it works and how it’s calculated, you can read more.

I’ve got a specific purpose.

VOLQ, like the VIX, is a futures contract derived from options on underlying stocks – three steps from the asset.  It’s a particular set of both put and call options designed to get to the volatility of instruments priced the same as the futures contract, called at-the-money options.

Have you moved on from drilling a hole in your hand to braining yourself on a brick wall?

Here’s the point. Derivatives have proliferated in the stock market. All derivatives are a right but not an obligation.  As such, the propensity to quit them is much higher than one finds in the actual asset.

Famed hedge-fund manager Lee Cooperman, whom I interviewed in the plenary session of the 2019 NIRI Annual Conference, back when humans gathered innocently, lamented in a CNN interview that stock indexes shouldn’t gap 50 points in a matter of minutes.

He blamed trading machines, the rapid-fire intermediaries setting prices. And he’s right.  But the more trading chases products that are rights but not obligations, ways to pursue changing prices, the more heightened the risk of sudden lurches.

Why? All layers of options and futures are forms of implied supply or demand.  But the moment prices move, those layers become ethereal, dissolving in an instant like those animated transitions you can put in you Powerpoint slide deck.

And the more people pursue the gaps rather than the assets, the greater the assets can be blighted by sudden lurches.  Realize VOLQ is just another clip for the automatic weapons in the Nasdaq’s volatility arsenal that already includes e-Minis and micro e-Minis on the Nasdaq 100.

The first e-Mini S&P 500 futures contract began trading in 1997 and was 20% the size of the standard contract.  Micro e-Minis are a tenth of the e-Mini, 2% of the original contract.  And you can trade options on Micro e-Mini futures too.  We wrote about them in August.

Markets keep migrating away from size, away from the core asset, toward tiny, uncommitted bets and hedges comprised of multi-layered derivatives.

It’s great for the firms selling the products.  But it makes volatility accessible to the masses.  And the masses don’t understand it. And the more the masses are exposed to things that vanish, the more given to wild swings become the underlying assets.

Sure, derivatives can work well.  VOLQ was the right play today.  Traders can hedge exposure to sudden market moves, play the probability of profits in snap swings.

But the consequence is a market that cannot be trusted.

Market Structure Analytics help one survive it. Everybody should have baseline market-structure metrics.

The market is likely to rebound, data say. But this lurch manifested a week ago – much of implied volatility is predicated on weekly options – when the sector data looked ragged to us.  Sure enough it was.  Blame volatility and its instruments. Cue the exit music.

Volatile Liquid

There’s a beer in this for you.  A glass of rosé from Provence if you prefer.

What’s the most liquid stock in the US market?

I’m writing this after the virtual happy hour for the NIRI Big I Conference (it’s a strong event, and you can catch Day Two and our wrap-up today that I’ll take part in), which of course makes one think of beverages. Liquid. Virtual drinks are no match for the real thing, nor is false liquidity in stocks.

Let’s lay the groundwork.  Stock exchanges describe market quality as low spreads.  Spreads have never been tighter, they say, and costs for trading were never lower.

Heck, you can trade for free. That’s about as inexpensive as it gets. So, is a low-cost, low-spread stock market a quality and liquid place?

Depends what you mean.  The market doesn’t fail often. Yes, we’ve recorded nearly 13,000 volatility halts since Mar 9.  Remember all the marketwide pauses that month? Still, it didn’t quit operating.

The Nasdaq just corrected – dropped 10% – in three days. And rebounded as fast. It highlights the importance of the definition of “quality.”

Which leads back to liquidity, and by extension, volatility. All three words ending in “y” are related.

Let’s begin with what liquidity is not.  Volume. Liquidity, bluntly, is the amount of a thing that will trade before the price changes. Put an offer on a house.  What’s the spread between the price you’d pay, and the last that somebody else paid?

I’ve just debunked the idea that low spreads reflect quality.  For the seller, a high spread is a reflection of quality.

Low spreads help parties with short horizons.  If my investment horizon is 250 milliseconds, a spread of a penny is wildly attractive. How many pennies can I make, in how many different issues, every quarter-second?

But if my horizon is more than a day, a wider spread reflects higher quality.  How come stock exchanges don’t mention that?

Let’s go one step further. To me, the measures we traditionally look to for guidance about market quality need revamping. For instance, beta, a measure of volatility, has the same flaws as our current economic measures of inflation.  Beta measures how a stock moves from close to close in relation to the market.

Terrible measure of market quality.  WMT, for instance has a beta score of 0.19, 20% of the volatility of the market. Yet its intraday volatility the past 20 days is 2.9%. The S&P 500 is 2.7% volatile over the same time (intraday high and low).

WHEN an investor buys during the day could in theory be nearly 3% different from somebody else’s price.  And WMT, contradicting beta, is not a fifth as volatile as the market but 7% more volatile.

The truth is low spreads PROMOTE frequent price-changes, which is the definition of volatility. The parties driving low trading spreads are ensuring volatility. Creating it.  And telling us it signals market quality.

They mean well. But good intentions pave roads to oblivion.

(Editorial note: Inflation isn’t the rate at which prices increase. It’s whether you can buy things.  All over the economy, people now buy on credit. Debt has exploded. That’s the evidence of inflation. Not the Fed’s equivalent of beta.)

And liquidity isn’t volume. That’s confusing busy with productive. Volume is stuff changing hands. Liquidity is how MUCH of it changes hands.  The most liquid stock in the market is AMZN (not counting BRK.A, a unique equity), at $70,000 per trade.

The mean component of the S&P 500 trades about $17,000 at a time.  But here’s the kicker. Just 50 companies, 10% of the index, trade MORE than $17,000 per trade. That’s the list from AMZN to DPZ. Everybody else trades less.

Including now, AAPL. It used to be in the top ten. Now it’s 146th post-split, trading about $12,000 per transaction on average.  TSLA was top five but post-split is now 49th at $17,600, well behind 32nd-ranked MSFT at $20,100.

Splits don’t foster liquidity. They breed volume. And price-changes. Volatility. We’re not anti-split. We’re anti-volatility, which increases risk for investors and the cost of capital for companies.

Why does the market promote one at the expense of the other? It’s a question owed an answer. All investors, every public company, should know liquidity. We have the data.

Roll Call

Apr 21, yesterday, is Texas A&M Aggie Muster.  Aggies everywhere gather to say “here” for Aggies lost in the past year, a roll call. It’s more poignant this time for my Aggie, Karen, and the many friends and family hailing from College Station.  Gig’em, Aggies.

Speaking of Texas, let’s talk oil.  We’ve been saying for years that volatility during the next crisis, whenever it came, would be exacerbated by Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) and lead to large failures.  It’s now happened in oil, which freakishly settled Monday at $37 below zero.

Oil prices are predicated in the USA on futures contracts for West Texas Intermediate (WTI). Overflowing storage facilities mean few parties want to take delivery of oil. That pressures prices.

But oil isn’t worth nothing. It’s not worth less than nothing. That futures went south of zero is a product of the supply/demand distortions ETFs introduce.

Futures are themselves derivatives that obligate one to action only if held to settlement. ETF investors are not buying barrels of oil. They’re buying the PRICE of oil.

But they’re really buying derivatives that represent derivatives that represent the price of oil.  The massive oil ETF, USO (always among the most active stocks, it yesterday traded a billion shares, one of every twelve, leading the market), currently claims assets of $3 billion comprised heavily of June and July WTI contracts.  It’s down 80% in a year.

We’ve explained before that ETFs work similarly to, say, buying poker chips.  You pay cash to the house and receive chips of equal value. The chips represent the cash.  The difference with ETFs is there’s an intermediary between you and the house.

So the intermediary, the broker, pays the house for the chips and sells them to you.  Suppose the intermediary, the broker, gave energy futures as payment for the chips, rather than cash.

Then the value of the futures plunged. ETFs compound the damage. The broker is out the value of it collateral, futures, and you’re out the value of your chips, which also collapse.

The broker may stop transacting in the ETF because it’s out a lot of money. Now you can’t find a buyer – and you suffer even more damage.

This happened.  Interactive Brokers said it lost $88 million, its portion of the excess losses by its customers, some of whom lost everything in their accounts. The firm’s CEO said in a CNBC interview yesterday it had exposure to about 15% of the May WTI futures contracts behind the damage, meaning some $500 million more exists.

And the damage yesterday to the June WTI contract, the next in the series, was as impactful.  Massive Singapore futures broker Hin Leong, which moves physical commodities, filed for bankruptcy. It had been in business since 1963.

Banks most exposed to Hin Leong’s billions in obligations:  HSBC and ABN Amro.  We’ve long said we thought HSBC was a counterparty at risk in a financial crisis, on exposure to derivatives.  ABN Amro lost big already, on Ronin Capital’s March failure.

The biggest derivatives counterparties though are all names you know: JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, BofA, Citi (which has vastly more derivatives exposure via swaps than anyone).  They may be fine – but the world relies on these firms to make every meaningful market, from helping the Fed, to trading ETFs.

We’re leaving out a key piece of the story. The big way ETFs cause trouble is by distorting the market’s perception of supply and demand. In 2008, securitized mortgage derivatives bloated the appearance of demand for real estate.

USO owned some 25% of the subject oil futures contract. Yes, we’ve got too much oil (remember peak oil? Cough, cough.) because travel died. Sure, we know supply exceeds demand.

But.

Demand from derivatives of derivatives is extended reach to an asset class – which inflates its price.  I submit:  WTI May futures traded to -$37 Apr 20 because ETFs grossly inflated the price despite its apparent weakness. When books were squared and inflationary “financial” demand from ETFs removed, oil was worth 200% less than zero.

Said another way, when money in ETFs not wanting to take delivery of oil didn’t even want its price, we discovered that demand implied in futures misrepresented reality.

Thank you, ETFs.

Barclays shuttered two oil instruments. A dozen more are at risk.  USO is at risk. The roll call of the threatened is lengthening.

Where else are ETFs inflating prices relative to underlying demand? Well, the greatest instance of asset-class extension is in US equities. Especially the FAANGs – FB, AAPL, AMZN, NFLX, GOOG (and the pluses are MSFT, AMD, TSLA, a handful of others).

These bellwethers have weathered better than the rest in a global shutdown.  But they all depend on consumer-discretionary income. People have to be working to pay for subscriptions, and businesses must be operating to spend advertising dollars.

The drums are drumming. I expect we’ll see some even more surprising ETF failures before the roll call is done.  The sooner we’re back to work, the quicker the drumbeat ends.

Epiphany

DoubleLine’s famed Jeff Gundlach says we’ll take out March lows in stocks because the market is dysfunctional.

Karen and I have money at DoubleLine through managed accounts with advisors.  Mr. Gundlach is a smart man. Maybe it’s splitting hairs if I say the stock market isn’t dysfunctional but reflecting its inherent structural risks.

We know as much as anyone including Mr. Gundlach about market mechanics. And I still learn new stuff daily.  Matter of fact, I had an epiphany over the weekend. I compared market behaviors during the Great 2020 Market Correction.

Wow is that something to see.  We might host a webcast and share it.  If you’re interested, let us know.

Over the past decade, the effort to produce returns with lower risk has spread virally in the US stock market.  Call it alpha if you like, getting more than you’re risking.  Hedge funds say it’s risk-adjusted return.

The aim is to protect, or insure, everything against risk, as we everyday people do. We protect our homes, cars, lives, appliances, even our entertainment expenditures, against risk by paying someone to replace them (save for our lives, where beneficiaries win at our loss).

Stock traders try to offset the cost of insurance by profitably transacting in insured assets. That’s the holy grail.  No flesh wounds, no farts in our general direction (for you Monty Python fans).

It works this way. Suppose your favorite stock trades for $20 and you’re a thousand shares long – you own 1,000 shares. For protection, you buy 20 puts, each for 50 shares. You’re now long and short a thousand shares.

If the stock rises, the value of your puts shrinks but you’re up. If the stock declines, your long position diminishes but your puts are worth more.  Say the stock rises to $23. The value of your puts declines, making you effectively long 1,300 shares, short 700.

To generate alpha (I’m simplifying, leaving out how options may decrease in value near expiration, the insurance-renewal date, so to speak), you need to offset the cost of insurance. With a good model built on intraday volatility, you can trade the underlying stock for 20 days, buying high and selling low, going long or short, to mitigate costs.

Everybody wins. Your counterparty who sold you the puts makes money.  You make money trading your favorite stock. You have no fear of risk. And because more money keeps coming into stocks via 401ks and so on, even the losers get lucky (thank you Tom Petty, rest in peace, for that one).

One big reason this strategy works is the rules.  Regulation National Market System requires all stocks to trade at a single daily average price in effect. Calculating averages in a generally rising market is so easy even the losers can do it.

Now, what would jack this model all to hell?

A virus (frankly the virus is an excuse but time fails me for that thesis today).

Understand this:  About 80% of all market volume was using this technique. Quants did it. Active hedge funds. Fast Traders. Exchange-Traded Funds (ETF) market-makers.

Big volatility doesn’t kill this strategy. It slaughters the parties selling insurance. Observers are missing this crucial point. Most active money didn’t sell this bear turn.  We can see it.  Again, a story for later via webcast if you’re interested.

What died in the great 2020 Coronavirus Correction was the insurance business.

Casualties litter the field. The biggest bond ETFs on the planet swung wildly in price. Big banks like Dutch giant ABN Amro took major hits. Twenty-six ETFs backed by derivatives failed. The list of ETFs ceasing the creation of new units keeps growing and it’s spilling into mainstream instruments. Going long or short ETFs is a fave hedge now.

The Chicago Mercantile Exchange auctioned the assets of a major high-speed trader that sold insurance, Ronin Capital (around since 2006. If its balance sheet and leverage can be believed, it may have imputed a loss of $500 billion to markets.

Just one firm. How many others, vastly bigger, might be at risk?

Forget stock-losses. Think about how funds mitigate volatility. How they generate alpha. We’ve been saying for years that if the market tips over, what’s at risk is whatever has been extended through derivatives. ETFs are derivatives. That’s 60% of volume.

And now key market-makers for stocks, bonds, ETFs, derivatives, commodities, currencies, are tied up helping the Federal Reserve. Including Blackrock. They can’t be all things to all people at once.

The market isn’t dysfunctional.  It’s just designed to function in ways that don’t work if insurance fails. And yes, I guess that that’s dysfunctional. That was my epiphany.

I’ll conclude with an observation. We shouldn’t shut down our economy. Sweden didn’t. This is their curve. Using a population multiplier, their curve is 27% better than ours – without shutting down the economy, schools, restaurants. We are the land of the free, the home of the brave. Not the land of those home, devoid of the brave. I think it’s time to put property rights, inalienable rights, above the government’s presumption of statist power.

Many Tiny Trades

All 20 biggest points-losses for Dow Jones Industrials (DJIA) stocks in history have occurred under Regulation National Market System.

And 18 occurred from 2018-2020. Fifteen of the 20 biggest points-gains are in the last two years too, with all save one, in Mar 2000, under Reg NMS (2007-present).

It’s more remarkable against the backdrop of the Great Depression of the 1930s when the DJIA traded below 100, even below 50, versus around 20,700 now and small moves would be giant percentage jumps. Indeed, fifteen of the twenty biggest percentage gains occurred between 1929-1939. But four are under Reg NMS including yesterday’s 11.4% jump, 4th biggest all-time.

Just six of the biggest points-losses are under Reg NMS (we wrote this about the rule). But ranked second is Mar 16, 2020. And 19 of the 20 most volatile days on record – biggest intraday moves – were in the last two years, and all are under Reg NMS.

Statistically, these concentrated volatility records are anomalous and say what’s extant now in markets promotes volatility.  Our market is stuffed full of many tiny trades.

Volume the past five days has averaged 9.9 million shares per mean S&P 500 component, up 135% from the 200-day average.  But intraday volatility is up nearly 400%, trade-size measured in dollars is down 30%.

That’s why we’re setting volatility records. The definition of volatility is unstable prices.

I’m delighted as I’m sure CVX is that the big energy company led DJIA gainers yesterday, rising 22%.  But stocks shouldn’t post an excellent annual return in a day.

CVX liquidity metrics (volume is not liquidity!) show the same deterioration we see in the S&P 500, with intraday volatility up 400%, trade-size down 47%, daily trades up over 240% to 196,000 daily versus long-run average of about 57,000.

Doing way more of the same thing in tiny pieces means intermediaries get paid at the expense of investors.

Every stock by law must trade between the best national visible (at exchanges) bid to buy and offer to sell.  When volatility rises, big investors lose ability to buy and sell efficiently, because prices are constantly changing.

Regulators and exchanges have tried to deal with extraordinary volatility by halting trading.  We’ve tracked more than 7,500 individual trading halts in stocks since Mar 9 – twelve trading days.  Marketwide circuit breakers have repeatedly tripped.

Volatility has only worsened.

In financial crises, we inject liquidity to stabilize prices.  We can do the same in stocks by suspending the so-called “Trade Through Rule” requiring that stocks trade at a single best price, if the market is more than 5% volatile.

Trade size would jump, permitting big investors to move big money, returning confidence and stability to prices. We’ve proposed it three times to the SEC now.

Investors and public companies need to understand if the market is working. Let’s define “working.” The simplest measure is liquidity, which is not volume but dollars per trade, the amount one can buy or sell before price changes.  By that measure, the market has failed utterly during this tumult.

Let’s insist on a market capable of burstable bandwidth, so to speak, to handle surges.  Suspending Rule 611 of Reg NMS during stress is a logical strategy for the next time.

Let’s finish today by channeling the biblical apostles, who came to Jesus asking what would be the sign of the end of the age?  Here, we want to know what the sign is that market tumult is over.

At the extremities, no model can predict outcomes.  But given the nature of the market today and the behaviors dominating it, the rules governing it, we can inform ourselves.

This market crisis commenced Feb 24, the Monday when new marketwide derivatives traded for March expiration.  In the preceding week, demand for derivatives declined 5% at the same time Market Structure Sentiment topped.

We had no idea how violent the correction would be. But these signals are telling and contextual. They mean derivatives play an enormous role.

We had massive trouble with stocks right through the entire March cycle, which concluded Mar 20 with quad-witching.  Monday, new derivatives for April expiration began trading.

It’s a new clock, a reset to the timer.

You longtime clients know we watch Counterparty Tuesday, the day in the cycle when banks square the ledger around new and expired derivatives. That was yesterday.

That the market surged means supply undershot demand. And last week Risk Mgmt rose by 5% and was the top behavior – trades tied to derivatives, insurance, leverage. Shorting fell to the lowest sustained level in years. Market Structure Sentiment bottomed.

It’s a near-term nadir. The risk is that volatility keeps the market obsessed with changing the prices, which is arbitrage. Exchange Traded Funds depend on arbitrage (and led the surge in CVX).  Fast Traders do too. Bets on derivatives do.

The tumult ends in my view when big arbitragers quit, letting investment behavior briefly prevail.  We’ll see it. We haven’t yet.  The market may rise fast and fall suddenly again.

The End

In crises I think of Winston Churchill who said, “This is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.”

Let’s start now with lessons from a health crisis that became a market crisis and proceeded to an economic crisis.

This last leg is yet murky but with hotels at 15% occupancy and the great American service industry at a standstill in an economy 70% dependent on consumption, it’s big.

First, the stock market. Intraday volatility in the S&P 500 averaged 10% the past week – a daily market correction between mean high and low prices by component.

Volatility is unstable prices, and big money needs stability to move. If the market exists for public companies and investors, it has served them poorly. Short-term machines have dominated. Investors were unable to get in or out without convulsing the whole construct of a $30 trillion edifice now smashed a third smaller.

Energy companies should be the first ones knocking at the SEC because the sector was 22% volatile the past week amid losing vast value. Sure, oil prices fell. Should it be the worst month ever for oil? The sector was battered more than in the maw of 2008.

Market structure is the hubris of equities. We’ve said it for years. We warned that Exchange Traded Funds, derivatives, had pervaded it, spreading the viral threat of severe inflation and deflation if stocks and ETFs move in unison.

There’s another basic problem. I’ll give you an analogy. The local grocery store down the street in Steamboat was denuded of wares as though some biblical horde of incisor-infested critters had chewed through it. I guess in a sense it was.

If there’s no lettuce, you can’t buy it. The price of lettuce doesn’t carom though. Demand ceases until supply arrives.

And it did. We later found lettuce, carrots, onions, eggs in abundance, but no limes (drat! A vital gin-and-tonic component).

We bought what they had.

In the stock market as with groceries there is no limitless supply of XOM or AAPL or whatever. But rules permit machines to behave as though lettuce and carrots always exist on the shelves when they don’t (a majority of volume was shorting and Fast Trading the past week – phantom products).

It’s why prices bucked and seized like a blender hucked into a bathtub. Investors would reach a hand for the proverbial lettuce and it would vanish and lettuce prices would scream smoking off like bottle rockets on July 4.

We don’t do that with groceries. Why in stocks? Energy companies, are you happy that machines can manufacture a crisis in your prices (that rhymes) and destroy the bulk of your value in days?

Look at Utilities. Producing energy to heat and cool American homes is vulnerable to tornadoes. Not viruses. Why did a preponderance of Utilities lose half their market capitalization in days – and then get 20% back yesterday?

These are questions every public company, every investor, should ask.

(Here’s what happened: Utilities were overweight – we warned of it! – in “low volatility” investments. Those blew up, taking Utilities with them.)

And they jumped on options bets. Volatility as an asset class lapses today around VIX expirations, and resets. Tomorrow index options expire, Friday is the first quad-witch of 2020. Derivatives have demolished swaths of equity capital like a runaway Transformer in one of those boom-boom superhero movies trampling through a trailer park.

It should be evident to the last market-structure skeptic – whoever you are – that market structure overwhelms reason, fundamentals, financials. If you’re in stocks, you need to get your head around it (we have, removing that burden for you).

If you want to be prepared and informed, ask us. We have a product that will fit your budget and put you in with the – socially distanced – cool kids who make market structure part of the investor-relations and investing processes.

Speaking of social distancing, there are 71 million American millennials (meaningful numbers living paycheck-to-paycheck). Viral mortality rate for them globally: 0%. There are two million hoary heads over 90. Covid-19 mortality is 19% (and most over 80 have chronic medical conditions).

I’m a data guy. How about keeping oldsters out of bars and youngsters out of nursing homes? I don’t mean to be insensitive and I know the concern is healthcare facilities. But destroying the finances of millennials over sequestering the vulnerable is troubling.

Last, central banks once were lenders of LAST resort taking good collateral at high cost. I would be pulling out all stops too, were I leading. I’m casting no aspersions. But governments are funded by people, not the other way around, and cannot carry the freight by idling productive output. That’s cognitively dissonant, intellectually incongruous.

This may be the last time we get away with it. Let’s stop that before it ends us. Find a new plan.

And investors and IR people, understand market structure. This is a beginning. It’ll again roar in our faces with slavering fangs.

Canary Prices

We’ve written of risks in stocks from proliferating Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs).

We’ve talked long about liquidity risks, here last October with CNBC’s Brian Sullivan.

So what, right?

The market has functioned well in this Coronavirus Pandemonium, argue regulators and reporters (WSJ subscription required).

What’s the definition of functioning?  Volume?  You longtime users of Market Structure Analytics rely on them so as not to confuse busy – volume – with productive – liquidity (and to know when story drives price, and doesn’t, and much more).

Refinitiv Lipper says some $20 billion left US equities the week ended Mar 6. Sounds big but it’s 1% of volume.

Add up shorting (borrowed stock) at 45.2% of daily S&P 500 trading the past week, and Fast Trading (machines hyper-trading intraday and ending flat), 53.3% of volume, and it’s 98.5% of market volume but not liquidity.

There’s your 99% (the difference is a rounding error).

This is why you should care about market structure, if you haven’t yet.

Volatility Monday triggered a marketwide stock circuit-breaker halting trading when stocks drop 7%. First time since the rule was implemented in 2013.

Volatility halts also stopped futures trading Monday. Both events derailed reads of VIX volatility, which depend on futures contracts and put/call pricing for freely trading S&P 500 components.

Maybe the VIX was over 100 Monday. We don’t know, as components stopped trading.

What’s more, volatility halts for stocks and ETFs cascaded to more than a thousand Monday and Tuesday, including pauses in large caps like OXY, stopped eight times. I think we surpassed the record-setting currency-driven (as is this) frenzy of Aug 24, 2015.

Many directional ETFs in energy, commodities, market vectors, bonds, leveraged instruments, were halted too.  Volatility halts are coal-mine canaries.

And we’re led to believe investors are panicking over the Coronavirus, and getting out, because markets are working. Anybody but ModernIR writing about volatility halts, paucity of liquidity? Do tell.

Market Structure Analytics exist, public companies and investors, to know what headlines don’t say.

It’s egregious disservice to tell everyone “the market is working great!” when volatility halts explode, most volume is transient trading, and nobody can get in or out.

Canaries falling in waves.

Active Investment declined in the S&P 500 from early Feb until Mar 6 and Mar 9, then ticked up 3% on selling – less than the 5.4% daily intraday volatility (spread between highest and lowest average prices) in components of the S&P 500.

Responding, the market suffered one of its greatest collapses.

People don’t care about insurance – a canary in the coal mine – until it’s needed. And then it’s too late.

Investors and public companies, if you’re lulled by quiescence like last autumn, you’ll be shocked by its departure regardless of the Coronavirus. You shouldn’t be.

ETFs are a principal cause for both market volatility and vanishing liquidity. Investors can sit on stocks – meaning they don’t circulate – and trade ETFs.  When the market lurched, ETF market-makers withdrew, as we’d reasoned from data.

Then investors wanted to sell.

Without the ETFs driving some 67% of trading volume normally, nobody was there to calculate prices. Markets spun crazily like a fighter jet hit by a missile.

And regulators tell us the market is working fine. What about these dying canaries everywhere?

Here is liquidity simply. Trade-size is down to 132 shares in the S&P 500. If you’re an investor trying to sell 100,000 shares, you fill 1% of it and the price gyrates away from you as Fast Traders jump ahead.

Now your pre-trade analytics are wrong. You can pull your trade. Or try to blitzkrieg it in a thousand 100-share trades “at the market,” the best bid.

Wham!

The market implodes a thousand points. Try to buy 10,000 shares and the market skyrockets, rising a thousand points.

Investor-relations people for Energy companies, how do your executives feel about this market?

Technology IR people, what if you’re next?  Tech is the biggest sector. Shorting rose 12% last week in the FAANGs (FB, AAPL, AMZN, GOOG/GOOGL, NFLX) and Active money was selling. FAANGs lead the market up and down. They topped Feb 14, bottomed Mar 3. And now?

(We have the answer. Ask us.)

Investors, is a market that can’t accommodate 1% of the audience into and out of the exits without shuddering the whole stadium and threatening its foundations okay?

Sentiment by our measures is the lowest we’ve ever recorded. Yesterday it was still falling but a day or two from bottom. Uncharted territory, yes. But ModernIR is continuously mapping behaviors, trends, spreads, more.  We have that data, right here.

What if markets zoom? Or don’t?

What’s it worth, public companies and investors, to know what the headlines don’t tell you?  What’s the price of a canary? Ask us. You’ll be surprised.

Beneath the Surface

I don’t think it should be overlooked that “Quants” and “Quasts” differ by only a letter.

Scott Patterson’s 2010 book, The Quants, is a great read.  You’ll be riveted by what was cascading beneath the market’s surface before the financial crisis.  Here’s a taste:

“That Wednesday, what had started as a series of bizarre, unexplainable glitches in quant models turned into a catastrophic meltdown the likes of which had never been seen before in the history of financial markets….

“Oddly, the Bizarro World of quant trading largely masked the losses to the outside world at first, since the stocks they’d shorted were rising rapidly, leading to the appearance of gains on the broader market that balanced out the diving stocks the quants had expected to rise.

“Monday, the Dow Industrials actually gained 287 points. It gained 36 more Tuesday, and another 154 points Wednesday. Everyday investors had no insight into the carnage taking place beneath the surface, the billions in hedge fund money evaporating.”

Key phrase:  Beneath the surface.

What the market appears to be saying may be the opposite of what gurgles in its depths.

It’s why we say price and volume are CONSEQUENCES, not metrics.  What’s causing price or volume to change?  This is the question every public company, every investor, should answer today (we have that data, so there’s no reason to go begging!).

Take the broad market Monday, with the Dow Industrials up 260 points. Cause? Risk Mgmt – counterparties to bets, covering their exposure.

And shorting rose. Yesterday, 47% of all volume marketwide was borrowed – short.  Intraday volatility, the average move from highest to lowest price, is 3%.

That’s 50% of market volume, combined. Can the market sustainably rise if half its volume depends on lower or fluctuating prices?  Well, it’s not impossible. But probability is poor.

High shorting doesn’t mean the market will tank. But short-covering is necessary for shares to rise.  Consider Jan 2018.  Shorting dropped, volatility vanished, stocks surged.

The VIX (coming volatility destroyed two synthetic ETFs), price and volume, gave everyday folks no clue to the looming maw.  But under the surface the gurgling hit a fever pitch. Market Structure Sentiment, our 10-point gauge of price peaks and troughs, topped Jan 19. Behavioral change was a black swan – more than three standard deviations from norms.

Behavioral change is the daily demographic evolution in the money behind price and volume. A surge is a stampede – with delayed effects. Sentiment usually says which way.

On Jan 22, the market’s Chernobyl core melted under a staggering six-standard-deviations move in behaviors.  The market continued to rise. Nobody on CNBC was warning people.

By mid-February, from peak to trough the S&P 500 fell over 10%.

On Sep 19, 2018, Market Structure Sentiment topped weakly, not even regaining 6.0 (the market trades between 4.0-6.0 most of the time).  Black swans crashed through behavioral-change Sep 14-19.  The market kept rising.

Sep 25-28, behavioral-change demolished every record we’d ever seen, cascading daily at an average six standard deviations over norms.  SPY, the S&P 500 ETF, hit 293.58 Oct 1, 2018.  Yesterday it closed at 286.87.

From its Oct 1 zenith to the Dec 24 nadir of 234.34, SPY declined 20.2%.

SPY reached an all-time peak Jul 15, 2019 as Market Structure Sentiment topped just over 6.0. And yup, you guessed it. Black swans flapped in Jul 31 and Aug 1. Another struck Aug 13.

Why has the market become so mathematical? Behaviors.  All trades must occur between the best bid and offer, and the bid must be lower. Somebody can make a half-penny on each side of the trade – the aim of Fast Traders.  Arbitrage.

ETFs have ten TIMES the assets they did in 2008 — $4 trillion in the US alone, the bulk in equities. There’s one ETF for every four companies. ETFs depend on arbitrage for prices.

Derivatives are an arbitrage trade. What is something worth now versus what it might be in the future?  Put these all together.  It’s 87% of volume. The market runs on arbitrage. Continuously differing prices.

It’s transformative to see, beneath the surface, why your stocks behave as they do.  Then what, public companies?  You have a duty to know what the money is doing and to understand when it’s story and when it’s not. That’s a puzzle solved only with data.

Investors, if you’re one day wrong, you can lose your gains.  Data are protection.

When you’re ready to go spelunking, let us know.